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Abstmct 
Contractarians are interested in producing a fundamental justification for 
moral or political institutions. A firndamental justification must both produce: i) 
compelling reasons to adopt, and ii) rely on grounds other than, the moral theory to 
be so justified, Taking instrumental rationality to be independent of any moral theory 
and sufficiently likely to lead to action, contractarians argue that a moral or political 
system is justified by its instrumental value to agents. 
Contractarians have previously relied on a bargaining mode1 of contractarian 
justification, where agents to be bound by a particular set of moral dictates are 
understood as if they are bargaining with each other over which rules to adopt. 1 find 
this unacceptable: no agent could foretell any other agent's worth to him or her in the 
fuhire - which is critical in bargaining theory. Agents do not have prior knowledge 
regarding which d e s  will thereafter govern their interactions, and therefore have no 
way to reliably estimate the ability of each to enhance or detract fiom each other's 
preferences. 
I suggest an alternative. Sumrning each person's preferences over each set of 
rules which might govem interaction, we identiw the set of rules which is thereby 
ranked highest to be justified. This process is also found to be calculable in principle 
(tractable), which is a necessary condition for providing a fundamental justification. 
Nevertheless we do not have sufflcient information at this time to proceed. We do 
not have access to each person's preferences and beliefs regarding the set of moral 
systems. Exploring the iiterature surrounding contractarianism leads us to 
recommend an examination of psychology and economics to attempt to identiG for 
each agent preferences that are of paramount import to that agent. 
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1. The State of Moral Debate 
Patrick and James are having a dispute over the propriety of taxing the better off 
for the purposes of redistributing the revenues gathered to the less fortmate. Patrick 
says, "Look, James, it is cIear that we al1 have a duty to safeguard the dignity of each 
person. Being extremely poor leads to ail kinds of indignities - people don't want to 
even look at you if you7re poor, children mock you and you have to resort to extremely 
degrading behavior in order to survive. Since we have a duty to protect the dignity of 
people, and since being extremely poor is degrading, we must gather resources fiom each 
better off person, and alleviate the indignities suffered by those worse off." 
James shouts, "I'm not even going to bother cataloguing the nurnber of problems 
with that supposed argument! The whole argument is absurd on its face, because we do 
not have a duty to safeguard people's dignity! Al1 we have to do is let people do what 
they want with the stuff that they own as long as it doesn't impede the abilities of others 
to do the sarne!" Pausing to regain his composure, he then continues, "Patrick, please get 
serious. You can't justifi theft by saying you don? want to see poor people treated in 
certain ways - we don't have a duty to maintain people's dignity, you can't prove to me 
that we do, and the reliance upon this duty is too convenient. It proves only what you 
want it to prove, and you can provide me with no reasonable proof that such a duty 
exists." 
Patrick replies, "Well, maybe 1 can't, but you can't prove to me that there isn't 
such a duty." 
James shoots back, "1 don? need to prove it to you. The burden of proof is surely 
on the person who wants me to constrain my behaviors in certain ways." 
Patrick yells, "Well then you can7t prove that I ought to re* fiom taking what 
you own, and giving it to someone else!" 
James yells, "Well it's just obvious, you idiot!" 
* * * * * r(c * 
Kathryn and Anne are having a disagreement regarding whether or not Anne did 
Kathryn wrong. Kathryn wails, "Anne, how could you! You promised to help me study 
for rny exam, and then you didn't show up! There's only an hour left and I'm going to 
fail for sure now-" 
Placatingly, Anne responds, "Look, Kathryn, I'm sorry that you're going to fail 
your exam, but 1 didn't have a choice. On my way to your house, 1 saw an elderly man 
looking disoriented. He almost wandered into traffic! 1 had to assist him - 1 walked him 
to his house, and got him inside, out of the sun. Who knows what might have happened 
had 1 not given him a hand?" 
Kathryn, not placated in the least, replies, "It doesn't matter what might have 
happened. You made a promise, and had to fulfill that commitrnent. You owed me!" 
Anne replies, "Of course 1 owed you, but that changed as soon as 1 saw the man in 
distress. 1 had an obligation to you that was overridden by the obligatios 1 have to give 
aid to those in imrnediate danger." 
Kathryn shoots back, "1 don? see how that's so clear!" 
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Anne replies, "Well now you're just being contrary! Look, I'm sorry that you're 
going to fail your exam, but you know that it's obvious that, morally speaking, I had no 
choice!" 
* * * * * * * 
Jan and Susan are having an argument about women's rights. Jan states, "Look, 
we al1 know that al1 peopIe shodd be treated equally, and clearly women need to be 
treated as equals to men. We also know that in the past this hasn7t happened. In order to 
correct this injustice, we have to engage in some form of affirmative action policy! 1 
think that the most effective fcrm of affirmative action is one that forces companies to fil1 
a quota system!" 
Susan responds, "Jan, have you taken leave of your senses? Of course 1 agree 
with every-thing that you have said, right up to the point where you suggest a quota 
system. However, the most effective form of affirmative action is clearly one that 
requires only that the nurnber of applicants i n t e~ewed  be composed equally of women 
and men." 
Jan responds, "Looky the studies that 1 have right here clearly show that there is 
no basis for your clairn.. ." 
Interrupting, Susan exclaims, "Jan, those studies are a load of crap! Not one of 
them makes use of a reliable method. Clearly the studies that have been reputably carrïed 
out show . .." 
(And the stmggle for women's nghts continues.. -) 
II. The Problem 
Moral debate does not usually result in either a clear victor or consensus. 
Reliance upon basic moral intuitions to derive a favored conclusion has become the 
mainstay of ethical debate. Unfortunately, we do not dl share the same basic moral 
intuitions, and the moral intuitions that we do share do not usually al1 recornmend a 
unique moral course of action. If either of these possibilities were the case, we would not 
recognize that a problem exists- But they are not, and so we recognize a problem in 
ethical theory - mere reliance upon basic moral intuition does not provide reliable 
recommendations regarding what it is that we ought to do. 
Overcoming this problernatic result of the current status of the debate requires 
first the justification of a particular set of moral rules (a moral theory). Given such a 
justification we could conclude that the theory is more than simply a set of moral 
intuitions. For this justification to have the effect on moral debates that we wish, we 
wouid al1 have to agree that this justified set is the one that should be decisive in 
recornmendations regarding moral action. For everyone to corne to agree regarding the 
practical applicability of a particular set of moral rules, each person would have to be 
persuaded to fïnd this set superior both to their intuitions and al1 other cornpetitor sets of 
d e s .  We would have to provide cornpelling reason for its adoption. 
By producing such a justification we would, in effect, be providing a set of rules 
against which we could check moral intuitions to see if they have been borne out by the 
justification. Lf a moral intuition regarding the duty to refiain fkom X was on the Iist of 
moral behaviors (one of the things agents have to do is refkin fkom X), then that intuition 
would be justified. To come to agree regarding any course of action, we wouid also have 
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to come to agree about what is moraily required of us, which would sometimes require 
that we agree about certain empirical matters. This latter issue is not what we here 
choose to focus upon. We instead wish to describe and defend a particular method that 
would most reliably result in a justification of a moral theory: instrumental 
contractarianism. 
An instrumental contractarian account atternpts to justifi a moral or political 
theory by way of reference to individual people's preferences and beliefs. It attempts to 
provide good reason for accepting the dictates of moral theory, which are social 
constraints on individual behavior, by relying on individuai beliefs and preferences.l 
Given each person's preferences and beliefs, the contractarian concludes that each 
person's interests are best served, ail things considered, by a particular moral theory. The 
contractarian holds this theory to be justified. 
Wishing to suggest that a particular version of this project is the most plausible 
method by which to provide a fundamental justification of a moral theory, we first 
critically survey the field of popular alternatives to show both what contractarianism is, 
and what it c m  accomplish that these contenders cannot. We then argue that a parîicular 
form of instrumental contractarianism (amalgamative contractarianism) is the most 
plausible method by which to provide a justification by showing that the popular 
alternative contractarian account (market contractarianism) is implausible as a method of 
producing a social choice via individual choices. According to amalgamative 
contractarianism, the calculation which identifies the set of niles that is justified is 
' Although a perspicuous way to describe our efforts here, it will become clear over the course of this 
project that we think it is rnisleading to describe moral rules as 'constraints'. 
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sufficiently simple to calculate that we could suppose that such a production is possible in 
a timely fashion. Without timely output, no justincation could M e r  moral debate. 
However simple the contractarian calculation is found to be, we also find that the 
necessary inputs are lacking. in order to produce a rnaximally compelling justification, 
we must make use of the complete sets of each person's preferences and beliefs - in no 
other way can we persuasively argue that each person has the best possible reason to 
accept the justification presented. We do not have access to such information, however, 
and it is not foreseeable that we will have such access in the near future. Finding the 
furtherance of moral debate sufficiently important to not be satisfied with letting matters 
remain as they currently are until such tirne as such complete sets of preferences and 
beliefs may be provided for our use, we ask what alternatives we are left with. 
Finding one prornising avenue of exploration in the possible production of a 
partial list of preferences and beliefs, we examine what properties such a list must have in 
order to have a chance at providing each agent with, if not the best possible reasons, at 
least the best reasons possible right now for the adoption of a particular moral code. It 
was a skepticism regarding the possibility of being able to provide such a justification 
that led to the mere intuition clashing that typifies moral debate today. It is a skepticism 
regarding the possibility that such intuition clashing will ever ailow mord debate to 
progress that forces us to re-examine the possibility of providing a timely justification. It 
is on this possibility that we now focus. 
CHAPTER 1 - These Things I Don't Believe - 
This chapter will be dedicated to both defining and justifjing instrumental 
contractarianisrn thmugh contrast with the alternatives to it. 1 will first distinguish 
instrumental contractarianisrn fkom other forms of contractarian, or contractualist, 
justifications. This will prirnarily involve an exploration of John Rawls' A Theory of 
~ ~ i c e . ~  S condly I will distance instrumental contractarians fiom those theorists who 
propose an 'idealized dialogue' approach to m o r d  politicai justification. John Rawls' 
Political ~iberol isrn~ and Jürgen Habermas' Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
~ction" will serve as exarnples of the idealized dialogue approach. Finally, Peter 
Danielson's Artifcial ~ o r a l i $  rvill serve as a focus through which to distinguish 
instrumental contractarianisrn from evolutionary theories of rational behavior. 
This chapter should not be understood purely, or even prirnarily, as an aid in 
identifLing an instrumental contractarian account. The general approaches examined 
here will be found unable to produce a compelling justification of a moral or political 
system. As each of the particular presentations examined will be found lacking in some 
fairly basic way, we seek to explain not only what we are not endorsing, but also why we 
are not endorsing it. Taking the inadequacies of these various theories to heart will then 
rnake our aim of presenting an instrumental contractarian account that is capable of 
producing a fundamental justification much easier. It is to the extraction of such lessons 
that we proceed. 
' John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Haward University Press, (Cambridge, Massachusetts), 197 1. 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, (New York, New York), 1996. 
4 Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, MIT Press, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts), 1990. 
5 Peter Danielson, Artifciai Morality, Routeledge (New York, New York), 1992. 
Both contractarian and contractualist attempts to jusm any moral or political 
system are grounded in a particuiar theory of rational agency. The specific understanding 
of "rational agency" and "rational agents" that both contractarians and contractualists 
begin with is, roughiy speaking, one which accords with the economic understanding of 
those ternis. An economicdiy rational agent acts in such a way as to attempt to 
maximize the satisfaction of her subjective preferences, given her information about both 
those preferences and the situations in which she finds herself. Given general 
information about the world, and in particular facts about strategic interaction, these 
theorists attempt to provide an account of why these agents would find it rational to 
endorse certain d e s  constraining their behavior in various ways. Relying on the 
rationality of the dlctates presented, such theorists attempt to provide reasons for their 
adoption, reasons that, they suppose, would prove compelling. This compulsion is, as 
outlined above, a necessary condition of any successfiii justification. Contractuatists, by 
way of contrast with contractarians, modify the psychology of the agents being examined. 
Typically they do this by either including or excluding certain types of preferences for 
reasons other than that these preferences could or could not be expected to be found in al1 
rational agents. They do so at the peril of their enterprise, as we shall soon see. 
Li A Theorv of Justice 
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice has, as its main goal, the justification of Our most 
basic intuition about justice: that justice ovemdes claims about social welfare. The basic 
rights of the individual cannot be violated for any increase in social benefit. Leaving 
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aside Rawls7 defition of utilitarianism, which serves as the theoretical champion for 
advancing social welfare over the concerns of the individual, we will focus upon the two 
other necessary components of this argument. For his argument to be compelling, Rawls 
both must present a convincing definition of justice, and produce good reasons why 
society should choose to champion justice over social welfare. We will now focus upon 
the argument Rawls provides to suggest why society should choose to champion justice 
over social welfare. 
In order to justifi society's championing justice over the advancement of social 
welfare, Rawls turns to contract theory. In presenting a contractarian account, the 
theorist enjoins us to imagine an hypothetical situation in which people corne together 
prior to their being constrained by any social regulation. These persons are to then decide 
which principles would best regulate the various competing claims to social benefits that 
particular persons are likely to demand as their privilege. These rational agents who have 
managed to come to agreement over which principles will thereafter arbitrate between 
competing claims over social benefits are supposed to have identified principles that 
would regulate a society as if it were a voluntary association. As these rational agents are 
to be understood as rational representatives of actual people, the resulting 'contract' 
cornes as close as possible to expressing what we would have agreed to be bound by were 
we to have had a choice in the matter. In a sense, therefore, one might Say that society 
endorses these principles of regulation. One could further explain why society endorses 
these principles; society endorses these principles because it has found them to be in their 
interests. 
In order to identiQ as precisely as possible those pnnciples which people would 
consent to be bound by thereafter, it is clear that these rational agents ought to resemble 
as closely as possible the actual people to which these principles are to be said to apply. 
The result of this construction, however, wouid likely include al1 of the rules that people 
would agree to be bound by. This list could include d e s  of etiquette, for instance. This 
is not acceptable, given Rawls' project. Rawls is not interested in identiS.ing al1 of the 
principles governing social interaction; he is interested is justifj4ng the precedence of 
justice over utilitarian concems. In order to do this, he must identifi the pnnciples of 
justice, and those principles alone. Harkeninp back to our considered convictions about 
justice, Rawls suggests that we can al1 agree that if any set of principles are to be 
identified with justice, they must be ones that do not produce any decisions over 
competing ciaims based on differences between the claimants that are arbitrary fiom a 
moral point of view! 
Suggesting what he takes to be quite basic examples of what we would al1 agree are 
arbitrary social contingencies about people - their natural talents, their social status fiom 
birth, etc. - Rawls systematically denies his rational agents epistemological access to 
these contingencies. Supposing that rational agents with this information would bargain 
in ways thought beneficiai to their contingent state of affairs, and that this would thereby 
introduce arbitrary distinctions into the deliberations about which principles that society 
would endorse, he denies that a process including such information could identifi 
principles of justice. The principles of justice must be identified via a procedure that 
makes no appeal to these social contingencies, a procedure thereby more likely to identify 
6 RawIs identifies considered convictions as those evident in our "jjudgments in which our moral capacities 
are most likely to be displayed without distortion." [p. 471 
principles that are obviously principles of justice. Agents are to bargain as if they had 
been placed under a 'veil of ignorance' with regards to these contingencies. These 
principles of justice are then compared with the principles of utilitarianism, and the case 
for the precedence of the former presented. 
It is obvious that this procedure does take us some way fiom identifj4ng the 
principles that actual people would have endorsed had they the chance, but it does so in a 
way that Rawls finds unobjectionable. Given that these modifications have been 
introduced due to our most settled convictions about justice, convictions that we ail share 
and make without hesitation, Rawls supposes that the results of this theory are still ones 
that we c m  be said to accept. The conclusions of this theory are to be understood as 
resulting fiom our interests combined with our most significant sentiments about justice. 
The original position, and the veil of ignorance that primarily characterizes it, are 
both the results of what Rawls takes to be our most basic intuitions about what is 
reasonable to require in order to assure that the principles proposed a) are principles of 
justice, and b) are rationally acceptable. We tum first to the veil of ignorance. Under a 
Veil of ignorance agents are supposed to have no access to arbitrary information, 
information that would taint the resulting inquky into the correct principles of justice. 
This entails 
[Tlhat ... no one knows his place in socie ty... nor does he know his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities.. .Nor.. .does 
anyone know his conception of the good.. .or even the special features of 
his psychology such as his aversion to risk . . . The parties do not know the 
particular circurnstances of their own society. ... The persons in the 
original position have no information as to which generation they belong.' 
7 Theoy of Justice, p. 137. 
This, naturally enough, raises the question of what information the parties in the original 
position are supposed to have. Together with an index of goods that it is supposed every 
rational agent would want more rather than less of, given that they have any rational plan 
of life at all, Rawls suggests that: 
[Tlhe only particular facts which the parties know is that their society is 
subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies. It is 
taken for granted.. .that they know the general facts about hurnan society. 
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; 
they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human 
psychology. Indeed the parties are presumed to know whatever general 
facts affect the choice of the principles of justice. There are no limitations 
on generai  ifo or mat ion.^ 
This ensures that, in spite of the previous extreme curtailing of information that agents 
may access, they still have both ~ ~ c i e n t  i formation and motivation to corne to 
agreement. 
The parties in the original position are m e r  assumed to have an equal Say in the 
proceedings, to not suffer from envy, more generally not to take an interest in one 
another7s interests (mutually unconcemed), and to be capable of effectively constraining 
their actions to accord with the dictates of a reasonable conception of justice and be 
known (by others) to be so capable. Their equality is demanded by our intuitions about 
justice, as an unequal Say is inherently unjust and any procedure that allows inequality to 
affect the output will not identify justice. Envy tends to make agreement less likely, and 
is therefore excluded. Positive fellow feelings would tend to render the project irrelevant; 
beings concerned with each other may be supposed to be less co~n~et i t ive .~  Finally, the 
- - 
Theory of Justice, p. 138. 
9 Of course, there is another, less charitable explanation for Rawls' exclusion of positive fellow feelings 
from the original position. The inclusion o f  such feelings would make the Utilitarian's case that much 
easier to make, since each person would have a motive to act fiorn other peoples' interests. 
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capacity to adopt a normally effective sense of justice is assumed in order to make the 
procedure meaningfd; there is no point in attempting to agree to a set of principles that 
no one would thereafler be constrained by. It is under these restrictions that Rawls 
concludes agents must conduct their cornparison of a society regulated by utilitarian 
concerns with a society regulated by constraints of justice. 
The particular constructions of the principles of justice that Rawls identifies, and 
the arguments fonvarded to j usti* the prionty of his principles of j ustice, are not relevant 
for our purposes. His method of constructing the choice situation is faulty, and we need 
discuss no more in order to take issue with it. His argument is fatally biased. We shail 
argue that it is clearly impossible to suppose that constructing the choice situation so that 
it accords with our sense of justice would not irreparabiy bias the argument concerning 
the priority of justice over utilitarian concerns. It is the M e r  elucidation of this concern 
to which we know tuni. 
I.ii The Role of Identification in Justification 
Rawls suggests that many of the conditions constraining the original choice 
position and the veil of ignorance are 'reasonable7 to impose on a theory of justice, and 
therefore on any theory arguing for a conception of justice. No theory of social 
interaction that allowed for decisions among competing claims to be made on attributes 
that are arbitrary fiom the mord point of view could be called a theory of justice; fiom 
this Rawls justifies imposing the veil of ignorance. No theory that allows for the unequal 
treatment of a society's members could be called a theory of justice; and so each person 
is supposed to have an equal Say. No theory that fails to account for the interests of 
fùture generations could be called a theory of justice; and so each person is assumed to 
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have an interest in the interests of future generations. Taking these and other sentiments 
to be our settled convictions about what a theory of justice must recommend, whatever 
else it recommends, Rawls concludes that each of these sentiments justiQ a modification 
of the method whereby he seeks to identi@ and justiQ his favored principles of justice. 
We will leave aside a quite serious reservation about whether, in fact, 'we al17 share these 
convictions. What is of concern is the reasoning behind justifjtng a theoretical 
modification to a justificatory enterprise because of constraints upon the output of that 
theoretical justification. 
The modifications in this particular project render the outcome of Rawls7 
arguments ~ s ~ r p r i s i n g  and not compelling. Arranging the choice situation so that it 
closely mimics our most basic intuitions about justice and the agents in such a way that 
they are fairly assured of choosing just institutions, and then showing that it is reasonable 
to suppose that these agents choose principles of justice over utilitwianism, is not 
showing very much at akl* The case is clearly manged in such a way as to load the dice 
fiom the start. One must always take care that if the dice are loaded, that they are loaded 
to the benefit of the opposition. It would have been far more satisfactory to constnict an 
argument that assumed that agents had strong positive fellow-feelings, and were average 
utility maxirnizers in al1 choice situations, and that these agents srill chose to accept 
principles of justice over a utilitarian system of govemance. As it is, the bias of the 
argument renders the conclusions questionable. 
1 O G .  E. Pence takes notice of many of Rawls' question-begging devices, both in his veil of ignorance and 
his formal constraints upon acceptable p~c ip l e s ,  in "Fair Contracts and Beautifil Intuitions". This can be 
found in pp, 137- 152 of New Essays on Contract Theory (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary 
Volume III, Kai Neilson and Roger A. Shiner, eds., 1977.) 
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More generally, however, one must be cautious about attempting to present a 
justification for a position which is modified in order to ensure that what is justified is 
that position. If one wants a justification to do any work at dl,  it m u t  be constructed on 
grounds other than those one is atternpting to justi@. A justification of justice that 
entirely relies on that conception of justice does no work. "A therefore A" is 
uninteresting. We are not suggesting that Rawls' account is completely question 
begging. But, similarly to the point above, the degree tu which one relies upon the 
concept to be identified has a direct relation to the degree to which the justification is 
uninteresting - the degree to which it is not a justification at d l .  Following Robert 
Nozick, a fundamental justification must appeal to none of the concepts of that realm." 
It is this most desirable justification which must, ultimately, be attempted if the results 
are to be convincing. A justification of the particular theoretical construction making the 
case for prïnciples of justice ought to make no reference to our intuitions about justice. 
This is importantly different fiom suggesting that the argument constmcted 
cannot lead one to inevitably choose one possible conclusion as justified over a field of 
contenders. We ought not, however, attempt to construct an argument in such a way so 
as to lead to a particularpreconceived conclusion. A good argument ought not to leave 
one neutral regarding which possible conclusion to endorse, but it ought to convince us to 
adopt a particular conclusion fiom a bais  of neutral (non-leading) premises. As simple 
as this point seems when stated clearly, parailel problems plague liberal studies because 
of a confusion between the two different types of neutrality. Liberals cannot cldm that a 
just political system must have consequences that do not partially affect diffenng 
1 I See Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books; New York, 1974, pp. 4-9. 
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conceptions of the good life, as some decisions will always have such an effect.12 Liberal 
govemments are, however, commonly criticized by other liberals because some policy or 
other has the effect of disadvantaging some particular conception of the good. Liberais 
can much more plausibly c lah that, nevertheless, these policies must not have as their 
aim the advantaging or disadvantaging of some particular conception of the good. l 3  
This is not to Say that our most fùndamental intuitions about justice have no place 
at d l .  Once a theory is constnicted, and its justificatory force identified, and the 
argument concluded, the principles thereby justified ought to be contrasted with our most 
basic intuitions. If the output of the theory does not recomrnend equal treatment, then it 
is not a justification of a theory of justice. A theory that justified the better treatment of 
some based on their height cannot be said to justify a theory of justice. But this is 
entirely distinct from the construction of the justification. Given that our basic intuitions 
are to be made use of in identifiing what it is that we have atternpted to provide a 
justification of does not imply that we may make use of these notions when constsucting 
the procedure by which the justification is attempted. Since this is the case, a 
fundamental justification of moral and political systems cannot make reference to moral 
and political values. Contractarians cannot, for example, assume equality of the worth of 
the participants if the assurnption is based on moral considerations. Any assumptions 
must be drawn fiom a realm distinct from the moral and political. 
*' For example, choosing whether or not abortion is to be a legal medical pracedure, or publicly fünded, 
w il1 inevitably result in some conception of the good (pro-c hoice, for example) being affected positively 
while another (pro-life) is affected negatively. 
13 Susan Dimock presents a discussion of these and related concems regarding neutrality and liberalism in 
her "Liberal Neutrality", Journal of Value Inquiry, 34:2-3,2000, pp. 189-206. 
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II Discourse Ethics 
Tuming now fiom non-fùndamental attempts to justifi moral and political 
systems, we proceed to investigate what 1 shall call, following Habermas, discourse 
ethics. These theories are attempts to justiQ strategic norms of interaction by appeal to 
the force of reasoned agreement; discussion arnong agents wili lead to agreement as to 
the content of these norms. There is one feature in particular of which it is worthwhile to 
take note: agreement has binding force. Reasoned agreement produces a good reason to 
act on the dictates of these agreements. Accepted reasons tend to constrain behavior, for 
accepting a new claim involves creating a new belief, and belief tends to modiQ action. 
In such a way, idealized discourse theory attempts to secure the motivation necessary for 
the resulting theory to be a justification instead of a mere explmation. 
Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls are the two theorists who 1 take to be the most 
famous proponents of such a view. Habermas' Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action and Rawls' Political Liberalism are both clear examples of this method. They 
also, between them, manage to chart the whole range of possible discourse ethics. 
Habermas suggests a theory that proposes that rninllnally idealized agents (that is, agents 
who are not idealized at d l )  are the correct ones with which to work; anything short of 
this necessarily diminishes the internat force of the argument. Insofar as an agent is 
conceived as separate fiom an actual discourse, it is the voice of the theorist that enters 
the picture, a voice which provides no M e r  benefit to the discussion, and lessens the 
ment of the enterprise. Sa much the worse if the agent is not even "discussing" 
problematic norms. E s  is a critique to which we are sympathetic. So, we join 
Habermas in critiquing Rawls' Political Liberalisrn, in which the discourse situation 
appears to be merely a vehicle for various theorists' discussion over the proper content of 
the political noms in question. In this section we will ignore the discussion of A Theory 
ofhstice above, and focus oniy upon those elements of Political Libemlism that pertain 
to Rawls' acceptance of a discourse ethic. 
Habermas' attempt must not be supposed to escape unscathed. While we are 
sympathetic to his approach, we suppose, perhaps pessimistically, that the interna1 force 
of mere reason is insufficient to produce the practical force we fmd necessary for a 
justification of a normative system. Belief in certain principles does not sufficiently 
compel action; hypocrisy flourishes, and any who suppose otherwise are simply not in 
touch with the real world. WhiIe Habermas' project may end up being a necessary part 
of any justificatory enterprise of moral theory, it is not the largest or most signinificant part. 
We will first outline Rawls' proposal, and then will discuss Habermas' offering. With 
both of these theories in hand, we will then proceed to critique the entire methodology as 
a system of justification. 
n.i Political Liberalism 
Rawls takes great pains to point out that his aims in Political Liberalism are: to 
suggest that the concept of a justified constitutional democracy whose citizens embrace a 
plurality of world-views is coherent; to provide a liberal theory of justice f?om which to 
develop the most appropriate institutions for the achievement of the ends of a liberal 
democracy; and to show that such a political system could be irnplemented in our world 
and be stable over t h e .  If these were his only aims, Political Liberalism would hold 
only tangentid interest for our purposes here. But Political Liberalism also has 
normative ambitions. It derives a conception of justice that a plurality of citizens of a 
19 
democratic regime may thoughtfully and fieely endorse. Rawls later suggests that the 
point of his enterprise is to achieve a consensus about the appropriate forms and of 
fùnctions of political institutions in a constitutional democracy dedicated to upholding the 
equality of its citizens as persond4 The latter normative aim obviously rests in large part 
on the former; it is oniy by allowing that those to be subject to the coercive powers of the 
state could endorse such treatrnent that a liberal could justiQ any form of political 
institution. Insofar as one is already persuaded, then, of the validity of a liberal 
constitutional democracy, and the moral intuitions which are supposed by Rawls to 
underlie such a regime, one cannot help but be interested in the daim that Political 
Liberalisrn is a tool through which we theonsts may idenm (morally) appropriate 
political institutions. 
In Political Liberalism the voluntary assent of each person to the proposed system 
of regulations is tightly linked to the question of stability. Consensus regarding the 
proper institutional form of a pluralist democratic regime is not only contingent in part 
upon the possible endorsement of each of its citizens, but also upon the structure and 
content of Rawls' denvation of the principles of justice. Finally, the most obvious way to 
attempt to prove that a notion is coherent is to spell it out without contradiction. 
Accordingly, Rawls' project is divided into two distinct parts: the spelling out of a 
liberal-democratic conception of justice and the principles by which its most appropriate 
institutional forms are to be identified, and his argument for expecting that a society that 
is well-ordered by such a conception will be stable. Given that we are here primarily 
interested in the form of Rawls' justificatory enterprise, we will not examine his 
discussion of stability over tirne. Whether or not his particular formulation is likely to be 
'" Political Liberufisrn, pp. 4546,300. 
stable over t h e  when he is concerned with his constructed citizens is not of primary 
import for our purposes. The project by which he proposes to derive appropnate 
principles of justice is our concem. Ultimately, we do not fmd this project acceptable. 
We render no opinion on the second project; for, hd ing  the first lacking, we have no 
reason to continue to beat what will have been found to be a dead horse. 
Rawls' insistence that his theory of political justice (justice as faimess) be 
acceptable to a muititude of people characterized by incompatible systems of belief and 
value (comprehensive doctrines) leads him to attempt an articulation of political justice 
that relies on no particuIar comprehensive doctrine. This in its turn, together with the 
obvious advantage obtaùied by not relying on any controversial premises - and the need 
to rely on some prernises - leads him to construct his system as far as possible on the core 
commitments of a democratic s o ~ i e t ~ . ' ~  There are two such commitments of which he 
centrally makes use when discovering democratic justice: society is to be viewed as a 
"fair system of cooperation over time"'6 and people must be regarded as both fiee and of 
equal worth. 
Rawls is quick to point out that "society as a fair system of cooperation over 
time"I7 is distinct kom the coercive coordination of citizen's actions. Cooperation 
implies an acceptance of the publicly recognized rules of interaction. These restrictions 
must be acceptable to each remonable person given that al1 would act accordingly. These 
15 Although Rawls himself is fnistratingly vague about the characteristics of these 'ïùndarnental ideas seen 
as irnplicit in the public political culture of a democratic society" [p. 131,I take him to rnean that these 
ideas could be commonly seen to motivate the various institutions and regulations without which no regime 
could reasonably be called democratic. Given the plethora of necessary and sufficient conditions proposed 
by various theorists to guide us in the proper use of this term, Rawls' casual derivation of these 
fiindamental ideas seems simplistic at best. 
16 Political Liberalism, p. 14. 
17 Polifical Liberalism, p. 15. Hereafter this will be treated as a technical tenn, and the quotation marks 
will be dropped. 
regulations must also be fair, they must assure that al1 who abide by these regulations 
appropriately benefit thereby. The purpose of these reguiaîions is to achieve and preserve 
the just distribution of the benefits of society, as specified by a suitable conception of 
justice. Partly by reference to this definition of what a society is, RawIs defines the 
relationship between a person, a citizen and a party in the original position. 
Before suggesting how people are to be viewed as fiee and equal, Rawls first 
presents us with his view of what underlies our "everyday conception of persons as basic 
units of thought, deliberation [and] r e~~ons ib i l i t~ . " ' ~  This derivation f?om our 
(uncontroversial and unscientific) conception of a person in turn provides the building 
blocks from which he constmcts his notion of the citizen as a political person. 
Ultirnately, it is the citizen that he attempts to mode1 in the original position, fiom which 
he derives his principles of justice (justice as fairness). But this is to anticipate. 
Persons as political entities are identified as at Zeast being entities that rnay be 
members of society; a person may be a fblly cooperating member of society over a 
complete life. Given Our cornmon understanding of what it is to be a person, this 
suggests to Rawls that a person is to be viewed as both reasonable and rational, and as 
having an organized view of the world, with which she steers herself through i d 9  To be 
rational is to bey in a non-naive sense, an econornic agent - to have goals and desires (a 
conception of the good) that one strategically acts upon given one's beliefs. To be 
reasonable implies two things: a desire to propose and discuss principles for cooperation 
justifiable to d l ,  acting upon them when assured that others will too and that they 
'* Politicat Liberalisrn, p. 1811. 
19 More accurately, b w l s  States that a person's being reasonable and rational is derived fiom our 
conception of  persons as being responsible for their actions [p. 501. A person's ordered world-view is an 
obvious requirement of his having îhought/deliberative processes. 
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recognize that people inevitably disagree about their world-views, and so they cannot 
appeal to these views when justimng their proposed principles. 
Citizens, by way of contrasting this concept with the concept of a person, are 
identified as entities that are fully cooperating mernbers of society over a complete life. 
It is by possessing the characteristics of a person spelled out above to the "minimum 
degree necessary to be fully cooperating members of society" that people are conceived 
of as equal for political purposes; people are equal as citizens. This is, of course, only 
one half of the democratic conception of the political person. People are not o d y  
conceived of as equd, but also as fiee. Citizens are understood as fiee in three ways: 
they have a fieestandhg public identity, with rights and duties, that does not depend on 
their particular conception of the good; they are fkeestanding sources of legitirnate clairns 
against their government; and they are seen as fieely endorsing their particular 
conception of the good. It is by reference to these attributes that Rawls concludes that we 
may conceive of citizens as also having a reasonable moral psychology.20 To have a 
reasonable moral psychology is to have the ability to internalize a conception of justice 
and the motivation to act upon it; to do one's part too in a justly organized society given 
assurance that others will as well; and to develop stronger bonds of trust in one's 
institutions and fellows over tirne, given continued just o~tcornes.~' It is this conception 
of a citizen which Rawls suggests should be modeled in the original position. It is to this 
modeling which we now turn. 
20 As with so much else in Political Liberalism, Rawls does not present a rigorous derivation of this 
reasonable moral psychology fiom the attributes of a citizen, We will not attempt to supplement what he 
clearly did not see as a deficiency. 
2 1 That citizens have a reasonable mord psychology is essential for Rawls' argument for the stability of his 
proposal. It is mentioned here to provide more flesh to the anorexic notion of the citizen. 
Rawls now has agents appropriately constructed fiom which fieestandhg 
principles of political justice may be derived. These agents are the products of a 
democratic regime; the principles of justice (and institutional organizations) which these 
agents would endorse through their reasonable and rational faculties are appropriate for a 
constitutional democracy. But how do we conclude which state of affairs they would 
endorse? These agents Say nothing themselves, and were we to attempt to speak for them 
- as we surely must - what assurance do we have that our own social station or world 
views, or in short, our unreasonable and irrational tendencies, would not obscure the 
correct response? It is in response to this problem that Rawls proposes that we attempt to 
divine the appropnate answer to this now pressing question by way of the original 
position. 
We wiil not dwell upon the specifics of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance here, since we already discussed them at length d u ~ g  our investigation of A 
Theory of hstice. It will be enough here to discuss how Rawls thinks that his original 
position would overcorne our own imperfect reasoning on the matter at handSu In an 
effort to overcome our own biases, Rawls envisions not theorists directly discussing 
which principles of justice should be agreed to, but instead what phciples  of justice and 
discussion and, ultimately, institutions would be rationally agreed to by agents who are 
unaware of their situation - rational agents who are behind a veil of ignorance. This 
discussion cannot, of course, be fully devoid of inputs; rational agents with absolutely no 
awareness of their situation - including their conception of the good and any general 
information about the workings of the world in general - could not rationdly agree to 
- - - 
" 1 do not mean to suggest that Rawls thinkr that his solution will cornpletely overcome the difficulty, only 
minirnize its impact. 
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anything. They couid not, therefore, be argued by theorists to agree to anything. These 
rational representatives are thus to be conceived instead as having some general 
information: they know that they are going to be expected to reside within the society 
they have created; they have access to uncontroversial infirmation about the worid and 
its various workings; and they have a set of interests supposed to be invaluable to any 
person as a citizen. Theorists, then, are to discuss what principles these agents would 
find in their best interests. It is these principles, once the theorists have agreed upon what 
îhey are, that are deemed by Rawls to be the most appropriate. 
Rawls suggests that the reasonable elements of people as citizens are represented 
in Political Liberalism by the constraints of the veil of ignorance. O d y  reasons that can 
be acceptable to an agent supposing that he could tum out to be any citizen will be 
offered and accepted in this model, and therefore be acceptable to dl. The rational 
elements of citizens are modeled by the uncontroversial empirical claims, and by an 
index of primary goods with which the theorists reason about the most rational set of 
principles which couId be agreed to under these conditions. In such a way the citizens' 
conclusions about the principles and institutions most appropriate to guiding society as a 
fair cooperative endeavor over tirne, as well as the reason appropriate to public discussion 
of political matters, could be m i m i ~ k e d . ~  
II.ii Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
Jürgen Habermas judges al1 social action to be either communicative or strategic. 
Strategic actions are ones in which an actor seeks to modify the behavior of one or more 
other actors by means of economic dis/incentives, in ways that the first actor has deemed 
instrumentally valuable. Communicative actions are ones in which actors seek to 
coordinate behaviors or speech acts in such a way as to facilitate a common 
understanding between them. Notwithstanding the possible economic reduction of the 
second type to a speciai case or" the first, Habermas treats these categories as different in 
kind; strategic interaction merely seeks to influence behavior, while communicative 
interaction seeks to intemally motivate participants to accept as vaiid various claims. It is 
the active acceptance of these claims that differentiates an understanding fkom mere 
agreement or accord. Accord could be produced strategically; people could be in 
agreement regarding the content of an utterance merely by accident. Understanding is the 
result of a unanimous rational assent to various claims and reasons. Understanding is 
achieved through rational assent. While Habermas suggests that these categories exhaust 
the possible types of social action, he does not suppose that they are exclusive: a 
communicative action may have strategic elements within it, and vice versa .24 
As Habermas does not recognize the possibility of individual action geared 
towards understanding, for hïm communicative action plays an invaluable role in the 
development and maintenance of our psychology. This becomes clear when one attends 
to the significance Habermas attaches to discourse. Discourse is presented as a special 
case of commu;iicative action, where participants reflect on the linguistic utterances of 
each other in order to test various claims that have been identified as problematic. 
Intemal discourse is a special case of discourse proper; a reflecting agent considers a case 
. - - - -- -- 
As Rawls notes, it is useless to denve principlss ofjustice without afso deriving an acceptable method of 
reasoning with which to discuss how best to institutionalize these principles. See especially Polifical 
Liberalisrn, p. 224. 
fiom two (or more) perspectives, and judges the ment of their various reasons, eventudly 
endorsing one and rejecting the others. 
A child first develops within a culture, and intemalizes a system of belief~.~' This 
systen of beliefs is eventually called into question by the recognition of extemal 
pressures - prirnarily other people engaging the child in communicative action. Insofar 
as the child recognizes the force of the reasons offered by the other person, that child's 
belief system is then modified in such a way that it can accommodate those reasons. In 
such a way the child7s psychology develops. Each person's beliefs and desires are 
maintained and refined through communicative actions throughout her life. A personality 
is refined when discourse results in a modification to the structure of a person's beliefs or 
desires through the force of reason. Even when no change to the content of one's identity 
results, a discourse still has the effect of re-affirming that content, and thus maintains an 
actor's previous personality. 
In each communicative action, a person makes claïms about either, the 1 )  
objective world, 2) the social world, or 3) the subjective world. 26 That is to Say that a 
person rnay be making a daim about the worid, or about the noms of the speaker's (and 
hearer's) community, or about the speaker's own persona1 (intemal) experiences. In 
engaging in communication, al1 speakers also claim that their staternents are valid - that 
their statements about the world are true, their evaluative statements accord with the 
- - -  - - -  -
24 See especially Habermas 1990, p. 140, & Habermas' Theory of Comrnunicafive Action, Vol. 1, Boston 
1984, pp. 285-287. 
25 For the purposes of clearly demarcating only what is of central importance for our purposes, 1 will here 
merely mention that Habermas has a fairly developed account of the relations between each person's 
subjective belief system, the social world in which it develops, and the objective world. Our purposes will 
not be served by M e r  etucidation, however. 
26 Whiie these daims are recognized to be both verbaI and non-verbal, we will focus only on the verbal 
case for the sake of readabiiity - Habermas supposes that what rnay be said of  the one may also be said of 
the other. 
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norms of their community (are right), and that their claims about their personal 
experience are honest. Each of these types of claims may be either disputed or accepted 
by the hearer, with agreement obtainùig oniy when each participant endorses the same set 
of claims. Understanding obtains when there is agreement on the claims, as well as on 
the grounds upon which those cIaims are made. 
The origin of a communicative action is a two-stage process. Ln the first stage a 
speaker offers a daim to a listener. Ln the second stage a hearer responds to the original 
claim of the speaker. They have then mutually embarked upon a communicative action. 
As can be gleaned h m  the above, each speaker has made, by implication, certain claims 
about the utterance that he has made, claims to the effect that it is true that X, or it is ri& 
that X, or 1 feel that X. Fudher, Habermas suggests that the speaker has, by making the 
claim publicly, offered to redeem his claim shodd this prove necessary. The hearer has 
accepted this offer, and in replying has offered similar assurances. In engaging in this 
activity, the various participants have thus created certain obligations, have accepted as 
binding certain norms of behavior that will in turn be the bedrock upon which al1 
justificatory attempts may depend. These standards are hevitably endorsed and 
intuitively understood by any competent speaker engaged in communicative action, and 
cannot be denied upon pain of contradiction. They cannot be acted against upon pain of 
performative contradiction. 
While Habermas produces only a sketch of his proposal, there is certainly enough 
detail to make clear his argument He suggests, following R. Alexy's analysis, that an 
actor engaged in discursively redeeming normative claims must be committed at least to 
the following: ailowing al1 people to participate; dlowing assertion of any claim 
whatever; allowing inquiry regarding any claim whatever; and disallowing or forbidding 
al1 forms of coercion?' Denying these, Habermas argues, leads to a contradiction. 
Indeed, al1 argumentative presuppositions are to be identified by showing that one who 
denies these claims is "caught up in perfomative  contradiction^."^^ It is these particular 
presuppositions, however, when combined with an understanding that belief justification 
(and thus normative justification) musr be based on agreement reached by 
argumentation,29 that together justify his principie of universalization, 
that every valid n o m  must fulfill the following condition: 0 ail af5ected 
can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance 
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone 's interests (and 
these consequences are preferred to those of know alternative possibilities 
for regu~ation).30 
This is to Say that each actor who engages in a discursive attempt to justify a claim, also 
implicitly acknowledges (U). While the argument is not explicitly stated, it seems 
obvious that it is only given each person's ability to accept the consequences of the 
observance of a particular n o m  that they may be expected to endorse the norm at issue. 
This leîds rather directly to Habermas' principle of discourse ethics (D): 
Only those noms can daim to be valid that meet (or codd meet) with the 
approval of al1 af5ected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
disco~rse.~ ' 
Anthropomorphisrn aside, clearly Habermas means to suggest that a norm with 
any clairn at al1 to validity is one that would be the result of an actual practical discourse. 
Recalling that Habermas states that the validity of a claim about the social world depends 
on its being recognized by the comrnunity, that some form of consensus is necessary is 
'' R. Alexy, "Eine Theorie des practischen Diskurses," in W. Olmuller, ed., Normenberpndwtg. 
Normernurchsemng, (Panderbom, 1978) 
'' Habermas, 1990, p. 89. 
" See esp. Habermas 1990, p. 14. 
hardIy unforseen. M a t  might have been udorseen is that Habermas suggests that norms 
must be justified in actuai discussions. Habermas suggests that any attempt to justify 
noms hypothetically is doomed to fail, as it is not justified in discourse. Thus Habermas 
distances himself fiom other idealized discourse theorists, such as John ~awls." 
While it is not my intention to here bring Habermas to task for his shortcomings, 
it will be helpful to present his response to critics who suggest that his proposal makes 
exclusive use of action geared towards understanding, and thus cannot be applied to 
strategic interactions. While agents may be committted to the above-rnentioned prïnciples 
of communicative action, it has not been a ryed  that these principles are also intuitively 
understood to govem strategic interaction. Indeed, given Habermas' definition of 
strategic interaction, it seems uniikely that these principles could be derived from 
strategic interactions. As a result, the cntics suppose that these principles are not 
applicable to strategic interactions. If this is so, surely Habermas' account is lacking, as 
we suppose that if anything is to be govemed by justified norms, it is our strategic 
interaction. 
Habermas' reply is to suggest that there is no such thing as an interaction that is 
simply strategic. This separation of strategic vs. communicative action is simply analytic 
- no actual agent can act without acting in his or her social structures, and therefore each 
action has a social elernent. It is this social element which entails that each action has a 
communicative fûnction. If this is so, then each actor does, for each action, implicitly 
accept the validity of the noms of discourse. Habermas supposes that an agent cannot 
become detached fiom his lifeworld - it is too integral a part of each actor's ego system. 
30 Habermas, 1990, p. 65. 
3 1 Habermas, 1990, p. 93. 
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II.iii Motivatinp Force and Discourse Ethics 
In order to develop a promising line of criticism of Rawls' Polifical Liberalism 
we first turn to Habermas. Habermas, unsurprisingly, decries Rawls' use of the veil of 
ignorance as well as the use of theory at al1 in an effort to bring about a meaningfil 
discourse ethic. Seeing the entire project as an effort to either induce the reader to come 
to an understanding of what would be agreed to in Rawls' described situation, or as a way 
for each theotist to come to his or her own conclusion and then allow for a majority 
ruiing to produce the correct normative conclusions, Habermas concludes that either 
interpretation is doomed to fail. If each person were to meditate over Political 
Liberalism and come to his or her own conclusion over what would be agreed to, this 
would not express a "cornmon ~ i 1 1 . " ~ ~  That is to Say that this could not count as 
internally motivating agreement. Neither would a majority vote by theorists count as an 
intemally motivating agreement expressive of a common will. Nothing short of actual 
agreement as a result of actual discourse would produce the necessary results. Rawls' 
response is both uncharacteristically brief and weak. Rawls replies that it is his intention 
to have his project judged by al1 citizens over time, and so it is neither of the projects 
supposed by Habermas. It is also, therefore, not prone to the critique proposed by 
Habermas. 
Assertion quite aside, Rawls' own interpretation of his project is stiii 
uncomfortably close to the second of Habermas' interpretations. Everyone judging a 
project over time still seems most naturally interpreted as each citizen reading Political 
Liberalism and then afrerwards taking what he or she wishes fiom it. Nevertheless, 
'' Habermas, 1990, p. 66, fn. 
33 Habermas, 1990, p. 67. 
whatever interpretation one cares to give Rawls' project, it still clear that it cannot be 
interpreted as an actual conversation. The sheer number of necessary participants alone 
disqualifies it fkom consideration as such. If it is not the result of an actual conversation, 
then the proposed nom has not yet met Habermas' conditions for knowledge of its 
~ a l i d i t ~ . ~ ~  
Habermas' point is quite well taken: without an actual agreement, no amount of 
supposition that there may be agreement on any particular norm produces knowledge 
about its worth. Moreover, there are concerns about the motivating force of hypothetical 
agreements that are distinct fiom questions about the accuracy of our foreknowledge of 
the content of any actual agreement. For in so far as a proposed norm is not an actual 
expression of a general will verified in conversation, it fails to have the intemal 
motivation necessary for a truly binding set of noms to result. Recalling Ronald 
Dworkin's farnous critique of A Theory of Justice, we suggest that the hypothetical 
conclusion of a hypothetical discussion fails to produce in actual people a motivation for 
recognizing the force of the proposed nom? 
Also following Dworkin, we recognize that it would give people a reason to 
accept a proposed nom if it were to be shown to these people that they would, right now, 
accept those conclusions. For thîs to be the case, interestingly, an actual discourse may 
be said to occur. But could Rawls' project be reasonably supposed to provide such 
arguments? Rawls suggests that we al1 try to adopt the position outlined by the veil of 
ignorance, and attempt to reason from within this blind as citizens, Each suggestion is a 
34 It should be recalled that, for Habermas, the n o m  could be said to be valid if it would be the result of a 
discourse. But 1 take Habermas to be objecting that we cannot have knowledge of  the validity of  this norm 
without it being agreed to in an actual discome situation. 
significant idealization. In an a c t d  discussion, each person would reason with his or her 
full information, as himself or fierself. Any idealization of the discussion situation must, 
in order for us to suspect that the conclusion would be one that we would accept, be 
supposed to accurately reflect what we already believe, and the degree to which we 
believe it. But this would render the idedization entirely unmotivated. Any other 
idealization can only be reasonably supposed to distance the conclusions frorn the ones 
that we would ourselves corne to. It would be only by way of happenstance that the 
modifications to the discourse situation resulted in identical conclusions to what would 
result in an a c t d  discourse situation. And so we conciude that these idealizations 
contaminate the results; the grander the idealization, the £ûrther we may expect the 
conclusions to be fiom peoples' actual conclusions. This separation, in turn, undermines 
the practical force of the argument, the force we earlier found to be necessary for a 
justification of any set of noms. 
Habermas' proposd faces no such difficulty. But it overcomes this hurdle by 
running the risk of eliminating the use for theoretical apparatus in the justification of 
noms. The only possible place for theoretical devices would be to exactly rnimic the 
argurnentative processes that actually occur, and to present the conclusions derived for 
the consideration of the participants who have been so mimicked. This makes the value 
of a theoretical discourse ethic questionable.36 Habermas, of course, entirely agrees. 
Something that rnay be more troublïng to Habermas is the suggestion, mentioned 
above, that strategic interaction is not regulated by discourse ethics. Notwithstanding his 
35 See chapter six o f  Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts) 1978. Esp. pp. 150-1 54. 
36 Instrumental contractarians, of course, face an obviously analogous problem, but it is best dealt with 
below. 
33 
assertion that there is no such thing as a simply strategic interaction, but only strategic 
actions that have communicative elements, and which are thereby govemed by justified 
norms, one could simply deny this fact- Habermas Ieaves kis assertion entirely 
undefended- 
Moreover he provides no reason to suppose that the existence of sorne 
communicative elements in any given strategic interaction ought to lead one to conclude 
that the communicative elements ought to entirely govern this mixed-motive action. It 
seems more reasonable to suggest instead that the strategic elements of any given action 
are still not bound by justified norms, while still allowing that the communicative 
elements of any given action are so bound. Or that to the degree that a mixed-motiv~ 
action is a communicative action, it is EO rhat degree governed by his justified norms. 
Given that Habermas supposes that the elements can be separately identified, surely he 
must give reasons beyond mere assertion for the governance of strategic actions by 
communicatively justified norms before we may be expected to find his account 
compelling. 
Allowing that they may not be separated, however, one must still suppose that the 
strategic elements of any strategic action together compose the greater part of that whole 
- indeed this seems analytic. Given this, it may be supposed that strategic considerations 
would ultimately lead to that action. There may be some communicative concems 
involved in the deliberation, but the strategic concems would be decisive, as they are the 
greater part. 
If this analytic argument is not compelling, it is to the nature of people to which 
we finally him. Any justification of a moral and political system must display practical 
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force, it must motivate the adoption of that system. This force must not be slight, nor 
easily overcome. Perhaps pessimistically, we suppose that communicative concems are 
not the largest motivating force that pulses within the human brain - we suggest instead 
that economic concems are the larger part of hurnan motivation. Any who deny thîs are 
simply ignorant of the empirical evidence. Take, for instance, the interest in academia, 
deliberation, debate, discussion, etc., and pit it against the interest observed in the world 
of business- Further, look at the need for the enforcement of contracts - the need to force 
people to honor their word. Lastly, look to the prevaience of hypocrisy both now and in 
ages past. There is significant evidence to suggest that people prefer to pursue economic 
advantage even if it means forsaking their reasoned principles. The motivation derived 
fiom the acceptmce of good reasons is by far the smaller part of humanity. I f  we are to 
present a justification of moral and political systems, it must be by way of appealing to 
the economically rational side of hurnanity. This does not discount the appeal to reason 
at all; this economic argument must be presented to the intetlect. But the grounds upon 
which this argument is to be constmcted must be economic if it is to be reasonably 
assured of convincing that intellect at the t h e  of the presentation. 
III. Sociobioloeica~ Justifications 
We now turn to theories that attempt to explain the creation of moral or politicai 
institutions by way of evolutionary arguments. Examinhg natural or constructed agents 
in their environments, these theories explore the development of moral behaviors and 
social structures. Attempting to justie morality by explaining the evolutionary 
circumstances through which it was created seems an initially plausible route. If an 
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argument can be forwarded which explains how certain moral behaviors evolved, it will 
presumably give r emns  for the adoption of moral behaviors. Although attempts to 
justie moral constraint by way of evolutionary apparatus are many, we will examine in 
any detail only Peter Danielson's Artifcial ~ o r a ~ i t y ? ~  Danielson hirnself dismisses the 
vast bulk of evolutionary arguments summarily, suggesting that they either fail to justifi 
moral constraint, or they fail to justie moral behaviors as constraints. We will bnefly 
explain this fiuther before proceeding to examine Danielson's positive thesis. 
Danielson first presents a general argument designed to exclude any direct appeal 
to sociobiology. Sociobiological appeals proper tend to explain only that certain 
behaviors are exhibited in certain organisms - behaviors that we consider moral. They 
do not, and cannot, claim that an organisrn finds these behaviors useful to adopt. Indeed, 
given the tendency to explain evolution as an unconscious method of selection of 
particular traits, it would be quite surpnsing if sociobiology proper ever suggested that 
these traits were adopted consciously. Sociobiologists can explain particular benefits 
derived fiom these behaviors, but cannot claim that these benefits are the reason why 
these behaviors were adopted. The reasons are only discoverable by recourse to interna1 
processes. Sociobiology, however, does not lend itself to the examination of the 
conscious psychological processes of its objects of study. Since this is so, it is il1 
equipped to explain the rationality of the adoption of certain constraints to their behavior. 
Sorne game-theoretic sociobiological attempts to examine the justification of 
moral behavior suggest that, given that agents who live together in an environment over 
time are likely to corne into contact with each other several times, and given their 
preferences, it is rational to exhibit some constraint in some strategic situations. To more 
37 Peter Danielson, Arrificial Moralify Routeledge (New York; New York), 1992. 
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successfully interact with the other agent in the fiiture, one ought to modi& one's 
behavior now. Cheating on an agent the fïrst tirne you interact is not al1 that smart, if she 
will thereafler cheat you on every subsequent interaction, or not interact with you again. 
It would have been better to cooperate dl dong. Aithough this line of inquiry avoids the 
problems associated with sociobiology proper, Danielson nevertheless discounts this 
possible route for the normative theorist. It will be recalled that Danielson suggests that 
moral behavior must involve constraint. Showing that it is straightforwardly rational to 
play these games a certain way shows that no constraint is necessary. As such, these so- 
called justifications hold no promise. And so Danielson is committed to presenting a 
justification of moral behavior that constrains our otherwise rational behavior that is 
straightfowardly psychological. It is that project to which we now tum. 
IIIi ArtX~cial Moralitv 
Wishing to present a fundamental justification for morality, Danielson argues that 
moral agents are substantively rational. Wishing also to take issue with the received 
theory of rational choice, he proposes a heterodox theory of rational action, one with 
which he provides arguments designed to suggest that agents following his theory of 
indirect rational choice fare better than agents committed to the received theory of 
rational choice. Danielson's challenge to the received theory of rational choice is not 
unmotivated; he supposes that the traditional account cannot be successfully made use of 
to produce a fundamental justification of morality. Suggesting that the structure of 
rational choice theory (RCT) makes providing a fundamental justification of morality 
impossible, an alternative account of rational choice must be provided. 
Upon providing such an alternative, Danielson proposes to test it against the 
received theory, as  well as  to test mord versus various moral agents, in a simulated 
arena Danielson runs computer simulations in which various agents are constnicted to 
interact strategicaily with each other, to see which would fare b e ~ t . ~ ~  Since the amoral 
agent is the agent Danielson suggests best represents the recommendations of orthodox 
RCT, the results of his computer simulation could provide evidence for both the thesis 
that morality is rational, and the thesis that his heterodox RCT better achieves the goal of 
instrumental rationality. This presupposes, of course, that a neutral cnterion for 
instrumental success could be detemined. Danielson suggests that an agent whose 
substantive interests are better served by his patterns of strategic interaction than some 
other agent, when interacting in mixed-motive games, is to be identified as the more 
rational one. SimiIarly, a theory of rational choice that recornmends courses of action 
which (when followed) better serve an agent's substantive interests than some other such 
theory, is to be identified as the more rational strategy. But this description is heavily 
laden with technical terrns, ones which demand a more detailed analysis. Such an 
analysis is best provided within a more detailed accounting of Danielson's project. 
As mentioned above, Danielson borrows the concept of fundamental justification 
fkorn Robert Nozick's Anarçhy, Stczte and ~ t o ~ i a . ~ ~ ~  fundamental justification is first 
defined as "a justification of a realm that does not appeal to any of the concepts in that 
realm.'"O Danielson latter adds that a fundamental justification of morality must provide 
sufficient motivation for following the dictates of morality; anything less would produce 
38 Danielson takes quite a bit of time dwelling upon the procedural problems of  constmcting this computer 
environment, and the particular agents. But it is not our intention to critique his implementation, but more 
importantly, his very project. So we will completely pass over his procedural discussions, including his 
descriptions of the various agents constructed- 
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an explanation of m o d  theory, at best. To provide such motivation, instrumental 
rationality seems the obvious autonomous realm to which one should turn. To make use 
of instrumental rationality to provide a fundamental justification of morality, one must 
show that morality, as an effective constraint upon agents' choices, is rational; that is, 
that agents who are moral perform better in social situations than their amoral 
counterparts. Danielson proposes, following the categorization of issues by Alan 
Gibbard, to focus on the problem of fidelity. 41 This is the problem of providing an 
argument for abiding by standards of interaction agreed upon by two agents. As we are 
now aware, this proposal does not require that al1 social situations must be exarnined. 
Many situations are ones in which constm.int is not necessary; one's unconstrained 
choices lead to the best solution for everyone involved. Iterated interactions in which not 
cheating on each particular action is warranted given future expected behavior, as 
previously mentioned, are of this type, as are coordination games. Morality is not 
required in these situations. Morality is also not possible in sûme situations. In zero-sum 
garnes, where one person's gain is another person's loss, there is typically no 'moral' 
course of action. There could be no agreed upon standard for interaction; whatever pair 
of actions is chosen, one person will be the 'Ioser'. Tt is only in mixed motive garnes that 
morality becomes possibly justifiable. They involve situations where it makes sense to 
propose rules dictating particular choices, and also makes sense to fail to comply with 
these d e s  once they are agreed upon. 
39 Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia, New York; Basic Books, Inc., pp. 6-9. 
40 Artificial Morality, p. 20. 
4 1 Alan Gibbard, 'TJorms, discussion, and ritual: evolutionary puzzles", Ethics, 100: pp. 787-802. Danielson 
forgoes, in an effort to produce a manageable project, accounts of justice (the standards to set) and 
allegiance (fidelity for large groups.) 
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Danieison supposes that the Pnsoner's Dilemma (PD) is the game that accurately 
models the problem of fidelity. In a PD, each agent prefers to defect instead of cooperate 
no matter what the opponent does, but if both defect, they do worse than if they had both 
cooperated. Knowing that this is the situation they are in, each agent realizes that they 
will both defect, al1 other things being equal, and that they could do better by both 
cooperating - there is room for an improved outcome to result given agreed upon courses 
of action. But even if the agreement is stmck, there is no reason to expect that either 
agent wivill adhere to this agreement - they would each do better by defecting. To provide 
a fundamental justification of morality, one m u t  provide an argument which proves that 
moral agents (agents who follow the dictates of their moral d e s )  fare better than amoral 
agents when playing PDs. Danielson supposes that this is an impossible task, given the 
received rational choice theory, and therefore is motivated to provide an alternative. If he 
cannot, he must conclude that his project is doomed to fail. 
Danielson has good reason for pessimism given his understanding of rational 
choice theory, game theory and morality. Danielson understands RCT as a theory of 
deliberation given idealized agents. Agents are supposed to be equally rational, have 
access to each others' subjective preference ranking over outcornes, and have similar 
information about the situation at hand. These agents perform calculations in parametric 
and strategic choice situations by which they d e t e d e  which course of action may be 
expected to best satis@ their preferences, and they act so as to attempt to maximize on 
their preferences given that calcu~ation.~~ It is by reference to the choices presented, as 
well as to the patterns of preferences, that the games being played are identified. 
42 Given that morality is exhibited in strategic choice situations, it is only such situations that Danielson 
discusses; we will follow his example. 
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In a PD, each rational agent has two choices: to cooperate with his or her partner 
in the game, or to defect. Each agent prefers to defect given that his or her partner also 
defects, and also prefen to defect given that his or her partner cooperates. Both agents 
also prefer a joint cooperative outcome to the joint defection outcome. Unfominately, 
given rational choice theory, these agents are forever doomed to end up both defecting. 
Given that each agent acts in such a way as to maximize his or her preference satisfaction 
and given that a PD is, in part, defined as a game in which each agent's expected 
preference satisfaction would be maximized if he or she defected, rational choice 
theoretic agents thus defect. In any situation where the calculation suggested 
cooperation, they would not be playing a PD; cooperation would have to be preferred to 
defection. Agents do not have the ability to constrain their behavior, and morality is 
irrationai by definition- 
Since rational choice theory defines agents in this minimal way, they are also 
symmetrical in a particular way; given the same preferences, options and the sarne 
understanding of a particular choice situation, each agent would choose the sarne action. 
Danielson suggests that this too is unacceptable. Symrnetrical agents are too simple to 
allow for a robust solution to the problem of fidelity. It is by allowing the possibility that 
agents could act differently fiom other agents in mixed motive games that Danielson, 
following Gauthier, argues for the rationality of f i de l i t~c~~  By allowing agents to choose 
to cooperate with other agents willing to do the same, and not cooperating with agents 
who are not willing to also do so, Danielson and Gauthier both argue for the rationality of 
43 Gauthier's most familiar account being in Moral by Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1986. Chapter 
five of this thesis presents a detaifed account. 
acting on agreements- Symmetrical agents simplifjr the situation too drastically, as 
there would be no diversity of agents to treat differently. 
Danielson's alternative account of rational choice theory, then, must allow for a 
gap between chosen outcomes and an agent's preferences. For in no other way can 
morality, understood as a constraint on otherwise preferred courses of action, possibly be 
rational. This also opens the door for the possibility of non-symmeûical agents. Two 
agents rnight have the same choices open to them, face the s m e  type of agent, be playing 
the same garne, and nevertheless choose different courses of action. This might be 
accomplished in one of two ways, while remaining roughly within the dornain of 
instrumental rationality and game theory, as standardly understood. One could allow 
preferences to determine the choice of actions, but not to determine the garne being 
played, or one might allow that preference determines the garne being played, but not the 
agent's choice of action. Danielson chooses the first of these possibilities, allowing that 
preference will determine the course of actions, while an agent's interests will determine 
the garne being played.45 These agents play games that are constructed fiorn each agent's 
objective interests. While unclear about the objects of these interests, he does suggest at 
least that they are things that an agent oughr to desire; given his close ties to 
sociobiology, we codd perhaps identifi these interests with things like food, or effective 
shelter without distorting his intent. 
Now that the alternative account of rational agents' psychology is in place, and 
recdling that Danielson wishes to allow for asymmetricd agents in the population, we 
may begin to examine what is to count as a rational. First we must recognize that a type 
44 Although they do so in different ways, as will be clear when cornparhg this section and chapter five. 
15 We retum to the second possibility in the critique below. 
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of agent is now to be identified by the preference structure he or she posses (hereafter 
referred to as its 'disposition'). Danielson identifies an agent as rational (or not) by 
comparing how well its interests are satisfied when playing PDs in mixed populations of 
agents to the level of satisfaction attained by the other agents. It is, in fact, quite a bit 
more complicated than this, given that he wishes to consider the rationality of several 
different types of agents in various combinations. 
Danielson proposes a pair-Wise testing procedure. Disposition A is more rational 
than disposition B if and only if it can invade a rational extension of an initial 
homogeneous B population and B cannot invade any rational extension of an initial 
homogeneous A population. A rational extension of a population consists of that original 
population, as well as some agents possessing different dispositions than any of that 
original population, who fare at least as well as some member of the original population. 
Disposition A invades a rational extension of disposition B by better looking after its 
interests when playing PDs with that population. With this test in hand Danielson 
proceeds to develop an account of the rationality of prtrticular moral dispositions by 
prograrnrning various agents to interact with each other in PDs and attempting to provide 
such proofs as he can that a moral disposition is more rationai than various others. 
Danielson takes a special interest in the disposition whose interests track its preferences, 
thereby effectively closing the gap between preference and game description, and 
ernbodying simultaneously the amoral agent and the standard account of rational choice 
theory. 
43 
III.ii Indirect Choices and Justifications 
We have corne a long way fkom sociobiology proper to Danielson's project, and it 
may be worthwhile recalling where that road originated. Extemal investigations of moral 
constraint merely explain that particular organisms act in particular ways, and cannot 
produce a justification for acting in a moral fashion. Therefore an intemal examination 
of the agents must ensue. Any internal examination that provides evidence that particular 
(supposedly) moral behaviors are, &er dl,  rational must also be discounted, as they 
cannot explain moral behaviors as constraints on rational behavior. Therefore any 
examination of iterated games, or any other argument that proceeds fiom a traditional 
rational choice theory must also be discounted. In order for a justification to involve the 
notion of constraining rational behavior, and therefore be a possible justification of 
morality, Danielson supposes that a theory of action must be adopted which opens a gap 
between the preferences of an individual, and the chosen outcorne. 
We turn fïrst to Danielson's choice of separation between chosen outcomes and 
preferences. Preferences determine the course of actions, while an agent's (objective) 
interests define the choice situation. Unfortunately, while his 'constrained' agents may 
then be seen to be rational in his favored sense, this is not a sense that agents themselves 
care about. They are shown to do better on a scale that they do not prefer to do better on. 
Since this is so, while they may be seen to be more successful on what can be described 
as an evolutionary scale, this cannot generally motivate people to act so as to maximize 
on that scale. One would have to rely upon an assurnption that agents care about their 
objective interests. This is obviously entirely unsatisfactory, for it closes the gap that it 
has been found to be necessary to open if moral action is to be understood as a constraint 
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on rational behavior. Agents constmcted in this way, and arguments presented with these 
types of agents in mind, cannot provide the intemal motivating force necessary for a 
justification to be the end result. 
To illustrate this point, imagine that a population that interacted regularly could 
either choose to help each other harvest their corn crops, or not Further, while no one 
could harvest al1 of his or her crops without help, with the help of only one other person, 
each person could have al1 of his or her crops harvested. Assurning that arrangements 
could be made such that al1 of each crop was hlly harvested (with suitable aid), would 
these agents conclude that the smart thing to do was cooperate? Would pointing out that 
such cooperation would maximize the amount of corn harvested convince these agents to 
so act? Not at dl,  unless one supposed that the agents aIso cared about rnaxirnizing their 
corn yield. Maximizïng retums on some objective scale does not motivate agents to so 
act. Any attempted justification wodd lack the practical force necessary for such a 
justification to be judged successful. Buttressing this argument with claims that people 
also ought to care about the maximization of whatever objective scale was made use 
would only provide sufficient support if it ultimately relied on the maximization of 
expected utility. This in turn entirely undercuts the reliance on Danielson's proposed 
argumentative structure, whose point was to not so rely. 
Turning now to the other alternative, one might suggest that an agent's objective 
interests define her choice of action, while an agent's preferences determine the choice 
situation. But assuming that agents could not act upon their preferences renders the 
entire attempt useless. Agents could not change their choice of actions even if they 
wanted to. They would be hstrated automatons, doomed to forever act in ways that they 
do not wish; and no amount of wishing that it were otherwise would produce any external 
effect. Any effort to Save this theory by the introduction of a psychologicai realm that 
one cares about, but that is not the realrn of preference, seems at best to be a linguistic 
game, or a just so 
The separation of action, situation and preference thus renders the project 
impossible. Al1 that rernains, then, is to presume that either 1) the effort to provide a 
fundamental justification of morality derived fiom rationality is impossible, or II) that 
Danielson's understanding of rational choice theory or morality as constraint is flawed in 
some way. Unsurprisingly, we choose the latter. Danielson's suggestion that standard 
rational choice theory is incapable of accomrnodating moral theory because it must 
constrain maximizing behavior is incorrect. The evidence that leads one to suppose that 
constraint is a necessary part of moral action only does not support this contention. The 
intuition that constraint is a necessary part of moral activity has strong opposing 
intuitions that it cannot easily overcome. We suggest that morality be understood in a 
different sense than it is currently, one in which constrained activity is not a necessary 
condition of moral action, but rather some evidence that one is trying to become a moral 
person. This will be discussed at greater length in chapter 5. 
IV Conclusion 
And so we conclude our investigation of alternative attempts to justifi moral and 
political systems. Instrumental contractarianism is what remains of this particular cluster 
of theories. The instrumental contractarian is one who relies exclusively on the 
46 This critique assumes that one's preferences do not contribute to the form of one's objective interests. 
Any mode1 developed that assumes such a relation woutd bear such strong similarities to Gauthier's 
preferences of each economic agent to produce an identification of, and motivation for 
adhering to, the dictates of some set of moral and political systems. Of course this is, as 
of yet, a hstratingly general characterization. To develop the details of an acceptable 
contractarian theory is, in part, the focus of our next chapter. When doing so, we will be 
well advised to keep in the front of our minds the lessons gleaned fiom the above 
explorations. 
While we must produce theoretic agents if theory is to result, we must minimize 
the idealizations. We must take care to minimize the distortions between the theoretical 
agents and the actual agents to whom our results are to be said to apply. Only then may 
we expect our results to produce compelling reasons for actual agents to endorse thern, 
and therefore be worthy of the title 'justification'. Of course it stands to reason that we 
must justie delving into the realm of theory - to deny that the conclusion of real world 
situations is what is justified given economic interests. Since the justification of the 
particular c haracterizations of the agents, as well as the particular argumentative structure 
being made use of, may not rely on our moral or political intuitions, other grounds must 
be presented. Failure to do so would render our argument cïrcular, and not particularly 
interesting. And finally, we must not separate action fiom preference; to do so is to doom 
the project for lack of motivation. We must nevertheless maintain this connection while 
making sense of the idea that morality is a constraint upon action. This is, it rnust be 
noted, different than justifying the theoretical apparatus by way of appealing to our basic 
intuitions about the matter. We will argue separately for the theoretical form of the 
project, while showing that this theory will still produce a result consistent with our basic 
account of rational choice theory that the reader should refer to chapter five of this thesis for a sustained 
critique of this approach. 
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understanding of the subject matter. It is with these lessons and goals in hand that we 
proceed to the development of the contractarian enterprise and the rendering of the most 
compelling of these projects into mathematical form. 
Chapter 2 - Tractable Contractarianism- 
We are concerned with fiindamental justifications. Examining the concept of a 
fundamental justification for moral and political theory, we conclude that it must not rest 
on biases and that its recommendations must have practical force. A fundamental 
justification of a mord theory should provide reasons to act in order to rise above the 
status of a mere explmation. Taking seriously the necessity for the justification of a 
moral or political theory to have practical force leads us to examine peoples' psychology. 
We observe that the mere public espousal of the validity of certain noms of interaction 
fails to provide the proclairnant sufficient motive to act in conformity with them; rational 
calculation often overcomes that which one has said one ought to do. Discourse ethics 
are not found sufficiently motivating. We tum then, naturally enough, fiom public 
espousal to that which is seen to ovemde it. In such a way we come to conclude that a 
fundamental justification of moral and political principles ought to rely on the economic 
interests of people. Finding fault with the alternative accounts of rational choice theory, 
we make use of an orthodox conception of rational choice with which to examine 
econornic interests; an action is rational when it is thought, by that agent, to be the 
response most likely to maximize the satisfaction of his or her desires in a given situation. 
Those conversant in rational choice theory will likely be raising eyebrows to 
almost comedic heights at this claim. Having only dwelt upon Danielson's aiternative 
account of rational choice theory, we can hardly be said to have surveyed the field. 
Further, we have no intention of surveying the entire field. Such a project is clearly a 
work in and of itself. But it is clearly one benefit of endorsing the orthodoxy that one 
need not feel compelled to assume the burden of proof. We will, however, deal with 
Gauthier's heterodox solution, which involves the introduction of rational dispositions, in 
chapter 5. 
1: Instmmental Contractarianism 
We take instrumental contractarians to be those committed to providing a rational 
ba i s  for moral and political constraid7 Contractarian accounts are generally 
understood as either seeking to convince each person that certain rules of interaction are, 
dl things considered, the rules to adopt, or as presenting a set of rules that everyone 
would (should) rationdly adopt- These two projects rnay seem indistinguishable at first, 
but there is a subtle, and crucial, difference. Only the former c m  account for the 
internally motivating force of the set of endorsed constraints. MereIy identifjring a set of 
principles to govern peoples' interactions is not sufficient. Such identification c m  only 
be the first part of the contractarian enterprise. Contractarians must always ultimately 
aim towards presenting this set of identified pnnciples to the people to whom it is to 
apply. The identification means almost nothing without the adoption. Anything less falls 
prey to a critique that takes both Habermas and Dworkin to heart: theorists cannot 
conclude that the hypothetical motivational force of the arguments for their particular 
principles thereby actually motivates people to fit those principles. If a theory cannot in 
pnnciple be presented for consideration, then it cannot be supposed to have a chance at 
being endorsed. If a contractarian account cannot in principle be endorsed, then it cannot 
be argued that it is compelling. If it cannot be argued that it is compelling, then the 
contractarian account must be found wanting. 
47 Given that the remainder of this work deaIs exclusively with instrumental contractarianism, we will 
hereafter use cirop the word 'instrumental' when referring to this theory. 
But this naturally enough raises the question alluded to in chapter one: why, then, 
do we need theory at ail? Why aren't we al1 doomed to answer these questions on the 
political stage, and not in the academic's armchair? The answer, 1 suggest Iies in our 
recognition that people reason irnperfectly and slowly. Each person's preference set is 
inconsistent and incomplete, each person's set of beliefs is inconsistent and incornplete, 
we reason abductively, and we rely on heuristics that lead us astray in crucial cases. This 
is to say nothing of the fact that we don't, in general, wish to spend al1 of our lives 
bargainhg with our neighbors about the proper form, function, and content of the niles 
goveming our behaviors- Theory, in short, may af5ord us an answer to which we would 
not otherwise have access. Our technology rnight provide for us resources of which we 
would otherwise not be able to make use. 
And so the contractarian attempts to identifl a set of niles that people would 
rationally endorse once brought to their attention. These rules are to govem how one 
may interact with another, and so one must understand what is to count as an interaction. 
An interaction rnay most broadly be defmed as any two or more persons engaged in 
activities in such a way that the actions of at least one of these persons affects at least one 
other person, and that each person in the interaction is either affected or aEecting.4' A 
Zegitimate action is one approved of by a set of rules. That is to Say that for a given set of 
rules Rj, an action is legitimate according to Rj if it is permitted, required or not forbidden 
by R ~ . ~ ~  These rules must also delineate what is to count as property; for it is impossible 
48 Contra the cornmon usage, this definition allows that a pilot who drops a bomb interacts with every 
inhabitant of a particular city, as has been brought to my attention by David DeVidi. It is also worth 
pointing out that on this understanding, what goes on in rny bedroom can be an interaction involving people 
who are not physically present in it. 
49 We will hereafter only be considering complete sets of rules, where each action is required, permitted, or 
forbidden. Thus 'not forbidden' becomes equivalent to being either required or permitted, though this is 
not tnie in general (i-e., of non-complete rule sets). 
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to deiineate what may be done without a M e r  delineation of what may be made use of. 
One's property is to be defined as that of which one may legitimately make use without 
the permission of any other person, and of which no one else may make use without 
permission.50 The contractarian must identifi a particular set of d e s  that has the greatest 
chance of being accepted by people in place of their moral intuitions. That property 
delineation in particular is a function of the set of rules has important consequences latter 
on. 
We submit that the version of the contractarian project most IikeIy to succeed is 
the account which makes use of an accurate identification of each person's preferences 
over fmitely many outcomes, and beliefs regarding the likelihood of al1 combinations of 
these outcomes obtaining, given each proposed set of d e s  governing behavior. With this 
in hand the contractarian rank orders the set of al1 possible d e s  of constraint for each 
agent. Each person's ranking of the set of each of the possible rules of constraint is 
summed with each other person's, and a set of mles that receives maximal support is 
identified as the set to bring to the people's attention. If such a project is successfully 
undertaken, its conclusions would have the best chance of gaining people's ailegiance. 
Attempting to render a maxirnally compelling system of rules govemuig actions, we 
attach its identification as strongly as we can to peoples' beliefs and desires, which are 
recognized to be motivating. 
It is obvious that contractarians do not, by and large, attempt any such enterprise. 
At best a sub-set of people's preferences and beliefs are taken as salient. For instance 
contractarians have excluded tuistic preferences (Gauthier), and have only made use of 
preferences that most of us have, and have quite strongly (Hobbes). They have by and 
-  
50 Modified in the obvious way, this applies to common property as well as group ownership. 
large assumed, in some sense or other, the equal worth of their participants, and have 
made use of the state of nature as a background against which to assess their proposed 
constraints. Some of these assumptions only weaken the contractarian account that 
appeals to them, some others are, perhaps, excusable simplifications employed in an 
effort to simpIiQ the contractarian's computational burden, and, lastly, some are 
necessary in order to achieve a meaningfid result at dl.  To distinguish into which 
category each of these assurnptions fall it is necessary to consider each at some length. 
As we must first see what the more complex project involves before exploring which 
simplifications are excusable, we here focus on the assumptions that unnecessarily 
weaken the contractarian account. And so we turn to a discussion of preference sets, 
belief sets and the set of al1 d e s  of interaction. With these concepts in hand, we turn to 
the b c t i o n  with which we identi& the proper set of d e s  of interaction. Along the way 
it will become clear why the contractarian is to insist on the assumption of equality and 
why she is not to rely on the state of nature. 
Li: Preferences 
Two considerations will occupy us here: the preferences that are to be allowed as 
inputs, and the formal constraints to which we demand that each set of preferences 
conform. Given the nature of our enterprise, it may be thought that there is a simple 
response to any question regarding which preferences are to be allowed as inputs: al1 
preferences are to be included. Anything less than total inclusion renders the calculation 
less motivating than it would otherwise be to the agent whose preference has been 
excluded. However, there has been, as of late, much ado about tuistic preferences - 
preferences that make reference to the utility function of another. David Gauthier has 
insisted upon the exclusion of tuistic preferences for a variety of reasons, and Susan 
Dimock has supplemented the reasons supporting this insistence." This insistence has 
been hotly contested in the literature, and the matter is by no means settled. We will here 
briefly examine most of the reasons offered for the assumption of non-tuisrn, and find 
them lacking. Whatever the rnerits of this assumption for particular contractarian efforts, 
or economic endeavors, it c m  play no role here. We will then move on to consider the 
formal conditions demanded of the sets of preferences to be made use of. 
1.i.a: Tuistic Preferences 
David Gauthier makes reference to both the assumption of non-tuism and the 
assumption of mutual unconcem. The former is the assumption that one does not take an 
interest in the interests of the agents with whorn one is engaging in an economic 
interaction. The latter assurnption entails that agents are conceived of as having no 
interests in the interests of any other person. The distinction between the two disappears 
when one is engaging in an dl-encompassing contractarian effort; al1 agents are involved 
in this economic endeavor.j2 
Historically, non-tuism originates in Philip Henry Wicksteed's The Common 
Sense of Political Economy, and is insisted upon as  an anaiytic consequence of his 
delineation of questions of political e c ~ n o r n ~ . ~ ~  Insisting that al1 choice is rational 
choice, he suggests that political economy is that subset of rational choice situations in 
which one engages in trade with another, and does not consider that other person's 
5 1 David Gauthier's Mords by Agreement, pp. 1 1,8S-90, 100-102; Susan Dimock, "Defending Non- 
Tuism", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29:2, 1999, pp. 25 1-274. 
" It is common to suppose that children are not included in the contractarian choice situation. So 
conceived, then, the distinction does not entirely disappear, but is greatly reduced in significance- 
53 Philip Henry Wicksteed, The Common Sense of Polirical Economy (2 vols.), Lionel Robbins, ed., 
Augustus M. Kelly (Publisher), New York, 1967. 
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satisfaction while detennuiing whether to (or at what price to) engage in a transaction." 
Therefore the degree to which one is concerned with another person's preferences is the 
degree to which the transaction is not one of political economy. It is, to that degree, 
perhaps a matter of familial economic choice (who gets dessert, and how rnuch of it), but 
not a matter of politicai economy. This cannot be thought sufficient to exclude tuistic 
preferences fkom our arena, the arena of general moral philosophy; we move straight- 
away to considerations that have been thought to do ~ 0 . ~ ~  
Rawls adopts the assumption of mutual unconcern in order to ensure that the 
outcome of his contractualist enterprise is fair. We have already suggested why this 
consideration is out of court; any appeal to moral considerations renders the project a 
non-starter. Fundamental justifications of morality must make use of no moral 
considerations when constructing the theoretical apparatus by which the result is 
obtained. This same consideration excludes appeals by some feminists who might 
suggest that women will be materially worse off should tuistic preferences be included in 
the bargain because of their being culturally constituted so that they care more for other 
people's satisfactions than menas6 Notwithstanding the fact that it is impossible to equate 
'matenally wone off with anything objectionable to the proponent of instrumental 
rationality, who cares about preference satisfaction, this is also clearly proposing that a 
moral presupposition (that wornen ought not to be disadvantaged) be allowed to shape the 
contractarian enterprise. As such, this line of reasoning must be rejected. Similarly, 
" Ibid., see esp. pp. 169-1 74. 
55 We wil1 not examine the use of this assurnption for the purposes of simplification. Given the nature of 
our endeavor, such a consideration is not yet germane. 
56 Gauthier makes reference to this defense on page 1 1 of Morals by Agreement. 
suggestions that it be made use of to avoid double comting the preference of some 
persons ought also to be dismissed. 
The assumption of non-tuism has also been insisted upon in order to ensure that 
the contractarian calculation is of a fundamental character. Noting that some 
recognizably moral d e s  ("Care about others!") may be construed as tuistic in nature, it 
rnay be suggested that, as these moral d e s  may not be made use of, preferences that 
seem to obey those d e s  must aIso be excluded fiom the consideration. However, as 
Susan Dimock has observed, not al1 positive tuistic preferences are moral preferences. 
Even should we dismiss this sensible observation, the inference that a preference that 
recornmends some action that would also be recornrnended by morality is therefore mord 
is surely absurd!" A preference may be consistent with a moral mie without being 
motivated by it. Even if one were to deny 'Shis, the line of argument rnisunderstands what 
it is that contractarians must accomplish to avoid begging the question. As was made 
clear in the previous chapter, those seeking a huidamental justification must rely on no 
moral considerations whatever when delineating their project. These tuîstic preferences 
are not, obviously, being made use of to shape the enterprise. Notwithstanding that their 
inclusion may lead to the adoption of some set of moral niles over some other set, they 
are not included in order to do so, and so cannot be excluded over concerns of question- 
begging. 
Non-tuism has aiso been insisted upon as a way to ensure that morality holds in 
the hard cases - cases where no one has any positive fellow feelings for m y  other 
- . - . - . - 
57 Although Dimock does not suppose that this is so. She suggests that 'Lhis argument provides a Iimited 
restriction on the admissible preference set with which contract theory can operate [.]" See Susan Dimock, 
"Defending Non-Tuism", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29:2, 1999, esp. p. 257. While supposing that 
penon.58 But Christopher Morris has poïnted out that this is not the hard case for 
morality. The hard case would be where people actually had negative fellow feelings for 
every other person.59 This is substantially different from the assurnption of non-tuism, 
and is not a particularly interesting observation in any event. There are obviously 
possible scenarios in which people are so constituted that rational cooperation or 
constraint is impossible. Elurne's circumstances of justice are never far fiom the ethical 
theorist's rnind. And while delineating the circurnstances more precisely is an obviously 
interesting project in and of itself, it is not the project with which we are concerned. We 
here wish to present as compelling a version of contractarianisrn as possible, and counter- 
factual constructions of agents' motivations -k l l  not, in general, help us with this project. 
At least three econornic considerations have been thought to motivate the 
exclusion of tuistic preferences. David Gauthier notes that the exclusion of extemdities, 
given perfect information and unrestricted activity, is sufficient (but not necessary) to 
ensure that an equilibrium choice iç also an optimum choice.6' The inclusion of tuistic 
preferences allows for extemalities, and since it is important that the equilibriurn choice 
also be optimal, the exclusion of tuistic preferences is therefore justified. Christopher 
Morris observes that the perfect market, which assumes a lack of externalities, thereby 
ensures that the resulting equilibrium is not such that some sub-set of the agents engaged 
-- - - 
this Iine of reasoning does not justi@ the adoption of the assumption of non-tuism, she supposes that this 
line of reasoning does justiQ excluding preferences that have a 'moral character'. 
58 See Gauthier's Morals &y Agreement, pp. 100. 
59 See Christopher Moms' "The Relation Between Self-Interest and Justice in Contractarian Ethics", as 
found in The New Social Contract, E. Paul, F. Miller, J. Paul, and J. h e n s ,  eds. Basil Blackweil, 1988, 
pp. 119-153. 
60 Morals by Agreement, pp. 87-90. "Optimal" is here understood in the Paretian sense; that no one could 
be made better off without some other person being made worse off. An externality is any result of a 
bargain between agents that affects any other agent not a party to this bargain. These other agents may be 
beneficially affected (by the services of a lighthouse, for example) or adversely affected (by the effects of 
inhating smog fiom a factory.) 
in this original market transaction could do better by trading in their own market 
environment which excludes the rest of the popdation, Tuistic preferences allow for the 
possibility of extemalities; having a tuistic preference for an agent engaged in a particular 
transaction that excludes your participation, you are nevertheless affected by its outcorne. 
Taking this observation and running with it, one might suggest that, owing to our 
intuition that rnorality ought to include everyone, we ought to adopt the assumption of 
non-tuism to, in part, ensure that this is so. Lastly, Susan Dimock suggests that positive 
tuistic preferences ought to be excluded fkom rational bargaining over cooperative 
surpluses due to the fkee-nding encouraged by not insisting on such a general policy. 
The suggestion that results fkom Christopher Morris' observation that this is a 
necessary assumption to make in order to ensure a system of niles universal in 
application can be dealt with in short order. Any credibility ascnbed to that line of 
reasoning in general depends upon our intuition that a single set of moral d e s  must be 
universal in application.61 Without the moral motivation, there seerns no other reason to 
require that contractarian accounts include this assumption. Moral intuitions being 
inapplicable at this stage of the inquiry, we proceed to an examination of the remaining 
two economic considerations. 
That equilibrium choice coincide with optimal choice is important for Gauthier's 
proof that the perfectly cornpetitive markets are moral& fiee zones - that rnorality as a 
constra.int upon behaviors in a fiee market would be unnecessary. This does not 
demonstrate its importance for the contractarian cdculation here considered. We are 
This, it should be ciarified, is only the case due to the particular nature of the enterprise in which we are 
engaged. As Jan Narveson has suggested, it could be îhat the universal applicability of a contractarian 
account is definitive of the enterprise. One might be exploring whether it is possible for a contractarian 
account to be completely inclusive in scope, for example. 
concerned here with presenting as compelling a case as possible to individuals for the 
adoption of a set of moral preferences. Individuals do not, in general, care about whether 
the resulting set of moral injunctions is Pareto-optimal. By way of illustration, imagine 
that the calculations have been nin, and that, al1 thuigs considered, the group of agents 
picked set R of moral des .  Suppose that this set is not Pareto-optimal. Further suppose 
that person X may be made better off and no one worse off by adopting instead set P. 
Given the existence of Prisoners' Dilemmas (PD), it cannot in general be supposed that 
this fact will make rational agents adopt P. Bargaining with another agent about how to 
jointly act in a PD will still result in people acting to defect. People care about the 
satisfaction of their preferences, and short of assuming that everyone cares about X 
(which we cannot do) the fact that the exclusion of tuistic preferences helps ensure that 
the chosen equilibrium is optimai does not even start to gain plausibility. 
Susan Dimock argues only for the exclusion of positive tuistic preferences fiom 
bargaining s i t~at ions .~~ She discems that the satisfaction of tuistic preferences would be 
considered as part of the distributable surplus of any cooperative endeavor only if persons 
concluded that parties to any cooperative endeavor had a claim to the future benefits that 
in part depend upon the distribution of benefits of the first claim. This is to Say that only 
if fiiture benefits derived fiom a past transaction were possible considerations for 
deciding how to distribute a cooperative surplus would tuistic preferences be included for 
consideration. Given that any tuistic satisfactions (or fnistrations) would only obtain 
a - r  the original surplus has been divided, it ought to be considered a separate future 
benefit, as opposed to a benefit directly tied to the onginal cooperative endeavor. 
If this principle of bargaining is adrnitted, then silver miners, for exampIe, would 
be able to claim that the benefits to be divided among necessary participants to the 
rnining of silver include not only the amount of silver r e ~ e i v e d ~ ~  but also the benefits 
derived fiom one miner crafbg his share of the silver into candlesticks at some later 
date. The tuistic satisfaction that person A takes at person B's satisfaction occurs only 
after the rnining of the siiver, and the division of the surplus, has actually taken place, and 
as such is clearly a fùture benefit. She argues persuasively that allowing this kind of 
claim encourages fkee-ridership, and a decline in rational cooperative endeavors. And so 
she concludes that rationd agents have reason to exclude future benefits from the domain 
of the present cooperative surplus to which each participant lays some claim. 
Whether or not one fmds Dimock's reasons compelling, what is of interest here is 
the form that her argument takes. She argues that rational agents, coming to an 
agreement over the correct understanding of what is to count as the cooperative surplus of 
a particular bargain, would likely not decide to include expected future benefits. This 
argument is most easily understood as of a contractarian type. It shows not that positive 
tuistic concerns should be excluded fiom a contractarian account, but instead that they 
should be excluded, due to contractarian concerns, fiom an account of rational 
bargaining. In fact, given the importance of tuistic considerations to this particular 
argument for what is to count as the cooperative surplus of rational cooperative bargains, 
Dimock's line of reasoning seems to argue for the inclusion of tuism in contractarian 
efforts. To not consider tuistic preferences would be to leave unanswered a question of 
'' Susan Dimock, "Defending Non-Tuism", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29:2, 1999, pp. 25 1-274. She 
does promise to argue for the exclusion of negative tuistic preferences at a latter date. This promise has 
not, to the best of rny icnowfedge, been îülfilled as of  yet. 
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paramount importance in rational bargaikg,  to wit, do we include the satisfaction of 
tuistic preferences in our cooperative surplus? 
Having thus dismissed the important economic considerations, we have only the 
issue of calculability lefi to consider. Should we exclude tuistic concems if they render 
the contractarian calculation impossible? Given our project, the answer is clearly 'yes!' 
Since we are here attempting to constnict as motivating an account of morality as 
possible, any-thing that renders the calcdation impossible must be excluded. Whether the 
calculation that remains possible has any merit is a question that we can answer only 
once the construction is complete. Do tuistic preferences render the calculation 
impossible? Not in general, but in specific cases some combinations of tuistic 
preferences render the calculation impossible. For example, any two (or more) peoples' 
preferences that mutually refer without end render the calculation impossible; if A's 2"* 
preference is that B's lSt preference is satisfied, B's lSt preference is that C's 5'h 
preference be hstrated, and C's 5" preference is that A's 2nd preference be fulfilled, no 
terminus may be produced.M Does this justi@ the assumption of non-tuism? It does not. 
There is no reason to suppose that hiistic preferences cyclically refer in general. Does 
this justiQ excluding particular combinations of preferences? Yes it does. The sarne will 
be true of any combination of preferences that render the calculation impossible. And 
this leads us to consider the formal conditions that each agent's preference set must 
satis@. 
62 Or more correctly, the satisfactions which each person wouId enjoy upon receiving some amount of 
silver. 
1.i.b: Coherent Preferences 
We will here take no interest in developing a correct account of the true 
nature of preferences, nor the correct devices through which to access them. It is beyond 
the scope of this project to take issue with the economic denvation of preferences by 
reference to choices made, or, altematively, by way of expressions of pairwise 
preferences, or perhaps by way of a more direct derivation via cognitive science. We 
stipulate, for the reasons made clear directly above, that the sets of preferences to be 
made use of do not CO-refer in such a way that they will infinitely cycle. This is the only 
inter-set requirement necessary. We will now delve into the necessary conditions that 
my set of preferences must meet. 
We take as our starting point that we have accurately managed to capture each 
concerned person's preferred ordering over the set of outcornes; that we have accurately 
ranked each person's preference for a world in which people do not hit people with 
sticks, vs. one where people do not hit others with steel poles, etc.. We stipulate that this 
set is f ~ t e .  In order to ensure that this set of preferences be applicable to the set of d e s  
each agent will later be required to rank order, we further stipulate that this basic ranking 
follow the conditions set out by Luce and Raiffa in Games and ~ e c i s i o n s . ~ ~  
Agents suppose that each set of d e s  will result, with some degree of certainty, in 
certain possible States of f lairs  obtaining. The set of rules that includes only a 
prohibition on hitting people with sticks, for example will be thought by some agent to 
64 As has been pointed out to me by Dave DeVidi, this is irnportantly different from simply mutually 
referring preferences. If A's s " ~  preference is that B's 1'' preference be satisfied, and B's lSt preference is 
that A's 2nd preference be about agent B's 1" preference, the preferences CO-refer, but a terminus results. 
result in the outcome that people will not hit people with sticks with probability p, but 
will also be thought to bring about each other outcome (and indeed, each combination of 
outcomes) with some designated probability. It is imperative, therefore, that the basic 
preference ordering be such that it can meaningfully rank complex choices under 
uncertainty. The Luce and Raiffa conditions, together with a preference ranking over the 
set of the basic states of affiîirs, ensure that this ranking may be accomplished. These 
conditions also ensure that we can rank order these preferences over the various sets of 
rules not only ordinally (lSt, 2nd, etc.), but also cardinally (on an interval scale). This 
becomes important when we search for a meaningfùl way to compare the various agents' 
preferences over the sarne set of d e s .  
Before discussing the forma1 conditions with which we measure complex choice 
under uncertainty over various complex states of &kirs, we must to M e r  delineate 
what is meant by the set of outcomes. This set contains al1 of the discrete outcomes that 
are taken as relevant results of d e s  regarchg agent activities. We formally identifi this 
set as O = (01, oz, 03, . . . O,). Since there seems no compelling reason to defme this set 
subjectively for each agent, this set is defined objectively, and is the same for each agent. 
With no obvious philosophical loss we have gained significant fomal simplicity. We 
further stipulate that each member of O be logically independent of al1 others. Failing to 
so stipulate would allow an agent to rank a contradiction possible or a tautology as not 
following fiom some set of rules; it would M e r  hs t ra te  our efforts to consider the 
power set of these outcomes without contradiction. As these outcomes are introduced in 
order to gauge the effects of various systems of d e s ,  it is appropriate to insist that these 
65 D. Luce & H .  Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, John W iley & Sons, inc., 
New York, 2nd p ~ t i n g ,  1958. See esp. pp. 23-29. 
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outcomes deal only with the patterns of behavior in which agents could engage. In 
particular, each outcome will be defined as a large percentage of the population refrainhg 
from a certain activity. To anticipate briefly, an agent considering the state of &airs 
(0,) is, in effect, considering the state of affairs where agents do not engage in any 
constraints other than 01, and so al1 relevant patterns of behaviors are thereby taken into 
account. Lastly, and perhaps trïvially, O will not include patterns of behaviors that do not 
effect the population of agents being considered. The patterns of behavior of the people 
of HD 83443 B do not affect us, and therefore do not concem US? 
These conditions, while fairly restrictive, are not sufficiently restrictive for O to 
be finite. We must further suppose that we can partition actions into sufficiently similar 
sets, and eliminate trivial differences of degree. The state of affairs in which most people 
throw a baseball at kittens at 95 MPH would be little different fiom the one in which 
most throw at 94.9882 MPH, and may both be classified as the same outcome. It is 
stipulated that this set of outcomes is h i t e .  Allowing an infinite set renders the 
contractanan calculation impossible to conclude. While we are attempting to render the 
maximally motivating contractarian project we must engage in a calculation that will 
terminate, for the reasons made clear above. 
We retum now to the forma1 conditions regulating choice under uncertainty. 
Luce and Raiffa provide an accessible account of the necessary conditions for this to be 
ensured. To wit: 1) The preference (>) or indifference (=) ordering holds between any 
two outcomes, and is transitive. in other words, O, > O ,  O, > O, or O, = O, for every pair 
of outcomes, and if O, > 4, O, > O ,  then O* > oz. 2) Compound lotteries over outcomes 
66 HD 83443 B is a planet circIing star HD 83443. 
can be reduced to a simple lottery accordhg to probability c a l c ~ l u s . ~ ~  3) The value of 
each outcome O, is indifferent to exactly one lottery over two outcornes oc and O,, when 
oc is more preferred to on and O, less preferred to O,. 4) If an agent is indifferent between 
01, and oc, then in any lottery Li containhg ob as a possible prize, O, may be substituted to 
create Lx and the agent will be indifferent between Li and b. To illustrate: if 1 like $5 as 
much as 1 like a certain lamp, then I will be not prefer engaging in a gamble that has a 
50% chance of rny receiving $5 to that same gamble with that lamp as a pnze instead of 
the $5. Nor will 1 prefer the gamble with the lamp as a possible prize to the gamble with 
the $5 as a possible prke. 5) Preference and indifference among lotteries are transitive 
relations. 6) A lottery Lb is preferred or indifferent to L,, given that they have only the 
same two possible prizes, if and only if the probability of the more preferred prize is the 
same or greater in Lb. These conditions are jointly sufficient for our enterprise. 
1.S: Beliefs 
The conditions put on beliefs are much less cornplex, but are no less rigorous for 
that. Each agent has beliefs regarding the likelihood that each complete system of rules 
of interaction results in each combination of o ~ t c o r n e s . ~ ~  For each examined system of 
rules, each agent has fixed views about the probability that each member of the power set 
of O will obtain. This is to Say that each agent has views about the probability that ( 0 1 )  
results (and nothing else), that (01, oz} results, that {O=, 034, ~ ~ ~ ) r e s u l t s ,  t h u g h  to the 
probability that (O, ... o.} results. We shall cal1 the power set of O the set of states of 
67 Imagine a coin toss resulting, in the case of a "heads" result, in the chance of  receiving a 50% chance at 
$ 1  vs. nothing and, in the case of a "tails" result, in an 80% chance or receiving a donkey vs. a horse. This 
conditions states that an agent would be indifferent between that lottery and a single-stage lottery with a 
25% chance at receiving a dollar, a 25% chance a receiving nothing, a 40% chance of receiving a donkey, 
and a 10% chance of receiving a horse. 
68 As will be made clear below, a complete system of rules is any system which, for each action, permits, 
forbids, or obliges it. 
&airs (SA) = (s : s O ) .  Formally, for each rule, each agent has beliefs of the form: 
P( Rj a st, ) for each sh E SA. Considering the power set has the advantage of allowing a 
more accurate reflection of each agent's beliefs regarding joint probability, given that it is 
well docurnented that people in general do not deal with probability well. People tend, 
for exarnple, to assign the joint probability of X and Y (P[X + Y]) occurring 
inconsistently with their discrete evaluations of the probabilities of X occurring, and Y 
occurring (P[q, Pm). Given that we have no reason to prefer the one ranking to the 
other - to suppose that one is the agent's 'real ranking' - we include them 
The highly subjective content of such conditions will not sit well with the more 
patemalistically inclined. Many people would benefit enomously if they relied upon 
some set of objective facts about the world, including the various implications of each 
system of rules. Compelling cases can be made for the inclusion of reliable objective 
information, should it be available, but I do not suppose that it is so clear that such 
information is availabie. 
Objective information involves facts; what one calls objective infonnation usually 
amounts to information that one believes, and strongly believes that one has received 
from an authority on such matters. This information is, at least usually, not universally 
agreed upon by experts, and in the cases relevant to our inquiry, where this set differs 
fiom the subjective set of some agents, is not agreed upon by definition. Usually each 
proposed set is not even agreed upon by any reasonably defined set of 'the experts in the 
field.' The usual trouble with defining the set of reasonably accepted facts, together with 
- 
69 This Iine of reasoning may be thought to also apply to the basic preference ranking over outcomes: we 
ought to gauge preferences over SA instead of considering sirnply the set of O. This ranking would render 
the calculation necessary here impossible, due to it, in general, failing to meet the Luce and Raiffa 
each person's preference for relying on their own expenence and beliefs, compels me to 
present, albeit reluctantly, a subjective account of beliefs. 
It may be objected that this will likely result in a set of rules being relatively 
favored by an agent due to his mistaken impression that the outcomes he prefers are 
likely to occur. The facts regarding the probability of various outcomes obtaining may be 
quite different fiom his expectations about it. This is, of course, a consequence of our 
construction. It is true that the world would not have the values that the agent irnagined 
above supposed, but we are here presenting the most compelling contractarian 
calculation, and are not unduly concemed with such a possibility. It is also possible that 
agents en masse make the same mistake, and end up implementing an irnpracticable set 
of rules. Such a possibility would raise concems if we were here considering the stability 
of the rules endorsed via contractarian assurnptions, as a mistake regarding the 
probabilities of certain results would become apparent upon implementation, and would 
then undermine the choice made. It is not here suggested that stability is of little 
consequence, but at this stage it is inappropriate to allow this concern to have any force in 
our construction of the contractarian enterprise. 
Liii: Rules of Interaction 
We begin with a basic set of rules of interaction, RI. Each member of the set of 
RI is a rule that obliges, pemüts, or forbids agents to perform a particular action, which 
we write as rOa, rPa, and rFa respectively for the action a. Each of these actions is to be 
understood as analogous to the outcomes describe as the members of SA. They are also 
defined objectively, are logically independent of ail others, and they concern the actions 
conditions. Moreover, in the cases where the Luce and Raiffa conditions were met by the ranking of SA, 
considering that ranking wouid be equivalent to sirnply considering 0. 
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of relevant agents in general. Further, it is a finite set into which an f i t y  of particular 
discrete actions, whose differences are trivial, are partitioned. The set of actions is 
formdly A = (al, a;?, . .. a,). So understood, then RI = {r: 3a E A (rOa v (rPa v rFa))) . 
From RI we take as salient the sub-sets that have a d e  referring to each action, 
and that have only one rule referring to each action. We will cd1 each of these sets a 
complete system of d e s  of interaction, Rh. The set of complete systems of d e s  is SR. 
That is, Rh E SR if and only if Va E A, 3r E Rh {[Ba v (rPa v rFa)] A 4 r '  E Rh [(rûa A 
(r'Fa v rlPa)) v (rPa A (rlFa v rlOa)) v (rFa A (rtOa v rlPa)) J ) . It may strike one as odd that 
we require that each R E SR not have any action that is both permitted and obIigatory, 
given that if some action is obligatory, deontic systems of logic require that that action is 
also pemritted. We invoke this restriction so that what would, practically speaking, 
amount to equivalent systems need not be considered twice by various agents. With SR 
in hand, we rnay now proceed to ouùine the contractarian caiculation. It proceeds in two 
stages: first at the level of individual choice and then at the level of social choice. 
II: The Contractarian Calculation 
The following account of the process of individual choice and then collective 
choice over the proposed alternative complete systems of d e s  proceeds in a fairly non- 
specific fashion. We propose to discuss in the most general terms what it is that the 
contractarian calculation must accomplish for the ultimately compelling result here 
desired to obtain. A more detailed analysis will follow when we examine the 
calculability of the contractarian calculation. 
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n.6: I n d ~ d u a i  Choice 
At the level of individual choice, we must first assign each Rx E SR a cardinal 
utility value. For each relevant agent we have at our disposa1 beliefs regarding the 
probability of al1 possible combinations of outcomes given each possible combination of 
rules. We also have at our disposa1 a ranking of the various outcomes. This ranking has 
been constructed in such a way that it meets conditions sufficient for various complex 
lotteries to be meaningfully compared and evaluated. Each agent's belief set about the 
outcome of any particular member of SR can be presented as a complex lottery over 
outcomes. For each Rx E SR, the agent's beliefs regarding the likelihood of each 
combination of the various outcomes are retrieved fiom her set of beliefs, which, it will 
be recalled, are of the form P( R, s sh ). The set of beliefs for each R,, (P( Rx -. sh ), 
. . .,P( Rz a Sm )}, in effect identifies a lottery which, if chosen, results in a chance of Pa 
that (01) and a chance of Pb that (O,, oz), etc. Given each agent's preferences over 
outcomes, then, once this process of belief retrieval is concluded for each R, E SR, we 
have a set of complex lotteries which is to be ranked via each agent's onginal preference 
ranking over outcomes. These steps are to be repeated for each relevant agent. 
II.ii: Social Choice 
We are now prepared to make the leap from individual choice to social choice; to 
infer what the chosen set of d e s  for interaction must be, given individual preference 
rankings. In making the preparations for such a construction, one must avoid 
constnicting a model that falls victim to Arrow's theorem: that there is no voting model 
that will satisw c o n n e c t i ~ i t ~ ~ ~  and transitivity, while allowing 1) that individuals are free 
to order sets in any way that they choose, 2) that social ordering satisfy Paretian value 
judgments (if even one person prefers X over Y and none prefer Y over X, then X is 
preferred over Y in the social ranking), 3) that the social ordering ranks each pair @,Y) 
depends solely on X and Y, and not on any other possible outcome 2, 4) that a social 
ordering shall not be imposed on individuals, and 5) that the social ordering does not 
depend only upon the ranking of any one person regardless of the others." 
We will consider two models of social choice available to those wishing to avoid 
the pitfàlls of Arrow's theorem. The first is Gauthier's proposal that individuals engage 
in bargaining with each other over a joint strategy that will consider the optimal sets of 
rules, and ultimately decide which is to be endorsed by dl.  We will find this first 
alternative inadequate. We will embrace the second proposal. Finding Gauthier's 
heterodox account lacking, we will follow the orthodoxy, constructing an account which 
makes use of the relative strengths of people's preferences - a route available to us due 
to Our insistence that each subjective scale be measured not only ordinally, but cardinally 
as well. This M e r  requires that we find some criteria with which to determine the 
relative weight of each person's preference set. We suggest that the project requires 
counting each person equally. 
The rejection of Gauthier's solution depends on no particular feature of his 
theoretical efforts; the reason to reject his proposal is sufficient to reject any such 
attempt. Any suggestion that bargaining may be used entails that one already has a 
70 Connectivity is the completeness of the social ranking of preference or indifference over each pair of 
choices. 
" In this description we follow D. M. Winch's Anafyticaf Welfore Economics, Penguin Books Ltd., 
(Harrnondsworth; England) 197 1 ,  pp. 176-1 80. 
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starting point fkom which to begin bargaining. People engaged in bargaining have certain 
attributes or possessions that they may bring to the table, certain offers that they can 
make that have particular values to the other individuals involved in the proposed 
bargain. It is o d y  in such a way that others may corne to conclude that it is rational to 
engage in such-and-such a bargain, given what it is that A has offered to contribute, and 
given what A demands as compensation for that contribution. ln the most fami1ia.r cases 
of bargaining, that which A has a right to offer to B and C is already well understood, as 
the expected reIative value of that offer to B and to C in the future (post bargain). Al1 this 
can also be said of forma1 theones of rational bargaining: a baseline must be 
presupposed. 
In this particuiar instance, however, what may be offered, and the respective 
expected values of that offer, depend in large part upon the d e s  which are eventually 
chosen. Should cornputers be banned, it will likely tuni out that we each value Bill Gates 
less than we othenvise would; his long term prospects seem less good. We would 
devalue him even M e r  if it is the case that people do not retain title to what they have 
previously acquired or produced. The support of the physicaily strong while walkùig 
through dark alleys will be less significant I f  we are al1 required to carry fully automatic 
weaponry. In short, without an understanding of the da t i ve  worth of each person's 
contributions in the fùture, or even an understanding of what that person's contributions 
are likely to be, no bargaining can take place. Without such a starting point fiom which 
to make offers, the offers could not be rationaily accepted. Bargaining about the joint 
strategy that is to choose between optimal points, then, is worthless in this instance." 
Gauthier's proposed baseline rests on an extension of his interpretation of the 
Lockean proviso: each may make use of that which is exclusively theirs, and anything 
obtained with the same, provided that none were taken advantage of during such 
procurement. While we will more tùlly explore his positions in chapter 5, it is worth 
noting that his particular defense falls prey to the above objection. I f  his Lockean proviso 
is to determine each person's wortb in the bargain, then it must be able to determine not 
ody  what possessions people are going to retain, but also what their powers and 
possessions are worth to others. This cannot be determined without some expectation 
that people will retain title to what they have acquired pre-bargain, and that there is some 
basis to expect that the strategic importance of each possession can be known in advance 
of the bargain. There is no reason to expect the former, and no reason to assume the 
latter. 
We return to the more orthodox account mentioned above: making use of the 
relative strength of people's preferences over the various alternatives. As is well 
recognized in economics Iiterature, Arrow's theorem depends in part on each agents' 
ranking over various alternatives being ordinal.73 Derking social choice directly fkom 
individual choice in this fashion demands a non-arbitrary scale with which to compare 
different agent's strengths of preference over alternatives. A cardinal measure of the 
strength of a person's preference for outcome O, is detennined relative to the set of an 
- 
72 An introduction of any 'state of nature' fixed point that stipulated what each c m  expect future 
contributions to be worth would clearly overcome such an objection, but any such introduction would also 
clearly be an example of question begging. 
" See, for example, Winch, 1973 pp. 175-1 89. 
72 
agent's preferences over al1 alternatives. The measurement tells us nothing about how it 
compares in strength to another person's preference for O,,. in order to produce an index 
on which to compare interpersonal utility, we must fïnd a principled method by which we 
can weight the worth of each person's set of preferences. 
Given the nature of this enterprise, one obvious suggestion to make at this point is 
that people's preferences over the set of possible systems constraining interaction be 
weighted in relation to each person's market value - the value that others place upon their 
participation in the system being agreed upon. A person's preferences count to the 
degree to which others instnimentally value the expected contributions of that person. 
Unfortunately, this proposa1 is untenable for reasons given above. Given that a person's 
contribution depends upon what is considered her property, and what it is expected that 
she would do with that property, any meaningful expectations about her contributions are 
here impossible to predict. An expectation about a person's contributions must depend in 
large part on which rules are chosen to govem interaction. Given our current position, 
then, such dependence negates the applicability of such considerations as expected 
contribution to our enterprise. 
It is worth reconsidering what, exactly, our enterprise is, in order see what 
consideration could both be consistent with it, and recommend an index that will allow 
meaningful interpersonal utility cornparisons. We are here undertaking to produce a 
schematic that will outline the procedure that must be followed in order for the most 
rationally compelling contractarian justification of a system of constraint to be produced. 
We have not, as of yet, discussed in much detail what it would be for a contractarian 
justification be 'most compelling'. This phrase invites misunderstanding. We could 
mean 'the most compelling' to agent Aj. Such a justification presumably would amount 
to an identification of a set of d e s  found most favorable by Aj. Or perhaps such a 
justification would amount to an identification of a set of d e s  most favorable to Aj 
which agents Ai to A, (the rest of the agents being considered) would adhere to if it were 
to be implemented. It is assumed obvious that this is not what we here mean to present. 
The most compelling set of d e s  is to be understood as a set of rules which equally 
compels each agent. Given that we have no interest in convincing agent Aj to any greater 
degree than sgent &, or any other agent, we give no more weight to Aj's preferences than 
any other agent. In attempting to compel each agenf one m u t  appeal to each agent's 
interests equally, and so we suggest that each person's cardinal preference ordering be 
scaled between O and 1, so that an interpersonal cornparison is possible.74 
Given this conclusion, then, the final step of the contractarian calculation is 
immediately evident. Having ensured a common measure, we simply add the weights of 
each agent's preferences for each suggested d e  goveming interaction, and that state of 
f lairs  which is thus accorded the greatest number is said to be ~hosen.~ '  Attempting to 
convince a population that a given set of d e s  is the one which al1 should adopt, we could 
oEer into evidence that people felt most strongly about this particular set of rules. Any 
attempt to implement any other set of rules, then, would lead to at least as much 
resistance as to this set, and likely quite a bit more. 
It is worthwhile to note that arnalgamative contractarianism and bargaining 
contractarianism (should this latter be practical) would likely identiQ the sarne set of 
" Although we present this assumption here, we formalize it by ranking each agent's basic preferences 
over outcomes between O and 1, as suggested by Luce and Raiffa. 
75 There is nothing that suggests that ties are impossible. We suppose that a randomizing device would be 
used to break ties. 
d e s  under some general conditions. Lf there is a set of d e s  that would be most 
strongly preferred by each agent to any other set of d e s ,  then this set of rules would 
obviously be identified both by the amalgamative and bargainhg model. While 
bargaining, each agent with d l  others, each agent wouid be a proponent for the sarne set 
of rules governing interaction, and the bargain would then obviously result in that set 
being chosen. In the amalgamative model, if each person preferred one particular set of 
d e s  (RI), then that set of rules wouid receive the highest numerical value in each 
agent's individual ranking of al1 of the members of SR. Sumrning al1 agents' preferences 
for each set of mles, the sum for R1 would have to be the greater than any other surn. 
Insofar as there exists a set of rules found to be unanimously preferred over d l  others, the 
results of these two versions of contract theory would not differ. Theorists who are 
convinced of the existence of such a set, then, have no reason to fear that amalgamative 
contractarianism would fail to identie that set of rules as authoritative. Those theonsts 
who are not so convinced will take issue with the amalgamative contractarian's assertion 
that a system of ntles not most preferred by some agent could meaningfùlly be said to be 
the 'rational' set of rules for that agent to adopt. To these theorists we have to reiterate 
that, given that the bargaining rnodel of contractarianism is impossible to implement, the 
amalgarnative option is al1 that remains to be attached to this term. 
III: Calculabiiitv 
In this penultimate section of the chapter, we will examine what chance the 
contractarian has of rendering any timely result fiom this calculation. Given that one 
ultimately wishes to compel the agents for which this calculation has been run, and given 
the average life expectancy of people today, we could suggest that 'timely' ought to be 
understood intuitively as 'less than 76 years'. This understanding entirely ignores 
complications such as the birth and death rate, which would likely result in a different set 
of agents having the results presented to them than was included in the calculation. 
Similarly, this ignores completely that people's beliefs and desires quite commonly 
change over the course of their lives - perhaps even day by day. Making an effort to 
include these complications in the project renders it unlikely in the extrerne that a result 
could be obtained in a timely fashion. It is entirely unclear what a 'tirnely result7 would 
then amount to; and we suspect that it would demand that a result obtain almost instantiy. 
Thankfully, we do not have the task of delineating what, exactly, a timely result 
would amount to. Appealing to computation theory allows us to avoid geîting bogged 
down in such a complicated matter. Computation theory understands al1 deterministically 
solvable problems, which are solvable in polynomial time, tractable. Those problems not 
solvable in polynomial time are considered intractable. Any intractable calculation may 
be considered to not result in a timely solution. Intuitively, a problem that increases in 
complexity on a greater than polynomial scale is going to be far too time-consuming in 
al1 but trivial cases. A problem that requires that 2" steps - such as the construction of a 
truth table - will require 68,719,476,736 steps for a sentence of 36 characters. Any 
probiem that is solvable in polynomial tirne, that is, a problem which requires steps of nc 
for some constant c, is not thought to become too the-consuming for greater than trivial 
cases. This is not to Say that any tractable problem will ultimately turn out to be 
calculable in practice. Given a very large constant value, some calculations will be 
tractable, and nevertheless not be possible right now. A calculation where n = 4 and c = 
300 requires 4.14951 SS688809929S85lî40786369le+l80 steps. Given that we do not 
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intend to explore exaçtly how many d e s  of interaction are to tK considered, nor how 
many agents we will consider, nor how large the set of beliefs of each agent actually is, 
etc., we c m  only here discuss computability at the level of tractability. We leave 
unexplored more fine-grained eval~ations.~~ We will ultimately show that the 
contractarian calculation is tractable, but we must fùst proceed to show that the 
calculation is possible. 
Both problems deterministically solvable in polynomial t h e  (P) and those 
thought not deterministically solvable in polynomial time, but for which a proposed 
solution can be checked in polynomial time (NP), are sub-set of the class of calculable 
equations.77 Without showing that it is possible to deterministically solve the 
contractarian calculation given the inputs suggested above, any fuaher examination is 
pointless - if it is not calculable, it is not P or NP, and so definitely not P. We will show 
that each calculation necessary to perform the above-described calculation is a member of 
the class ofprimitive recursive fùnctions. Primitive recursive hc t i ons  are calculable; in 
fact, the set of primitive recursive fünctions is the most basic set of calculable functions. 
Any fuiite serial application of primitive recursive functions is also a primitive recursive 
function, and therefore calculable. So in showing that the contractarian fûnction is 
composed of primitive recursive functions, we will have also s h o w  that it is ca lc~ lab le .~~  
76 1 wouid like to thank Dr. J. Shallit for pointing out the importance o f  this fact to my proposal. 
77 We will be throughout assurning the plausible conjecture that P # NP- 
78 The following account o f  primitive recursive fùnctions relies quite heavily on H. R. Lewis & C. H. 
Papadimitriou's proofs in Elements of rhe Theory of Cornpufation, Prentice-Hall Inc., (Englewood Cliffs; 
New Jersey) 198 1, esp. pp. 232-248. 
A primitive recursive fimction is one that can be generated fkom the foliowing 
basic set of initial functions by way of repeated applications of composition and primitive 
rec~sion:'~ 
1. The O-plucejkction. < represents the function fkom NO to N such that <( ) = O.* 
2. A projectionfunction. A projection function, n, is one that, for each 1 5 j 5 k, 
(nl, - -9 N) = nj- 
3. The successorfunction. The successor hction, 6, is the function fiom N to N such 
that 8(n) = n + 1 for each n E N. 
A function, f, is composed of other functions g and hl,. . . ,hj if f(nl, . . .QJ = g(hi(nl, . . .@, 
. . - hj(nl, ...a). When g is a k-place fùnction, and h is a (kt2)-pIace function, and f is a 
(k + 1) place function such that for every (nt, . .a E Nk, fl(ni, . . .ni,), 0) = g(nl, . . .rQ, 
while for every m E N, f((nl, . . .a), m + 1) = h((n1, . . a, m,f ((ni, . . .@)), then f is said 
to be derived nom g and h by primitive recursion. Intuitively, the three functions 
described above are calculable if any hinctions are, and any combination of these 
functions via composition or primitive recursion, king built up of computationaiîy trivial 
building blocks, will be calculable as weiL We will not dwell on these details or upon 
prwfs that certain equations are primitive recursive; we simply note that summing and 
product functions are primitive recursive functions. " 
A predicate, or relation on a subset of nanirat numbers, is primitive recursive if 
and only if its characteristic function is primitive recursive. A characteristic function of a 
k-place predicate is that k-place functionf, that maps N~ to {O, 1 } such &affinl, . .a = 1 
79 This trivially implies that the set of initial functions are also primitive recursive. 
N WU ha& represent the set of naairal numbas, N' represents a Cheshn product of the naarnil 
numbers k ordered elemaits long, and NO is the empty set. 
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if (ni, . . .nk) has the relation, andJn1, . . .nk) = O if it does not. Foregoing the proof for the 
sake of a linear presentation, we merely state that the equaïity relation, less than relation, 
and the less than or equal to relation are al1 primitive recursive. 
At the level of individual choice, we must present a cardinal utility ranking over 
each R, E SR. The first function we make use of calculates the utility of each sh E SA. 
It will be recalled that each sh is composed of a set of outcornes over which we have a 
cardinal utility ranking. The utility of each sh is equal to the sum of the utilities of the 
outcornes that comprise it, Forrnally, Ash) = u(ol) + .. . u(o,), for Vo, E sh. We then 
proceed to assign a utility measure to each R, E SR. For each d e ,  the expectation that 
each sh obtains ( P( Rx = sh )) is multiplied by the utility calculated by Ash). This 
provides us with each sh7s expected utility, given the Rx being considered. These results 
being summed provide us with each individual's ranking of Rx. This is repeated for each 
Rx E SR to provide us with the individual's ranking of each of the proposed systems of 
rules. Repeated for each agent, these calculations provide us with al1 considered agents' 
rankings of the proposed systems of d e s .  As these calculations are al1 known to be 
primitive recursive, the contractarian project is now known to be primitive recursive at 
the level of individual choice. 
At the level of social choice the ranking of each Rx given by each individual is 
summed together with every other agent's ranking of the same. This set is then ordered 
according to a "greater than or equal to" relation. The d e s  with the highest overall sum 
are appropnately chosen. As this stage of the contractanan calculation is also composed 
81 The enthusiast is referred to Lewis & Papadimitriou's proofs in Elements of the Themy of Compritation, 
198 1 ,  esp. pp. 234-239. 
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of fùnctions known to be primitive recursive, the entire calculation is thus now known to 
be calculable. 
Moreover, this calculation is also clearly calculable in polynomial tirne. The 
addition of each agent merely ensures that the calculations at the level of individual 
choice must be run one more tirne, and that at the level of social choice, the ranking of 
each of the d e s  being considered has one more number to be added to the s u  of the 
others. Following the conventional wisdorn of cornputer science, then, we deem the 
cûntractarian calculation calculable in a timely fashion, given the appropriate inputs. 
IV: An Objection Considered 
A critic may inquire of our investigation whether we have assumed too much at 
the outset. Gathering our assumed inputs is at least incredibly complex, if not impossible 
to perform. Gaining accurate access to a person's basic desires and beliefs is, admittedly, 
not unproblematic. And this is to Say nothing about how to manipulate a person's 
preferences over outcomes in such a way as to have them conform to the Luce and Raiffa 
conditions; we will examine this presently. But while the possibility of gaining this 
access is a complex issue, it is not our issue. The philosopher cannot be expected ta 
compete with an economist, or psychologist, or cognitive scientist, in their respective 
areas of expertise. ffiowing of no irnpossibility proof against the successfÙ1 completion 
of each of these possible methods of gaining the necessary information, then, we content 
ourselves with the optimistic assurnption that this access is possible. 
However optimistic this assumption, it does nothing to cheer the contractarian 
who wishes to provide a contractarian justification now. Forbearing £kom recornmending 
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a termination of al1 contractarian activities too hastily, we turn first to examine three 
possible routes down which the contractarian might turn instead of coming to a full stop. 
We frrst turn to Herbert A. Simon's satisficing agents in an effort to see what may be said 
for making use of agents with a simpler cognitive process than straightforward 
maximization. Secondly, we examine the work of contractarianism's most famous 
proponent, Thomas Hobbes. We there focus on what may be said of the practice of only 
identi@ing a few preferences that almost al1 people have, and have quite strongly. 
Flnally we tuni to the works of David Gauthier to see what benefit there is in considering 
agents entirely devoid of particular preferences, and identifjring which d e s  of interaction 
favor economic interests in generai. It is through the conclusions drawn f'iom the 
examination of these particular tums that we hope to console the contractarian who 
wishes to present a contemporary coritractarian justification, but who is aware that the 
requisite input is, thus far, lacking. 
CHAPTER 3 
- Satisfactory Contractarianism? - 
Contractarians who have proceeded this far, and who nevertheless wish to attempt 
to produce a contractarian justification in spite of the ïmpossibility of currently producing 
an exhaustiveiy informed effort, must examine the suggestion presented thus far to find 
what is lacking. We can separate the previous proposa1 into two basic units: the agents 
and the calculation. It has been shown that the calculation is not problematic. The 
problem lies with the constructed agents. These agents were constructed in such a way as 
to be exhaustively informed maximizing agents. Finding such maximizers inadequate for 
the above-proposed purposes, we proceed to examine the most commonly proposed 
alternative: satisficing agents. Satisficing agents are widely regarded as the obvious 
alternative for instrumentalists about practical rationality who, for whatever reason, find 
the traditional maxirnizing account l a ~ k i n ~ . ~ ~  
1: Satisficin~ Agents 
Satisficing agents are traditionally proposed as alternatives to maximizing agents 
in economic analyses - most farnously by H.A. Simon, who first proposed that making 
use of satisficing agents wodd produce more accurate econornic analysis of 
administrative behaviors than would reliance upon optimizing agents.') These satisficing 
agents are typically envisioned as failing to exhaustively consider al1 known (or 
knowable) alternatives in a given choice situation in an effort to bring about the optimal 
8' See, for example, Michael Byron's "Satisficing and Optimality", Ethies, 109 (October 1998), pp. 67-93, 
esp. fF. 67. 
83 Most famously in H. A. Simon, Models of Man, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Wew York) 1957, esp. pp. 
24 1-260. 
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state of affairs. Satisficers instead search for an alternative that is seen to be 'good 
enough' , and act accordingly . 
This brief description does not accurately capture the original intuitions of Simon, 
as he can be taken as origindly supposing that satisficing agents do not even engage in 
deliberative behavior when acting in market transactions, given their total Iack of access 
to other agents' subjective belief states." Nor does it capture any general tendency in the 
field of heterodox rationai choice to produce satisficing agents of a particular type. There 
is a tremendous amount of divergence regarding the proper construction of a satisficing 
agent. There are proposed satisficing agents who knowingly choose a lesser over a 
greater good (anti-maximizer); who satisfice as a meta-strategy in an effort to efficiently 
conclude any given deliberation; who satisfice simpliciter (not as a meta-strategy); who 
have access to al1 possible solutions, but only choose to examine 'promising' alternatives; 
who do not gather al1 possible solutions, but exhaustively examine those solutions 
known; etc. Perhaps the only defuiing feature shared by each of the agents is what they 
do not do: they do not always act in such a way as to exhaustively enumerate and 
compare al1 possible solutions to a given problem in an effort to identiQ the optimal 
solution. 
The plethora of available alternatives to rnaximizing agents may be in part 
explained by the variety of disciplines from which such agents are derived, and the 
respective goals of each such discipline. Economics has taken its cue £Îom Simon, and in 
the main has attempted to construct satisficing agents for the purposes of more accurately 
84 H.A. Simon, 1957, pp. 259-260. 
modeling economic behaviors.*' Such activity is best understood as a reaction to 
neoclassical economic analysis, which assumes perfectly rational agents who have at 
their disposa1 perfect information regarding theK environment and interests, and reason 
instantaneously. Cornputer science, on the other hand, makes use of satisficing agents in 
an effort to overcome obvious difficuities with what are called calculatively rational 
algorithrns. These calculatively rational algorithms can produce the correct answer to a 
given problem, but given calculation costs and problem complexity, may produce the 
answer far too late to be of any use. As these answers are (by d e f ~ t i o n )  of no use, other 
aig0rith.m~ must be used: algorithms that produce an acceptable answer, and do so within 
the necessary tirne constraints. These aigorithms are obvious analogues to satisficers. 
Such efforts are clearly prescriptive in nature; each proposed algorithm is recornrnended 
as a better way to solve a given type of problem. Philosophy has concerned itself with 
both types of projects; prescnptive approaches to rational choice scenarïos of fairly 
complex natures are of particular interest to us here, and there is a vast literature 
exarnining the proper understanding of practical rationality. 
We will be primarïly concemed with spelling out the various ways in which these 
satisficing agents may be envisioned as carryuig out their assigned procedures and what 
reliance on this type of agent might achieve for contractarïan~.~~ It will ultimately be 
concluded that the construction of a satisficing agent is no help to the contractarian. This 
result is important both because it corrects the current perception that satisficing agents 
are of some use to the contractarian (as a project invoiving instrumental rationaiity), and 
85 As tempting as it may be to sirnpli@ Simon's interests to solely descriptive projects, it is obvious that he 
also has normative ambitions. See, for example, his "Theories of Bounded Rationality", Models of 
Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organi. ion,  Vol. I I ,  MIT Press, 
(Cambridge:Massachusetts) 1982, pp. 408-423. 
because it will fùrther clariS what it is that the contractarian must attempt to change in 
his current approach. 
II: Siote's Satisficers 
In an effort to clear the field as much as possible, we will fust examine and reject 
reliance upon a fairly radical type of satisficing agent introduced by Michael Slote in 
Beyond ~ p r i m i z i n ~ . ~ '  Slote proposes a satisficing agent that can deliberately reject that 
which is known to make that agent better off in favor of that which is good enough; such 
an agent may be thought to be an anti-rnaximizer. In fact, Slote wishes to propose that 
this kind of agent more accurately models our cornmon sense understanding of what it is 
for a person to be rational, and proposes that satisficing rational choice is a viable 
alternative to optimizing rational choice when attempting to describe deliberative 
behavior. Insofar as Slote suggests that actual people use the term 'rational' to describe 
more than simply deliberative behavior, he will of course get no argument fiom any even 
rninimally observant person. People use 'rational' to indicate a person's lack of 
behaviors attributable to neuroses ("Well, he's more rational now than he was when he 
went into the sanitarium") and lack of emotional influences ("He's rnuch more rational 
now that the fimeral has taken place") and that a person has certain cognitive abilities 
("My teenage daughter is just bnrely rational - she just can't seem to understand that her 
actions have consequences") and that a person has reasonable beliefs about the world 
("My brother's rational retirement plan does not involve winnïng the lottery ") and for 
many other loosely related purposes. 
86 We will hereafler be ignoring the differences inherent in projects concemed with normative vs. 
descriptive objectives. 
87 Michael Slote, Beyond Opfimizing, Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Insofar as Slote suggests that people are not properly understood as solely rational 
calculators, he will also get no arguments, At rnost, people are understood as entirely 
instnimentally rational agents as a simplifj+g assumption when analyzing market 
behavior - in order to make sense of deliberative choice and market forces, one first 
assumes that al1 choice in a market is deliberative. Everyone acknowledges that people 
are a mix of affect, automatic behaviors and deliberative behaviors; the dispute centers on 
the ratio of each. 
Slote, however, maintains a more radical line: 
p ] y  exploring our intuitions about rational choice 1 hope to show that 
choosing what is best for oneself may well be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition of acting rationally, even in situations where only the 
agent's good is at ~ t a k e . ~ ~  
1 think it can also be shown that it sometimes makes sense deliberately to 
reject what is beîîer for oneself in favor of what is good andsuflcient for 
one's purposes89 
He attempts to make his case with a series of examples that are designed to suggest that: 
1) we commonly understand as rational behavior a class of actions where the better is 
rejected in favor of the less good because the less good is perfectly sa t i smg,  and 2) we 
commonly understand maximizing behavior as irrationai. These examples take on three 
basic forms: ones in which we reject a known better for a known good enough, ones in 
which not being satisfied with a good enough option seems peculiar, and ones in which 
choosing a less than efficient means to a given end seems rationally permissible. We will 
examine each, find them lacking, and conclude by suggesting that his project is 
anal yticali y incoherent. 
88 Beyond Optimking, p. 1. 
89 Beyond Optimizing, p. 2. 
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Slote enjoins us to imagine a man deliberately dressing before going to work. 
While engaged in the projecf he also glances outside to gauge the weather a few more 
times than necessary, gets sidetracked by a messy pile of newspaper and begins to 
straighten up before changing his rnind and returning the paper to its original position. 
This is not an optimally efficient way to get dressed, Slote rïghtly suggests, and 
nevertheless we would not label such behavior irrational. And so, he concludes, our 
understanding of rational behavior cannot rnerely invoIve attempts to be maxirnally 
efficient. It must be rationdy pemiissibie to choose a less than optimally efficient rneans 
to our ends. And so we have some evidence that deliberative rational behavior must 
involve more than just considerations of maximization. 
In order for this conchsion to follow fiom this example it must be assumed that 
tidying his room and checking the weather were not deliberative goals; otherwise Slote 
would simply be describing a case where one goal is pursued simultaneously with other 
goals- Once this is understood, it is clear that these alternative activities must be ascribed 
to atIècted behavior. The unconscious occasionally affects behavior during the course of 
a deliberative endeavor, and we do not cornmonly ascribe irrationality to the agent so 
affected. This is al1 well and good, but it surely does not support the conclusion that 
deliberative rational behavior involves more than maximizing behavior. Instead this 
suggests that we cornmonly use the term 'rational' to denote a lack of undue interruption 
of purposeful behavior by affected behavior. By way of illustration, let us imagine at 
what point we would describe Slote's agent as irrational. Would it be when he glances 
out the window to check the weather 5 times? When he checks the weather 500 tirnes? 
When he checks only 5 times, but stares unthinkingly out the window for 10 minutes at a 
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time? At some point, the extreme nature of the unconscious behavior will prompt us to 
conclude that such an individual is irrational. We would not mean that he is too 
inefficient while pursuing his goal of getting dressed. Instead, we would be suggesting 
that he is crazy. 
Slote also describes a scenario in which a person with a large group of intimate. 
penonal fnends states that he wishes to engage in some (unspecified) activity so that he 
may make more intimate, personal fiiends. Upon being told that he already has several 
fiends who fit the bill, he responds by suggesting that since more is better, more fiends 
will make hirn even better off. Slote, again rightly, suggests that we would think that this 
response would strike the average person as "specious and bizarre."g0 He also supposes 
that our reaction to this response depends on our hding  it peculiar that the person isn't 
satisfied by the fnends that he has - that he isn't satisfied by what is good enough. 
1 suggest instead that it is at least as Iikely that the oddity of the response depends 
on an agent's not recognizing that it is impossible to rnaintain large nurnbers of intimate 
fiends, or that more intimate fkiends is not necessarily better. In short, 1 think that this 
response is considered irrational because the agent is supposed to lack certain fairly 
widespread and firmly held beliefs that each of us has acquired. His response is supposed 
irrational due to his lack of reasonable beliefs about the way that the world works. This 
example certainly does not yet suggest any compelling evidence that deliberative 
rationality, as comrnonly understood, can involve choosing a good and sufficient option 
over one that is better. 
And so we turn to the third type of exarnple through which Slote attempts to 
motivate us to accept his proposal. Imagine that you have just had a satisfjhg lunch, and 
M e r  suppose that there is a candy bar on your desk. You would enjoy a candy bar, but 
as you are perfectly satisfied given the lunch that you have just eaten you forgo the tasty 
treat. You do not forgo the treat because you are on a diet, or to not ruin dimer (in short, 
not because of any other conflicting desire) but because you are perfectiy satisfied. You 
'him down a sure enjoyrnent, because you are perfectly satisfied as you are."g' And so 
Slote's strongest case for his alternative account of deliberative rationality goes. If we 
can make sense of this account, then it makes sense to talk about deliberately cfioosing 
the good enough to that which is better; if not, then Slote's last type of evidence for his 
position has been found lacking. 
Slote himself seems at times to make sense of this example by appealing to 
habitual responses. He States that "[we] occasiondly reject aftemoon snacks ... 
because.. . we have a habit of rn~deration."~~ I f  his thesis was that we sometirnes act for 
reasons other than that we have made a deliberative choice, then this exarnple woulci 
indeed support his case. However, if this were his thesis, he would not need to support it. 
As mentioned above, no one disputes this. People are commonly understood often to act 
unconsciously; and habitual behavior f d s  into that category. 
What Slote must produce is an example that can coherently incorporate the idea 
that one is perfectly satisfied with a certain state of affairs, and so rejects what is better. 
Herein lies the problem. If one is perfectly satisfied, this means that d l  of ones desires 
are fùlfilled - no more utility satisfaction is possible. If one is to be better off than one 
was previously, this means that a larger amount of preference satisfaction occurs than had 
occurred previously. But it is impossible to both be completely satisfied and to then be 
Beyond Optimking, p. 77. 
91 Beyond Op timiring, p. 10. 
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made better off. Slote's example, then, is incoherent, as it relies both on one being 
perfectly satisfied and it being possible for one to be made better off. This incoherence 
permeates this entire proposed enterprise. The same can be said for any effort to define 
deliberative rationality in tems other than maximizing behavior. Deliberative behavior 
just is meandends reasoning. Any effort to suggest that meadends reasoning is 
something other than reasoning about the appropriate means to a given set of ends is 
bound to fa11 into absurdity. Insofar as one is engaged in an effort to convince people of 
the rationality of a particular set of d e s  governing interaction, one must make use of an 
agent who at Zeast chooses the best of any exarnined alternatives. As the contractarian is 
engaged in an instrumental enterprise, no use c m  be made of Slote's type of anti- 
maximizing agents. 
HI: Instrumental Satisficers 
Clearing the field of anti-maxirnizing satisficers still leaves quite a few different 
types of satisficing agents in view. They al1 share the virtue of being consistent with our 
proposa1 in virtue of the fact that they will never recornmend a good known to be of 
lesser value over one that is known to be of greater As discussed above, these 
satisficers corne fiom a variety of disciplines, each with their own particular vocabulary. 
Cornputer science, economics, and philosophy dl have very daerent enterprises in mind 
when they investigate the world, and their word choice reflects this fact. We will here 
proceed to examine some of the main types of proposed satisficers without going into too 
92 Beyond Opfimking, p. 13. 
93 It is worth noting at this point that by rejecting Slote's satisficing agents, we have not rejected algorithrns 
that randomize over a set o f  possible answers, some of which are known to be superior to others. In the 
event that one of the less appropriate solutions was identified through this randomizing procedure, it could 
not be correctly suggested that the algorithm compared the identified solution to the members o f  the set. 
Any such suggestion would depend on an equivocation on the term 'known' for its plausibility. 
much detail about the various titles ascribed to them, nor about irrelevant merences in 
their suggested constriction. This allows us to avoid complex examinations of, Say, 
David Schirnitz's discussion of global vs. local satisficing and its reIation to algorithms 
designed to operate efficiently given unknown time c~nstraints.~~ Such a detailed and 
lengthy discussion would only obscure the presentation of fairly general reasons why 
each class of proposed agents is unacceptable for our purposes. That being said, we shall 
proceed to examine each of these agents in turn. 
1II.i: Meta-Rational vs. Simple Satisficers 
The instrumental satisficing agents that have been proposed fa11 into two 
exhaustive classes: meta-rational satisficers and simple satisficers. Simple satisficers are 
satisficers simpliciter. These agents are constructed in such a way that they fail to 
exhaustively consider al1 alternatives. There is no higher level reasoning behind the 
satisficing approach to any given choice scenario - the agent is only capable of satisficing 
behavior. Meta-rational satisficers are agents who satisfice in particular situations 
because they have determined that this is the rational r e~~onse .~ '  Meta-rational 
satisficers are of two distinct types: those that have decided in al1 problem scenarios to 
use one satisficing strategy (rigid satisficers), and those that decide which satisficing 
strategy to employ on a case-by-case basis (flexible satisficers). Concerns regarding the 
costly nature of determining which satisficing strategy to employ in any given choice 
situation straight-away give rise to more complicated agents, agents who, at the meta- 
94 See chapter 2 of David Schmidtz's Rational Choice and Moral Agency, Princeton University Press, 1995 
for the former, and Suart Russell & Devika Subramanian, "Provably Bounded-Optimai Agents", Journal of 
Artl>cial Intelligence Research, 2 (1995) pp. 575-609 for the latter. 
95 This leaves open the possibility that such agents may, some of the time, conclude that it is cost-effective 
to act as mauimizing agents. 
level, satisfice when deciding which lower-level satisficing strategy to employ. This can 
be seen to immediately give rise to an infinity of satisficers of various levels of 
complexity, as these agents may satisfice at the meta-level simplistically, or this 
satisficing behavior rnight be the result of M e r  meta-deliberations regarding the 
rationality of their meta-satisficing strategy. 
Thankfiilly, we need not examine the cornplexity of infinïtely many satisficing 
agents. We cm satise ourselves with an examination of the three types just mentioned 
above: simple, rigid and flexible satisficers. For our purposes, there is no discernible 
difference between rigid and flexible satisficers. Given that we are here concemed solely 
with the contractarian calcuiation, agents need ody consider this one choice scenario. As 
these flexible satisficers need only consider one choice scenario, they may be reduced to 
their rigid counterparts - whatever the reason for adopting a given satisficing strategy, 
what is important for our purposes is the chosen strategy in this particular instance. 
This line of reasoning clearly also allows us to identifi any meta-rational agent 
with its simple counterpart: we are interested in which satisficing strategy, if any, will 
allow us to satisfactorily conclude our hitherto interminable endeavor. To put this point 
another way, we are engaging in the meta-deliberations about which satisficing strategy is 
appropriate. Our interest is thus properly focused upon simple satisficers. 
1n.ii: static vs. Res~onsive Satisficers 
Static satisficers are ones that, in each problem scenario, inevitably invoke the 
same satisficing strategy over and over again. Responsive satisficers, in contrast, given 
serial exposure to a given choice situation, may eventually evolve better and better 
satisficing responses. These agents may proceed, for example, by randomizing over 
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various strategies for a given length of time, and then endorse the one found to result in 
the average best answer. They could also proceed by mutation, sticking with a particular 
type of strategy, until a modification of the original algorithm is found to produce better 
results (changing the number of options considered out of a given field, for example) and 
thereupon adopting that latter strategy. Any number of responsive alternatives can be 
envisioned, and al1 are inappropriate for our purposes. 
Any leaming satisficer is deemed inappropriate because any contractarian result 
obtained by recourse to leaming satisficers will likely be regarded as inferior to the result 
of running the calculation one more time. If approached with any timely resuit, a person 
could quite reasonably ask that the calculation be run again, as their 'satisficing' 
counterpart will not produce a less good result (for the person) and may indeed provide a 
better result. Infinite iteration is not an acceptable result; the contractarian calculation 
must produce an authoritative result Reliance on this type of satisficing agent is 
therefore not advisable. 
Closer inspection of this line of argument coupled with the conclusions reached 
when investigating the meta-rational satisficers are together sufEcient to generate the 
conclusion that we ought to attend exclusively to simple satisficers. Insisting that 
satisficers have only one application of the contractarian calculation in which to act 
ensures that the agent can make use of only one satisficing strategy, and we do not care 
about how they corne to make use of that strategy in this choice scenario. 
1n.iii: S i m ~ l e  Satisficers 
Simple satisficers make use of one of two possible 'stopping d e s ' ,  each an 
obvious extension of the pressures which here concem us: time and value.96 A satisficer 
rnay either: 1) examine various alternative actions in a given field and pick the best 
option evaiuated by a given time, or 2) examine one possible alternative after another 
until one has been found to have results which are at least as valuable as a pre-determined 
measure. The former rnay be characterized as picking the best of the available 
alternatives given time constraints, and the latier as choosing a satisfactory alternative. 
As has been so ably observed by David Schmidtz, however, "A satisfactory [option] rnay 
or rnay not be optimal. Likewise .. . the best available . .. rnay or rnay not be 
satisfact~r~.'"' This latter consideration brings us to discount from consideration those 
satisficing agents that rely on choosing the best of available altematives. There is no 
guarantee that the people that we wish to convince of the rationality of the contractarian 
calculation are going to fïnd the alternative proposed satisfactory. For each agent, the 
rules considered by the relevant satisficer codd have been the worst rules possible arnong 
the rnernbers of SR. None of these mies would be acceptable to that person. People, we 
submit, couid rationally endorse no calculation that allows for this possibility. And so we 
turn to satisficing agents that search for acceptable alternatives, and terminate once one is 
found. Those agents have set "aspiration levels" that a solution must meet to be deemed 
an acceptable termination point. 
The issue before us, then, is obviously how to properly set the aspiration level of 
each agent. Aspiration levels are going to be set either objectively or subjectively. That 
% We will hereafier use the term satisficer to denote simple satisficers. 
" David Schmidtq 1995, pp. 30-3 1. 
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is to Say, either we are going to pick out an aspiration level to meet, or we are going to 
make use of agents who set the aspiration level. Either general project has many distinct 
variations. One objective aspiration level could be imposed on al1 agents, or each 
separate agent could have their own aspiration level imposed upon them. Subjective 
aspiration levels could be obtained fiom each agent, or they could vote on a common 
aspiration level. Al1 of these projects fail to produce a meanuigful result, for quite 
general reasons. 
Objectively defmed aspiration levels fail to give aid to the contractarian enterprise 
for the trivial reason that they are not subjective. Separating the result from the 
preferences and beliefs of each person separates it simultaneously fiom any authoritative 
force derived therefiom. Any attempt to defme an aspiration level subjectively fails for 
the very reason that we wished to introduce the satisficing agent into this effort: any 
effort to gauge whether a given set of rules meets a certain aspiration level depends on its 
expected utility for each agent being calculable. This in tum depends on each agent's 
preferences over outcornes and beliefs being known, as was made clear in chapter 2. It is 
exactly each agent's beliefs and preferences that are lacking. And so no satisficing agent 
that relies upon an aspiration level is going to be useful. It is also the case that no 
satisficing agent that relies on anything other than an aspiration level is going to be 
useful, as it would then identiQ a set of d e s  as acceptable for reasons other than a 
person's beliefs and desires, which would diverge from the instrumental spirit of this 
project. And so we conclude that satisficing agent will not, in and of themselves, be of 
any use to the contractarian. 

CHAPTER 4 
-Hobbes' Universal Motions and Leviuthan- 
Thomas Hobbes is Iikely to remain the most famous instrumental contractanan 
for some time, Leviathan is also likely to remaipi his most read work. In Leviathan, 
Hobbes argues for the positing of a universai tendency to be found in al1 men that makes 
it reasonable to conclude that al1 men will eventually come into conflict with each other. 
Mankùid will fall into an etemal struggle, each against the other, unless they al1 agree to 
institute a govemment of unlimited license to reign over dl .  We will ignore Hobbes' 
conclusions regarding the justified form and function of government, and focus on his 
argument for the positing of a universal tendency that may be ascribed to al1 persons. It 
is by focusing upon this tendency alone that we will most clearly see what Hobbes' 
efforts have to teach us about the properties that our required partial list of preferences 
must have. 
In Leviathan Hobbes presents arguably the most complex and interesting effort to 
ground political obligation and the authority of morality in people's economic 
deliberation produced to date. Notwithstanding its sometimes primitive tools of analysis, 
Leviathan continues to capture theorists' interests and imagination.98 This is in no srnall 
part due to his trademark theory of human nature. Notwithstanding the sheer volume of 
critical gazes brought to bear on this work, there is still significant divergence of opinion 
regarding what Hobbes' theory of human nature actually amounts to, and what part it 
plays in his contractarian endeavors. Given that it is our intention to examine what, 
exactly, Hobbes' theory of human nature is, and what we may glean from it, it is crucial 
.. -. 
98 We do not intend to be unduly harsh to Hobbes' analytic capacities. Ian Hacking points out that Hobbes 
adopts the frequency theory of probability in The Emergence of Probabihly, Cambridge University Press, 
for us to be absolutely clear on these issues. It might be observed that the volume of 
critical analysis makes our task ïnsurmountable in the space devoted to it, and this 
observation is not without ment. Perhaps the best that c m  be hoped for is to form a 
settled opinion regarding what it is that Hobbes' Leviathan presents for our consideration, 
albeit one that purports to be in large part accurate. We will therefore be engaging in a 
purely descriptive enterprise, thereby distancing ourselves h m  some recent contractarian 
investigators, whose (at least) partial airn has been to present a corrected version of 
Hobbes' 
Our purpose also allows another delineation of the field of study. We will not be 
pursuing the interconnection between Hobbes' theological and secular ratiocination. Our 
interest is purely secular. It may be objected that this will necessarily distort any 
interpretive efforts we thereafter make, and this may indeed be the case, but here this 
objection has no force.IoO This objection would be telling against efforts to either 
accurately portray Hobbes' rhetorical efforts simpliciter, or to assess Hobbes' failings as 
a theoretician. Our goal is neither of these. We are concemed with corning to an 
accurate portrayd of Hobbes' as a contractarian. We wish uncover how it is that the 
most farnous advocate of this theory attempts to provide a cornpelling version of it, which 
nevertheless does not provide an exhaustive account of each person's psychology. We 
therefore attend almost exclusively to his descriptions of his method, and to his 
1984, p. 48. In the 1600's this was subtle reasoning indeed. He did not, however, have the tools of game 
theory at his disposal. 
99 For example, the accounts found in Gregory Kavka's Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Princeton 
University Press, 1986 and Jean Hampton's Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. 
100 This objection has been at least implicilty made by David Johnston in his The Rhetoric of Leviathan, 
Princeton University press, 1986. Johnston suggests that recent Hobbes scholarship focusing mostly on his 
political philosophy has effected a distorted view of leviathan, one in which the political, theological, and 
interpretation of mankïnd. We do nof therefore, require an exhaustive investigation of 
al1 of Hobbes' arguments, however they may be related; nor need we pass judgment on 
whether his arguments are valid or sound. 
We limit our investigation to Leviafhan due to two simple and widely 
acknowledged observations. n i e  first is that Hobbes changes his arguments from book to 
book, and second that Leviathan is the superior presentation of his general d~ctr ine. '~ '  
One of the results of the first observation is that we will not spend a great deal of time 
examining Hobbes' other works, as there is no suficiently important arnbiguity in 
Leviafhan which would require clarification by such a rislcy deparhxre. Oddly, not al1 
philosophers interested in an explicit recreation of Hobbes' arguments have drawn this 
inference. Gregory Kavka' s Hobbsian Moral and Political ~ h e o r ~ l ~ ~  quite explicitly 
recognizes that Hobbes' argument Vary fiom text to text,lo3 and nevertheless proceeds to 
make use of Hobbes' other works when analyzing Leviathan's ~ t r u c t u r e . ' ~  R. E. Ewin 
seems not to even notice that Hobbes' arguments and methods change over time when he 
describes Hobbes' method, freely making use of passages £iom Leviathan, The EZemenîs 
of L m ,  A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Cornmon Laws of 
physical trains of thought are percieved as almost unrelated, An accurate reading of Leviathan, he 
suggests, can result only if there is an effori to examine the text as a connected who1e. 
10 1 While wideiy acknowledged, this latter opinion is by no rneans universal. Bernard Gert, for example, 
contends that De Cive is superior to Leviathan as a philosophical work in his introduction to "Man and 
Citizen", B. Gert, ed., Hackett press, 1993, p. 3. As Gert recognizes, however, De Cive lacks an 
incorporated account of hurnan nature and as a result is unsuitable for our purposes. That this was to be 
supplemented by the account of hurnan nature in De Homine is not sufficient for us to begin exarnining two 
texts for one coherent position when there is an obvious alternative available. 
'O' Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral andPo2ifical Theory, Princeton University Press, 1986. Kavka 
proposes to give an accurate picture of Leviathan on p. xiv of his preface. 
'O5 Ibid, p. 87. 
104 Ibid, p. 97, 157. 
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England, De Cive, De Homine, and De Corpore while making no case for this unitary 
interpretation of Hobbes' method being the correct one. ' O 5  
Finally, given our purposes, we will assume that Leviathan is what it appears to 
be: a contractanan enterprise. Starting with agents attempting to maximize their expected 
utilim Leviathan sets out to prove that it is rationai for each such agent to join together 
with al1 others to fom a state, given the available alternatives. Any suggestion that 
Hobbes presented a strictly deontological theory, or that his theory is not based mainly on 
prudential considerations, or any other such other suitably radical proposal is surely 
"absurd on the face of it, and absurd on refle~tion." '~~ 
1: The Proiect 
There is some disagreement over the form of Hobbes' enterprise. Hobbes 
recognizes quite clearly the differences between an empirical investigation and a 
deductive argument. He takes the former to be concerned with facts about the world, 
fiom which no general conclusions rnay be derived. The latter concerns what may 
always be rïghtly be said to follow from particular premises, yet has no direct application 
to the world. While some passages in Hobbes quite clearly lead one to believe he is 
engaging in a deductive enterprise, others quite clearly involve empirical evidence. This 
tension has led to a correspondhg tension in the secondary literature. Some take Hobbes 
at his word, interpreting Hobbes as presenting us with definitions fkom which he presents 
analytic arguments fiom which he derives his conclusions, while others think that 
'OS Notwithstanding this puvling feature, the presentation o f  Hobbes' method is both revealing and 
interesting. See R E. Ewin, Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Westview 
Press, 199 1, esp. the introduction and chapter one. 
'O6  David Gauthier, Logic of Leviathan, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 28. 
Hobbes' reliance upon empirical evidence makes such an interpretation implausib le, 
notwithstanding Hobbes express thoughts on the matter.''' Tunllng instead to passages 
where Hobbes suggests that interna1 investigation of one's own mùid, and the observation 
of others are the only ways in which to demonstrate the truth of his conclusions, they 
conclude that he must have had some other method in mind when constnicting the 
arguments of Leviathan.lo8 
We will here argue that regarding Leviathan as Hobbes suggests, Le. as the 
presentation of  a deductive argument, or what he calles a scientific enterprise, makes 
sense of both his expressed opinions of what he is attempting as well as his appeals to 
empirical evidence. This interpretation M e r  makes sense of Hobbes' claims that 
Leviathan's conclusions are certain, while human reason does not, in general, produce 
certain conclusions. Hobbes believes that only a public presentation of a derivation 
dependent upon definitions, which perspicuously convinces others of its truth, is a sign of 
certain science- This is explicitly distanced fiorn mere Prudence, which is derived solely 
by experience, and whose conclusions are ~nce r t a in . ' ~~  There must, by implication, be 
more to Hobbes' scientific presentation in Leviathan than experiential observations. To 
adequately ide&@ Hobbes' method we will focus on chapter 5 of Leviathan, where he 
presents these differences most clearly. Correctly identifjhg Hobbes7 method in 
'O7 See F. S. McNeilly's The Anatomy of Leviathan, Macmillan Press, 1968, for an example of the former. 
Kavka's Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, provides an example of the latter. Kavka also denies that 
Hobbes' arguments could be deductive given his use of probabilistic reasoning. It will become clear that 
this observation does not count against the deductive interpretation of Leviathan's structure. The 
probabilistic reasoning Kavka points to is embedded in a deductive argument, and so it is best understood 
as a deductive conclusion. The statement that "These agents will, of  necessity, decide that it is most 
probably the case that they will be attacked, and so will fortiQ themselves" is clearly not probabilistic in 
any sense that renders its inclusion in a deductive argument problematic. 
'O8 The most obvious passage in Leviathan that lends itself to such an interpretation reads "when 1 shall 
have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains lefi another, will be onely to consider, 
if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.", p. 
83. 
Leviarhan is crucial for our enterprise; an inaccurate description of Leviathan's structure 
cannot be reasonably supposed to result in an accurate assessrnent of the applicability 
Leviathan S structure to our project. 
Li: Reason and Science in Leviathan 
Hobbes, uncontroversially, considers language to be the most usefbl creation 
mankind possesses. It allows us to register our thoughts, and thus more easily recall the 
consequences of our thoughts, as  well as to convey these thoughts to another. It also, 
through the use of general names, allows us to conceive, and utter, universal statements. 
Not an unmixed blessing, it can also allow us to incorrectly attempt the same. We can 
misregister Our thoughts, by using words in an inconsistent marner, and in effect mislead 
ourselves regarding what it is that we have registered. We can also deceive others, either 
intentionally or not. And we c m  incorrectly reason about general ternis, which leads to 
absurdity. Recognizing al1 this, Hobbes must assure the reader that his conclusions have 
not fallen into absurdity, and in so doing, it will become clear that he cannot be appeaiing 
to experience alone. 
REASON . . . is nothing but reckoning . -. of the Consequences of generall 
names agreed upon, for the marking and signzfiing of our thoughts; 1 say 
murking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signzfling, when we 
demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men. ' l0 
Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as 
Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor 
the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie.. ."' ' l 
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of 
one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled 
1 O9 Leviathan, p. 1 1 5 and 97 respectively. 
"O Leviathan, p. 11 1. 
Leviathan, p. 1 1 1. 
significations of the names; but to begin at these; and proceed fiom one 
consequence to another.. . 112 
In the above quotations we find our puzzle presented most starkly. How are we to be 
assured of the tmth of the consequences of any reasoning when no number of people 
reasoning in a like fashion can assure us of the sarne? Hobbes' reply to this question 
could be that he only meant to suggest that it is no number of people agreeing about the 
conclusions of any reckoning alone that guarantees the avoidance of absurdity, but it is 
instead any person (or any number of people) reasoning in the righr way that provides the 
guarantee. Of course, such a response is useless without a sign whereby one may 
distinguish correct reasoning fiom that which is faulty or uncertain (absurd). Hobbes' 
sign of right reason (science) is the ability to perspicuously demonstrate the validity of 
one's conclusions to another. 
When reasoning linguistically, be it intemally or externally, people rnay be led 
astray for want of method. Hobbes suggests two main causes of this lack of methodical 
progress: failing to begin reasoning from definitions to conclusions via syllogisms, and 
failhg to clearly and unambiguously define one's tenns. He suggests that people mainly 
fail to follow proper method fiom stubbornness in wishing to maintain tiieir opinion, and 
fiom unthinking acceptance of customary definitions or conclusions. Whatever the 
reason, it is clear that for any reason to be right reason, clear and unambiguous 
definitions must originally be made use of. This becomes entirely obvious when Hobbes 
presents us with the causes of reasoning to absurd conclusions, the first cause of which is 
beginning to reason without defrnitions. Such efforts are seen to be as absurd as 
attempting to add or subtract without knowing what "one", "two7', or "three" signifies. 
IL' Leviathan, 1 12. 
n i e  remaining causes of absurdity may be summarized as the misapplication of terms. 
To give the narnes of bodies to accidents, or vice versa, or making use of names that do 
not refer. or are meaningless, are al1 possible causes of absurd conclusions. To him that 
can avoid these pitfalls, "it is not easie to fa11 into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the 
length of an account.. .For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good 
principles."113 And so if we follow the method of Hobbes, we should dl ,  reasoning from 
the same de f~ t i ons ,  and making use of the same syllogisms, come to the same 
conclusions. 
It is obvious that if this account is correct, reasoning is hypothetical in nature. 
Reasoning fiom definitions to conclusions does not thereby apply to the real world. Any 
reasoning about a triangle's properties, or of three-dimensional space, does not tell us 
anything about the worfd unless it is accepted that this thing is a triangle, or that we exist 
in three-dimensional space. If Hobbes is seen to recognize this implication, then so much 
the better for our account. Unfortunately, irnmediately proceeding his conclusions 
regarding how to avoid absurdity, Hobbes presents us with a rather puzzling passage: 
And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a 
thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, 
and dependance of one fact upon another.. . 114 
This seems to suggest either that science is not right reason, or that right reasoning 
involves matters of fact. Given that the science of which he most commonly speaks is 
geometry, and that he identifies science with completed right reason when he asserts that 
"we come to a knowledge of al1 the Consequences of narnes appertaining to the subject in 
' l3  Leviathan, p. 1 1 5. 
I l 4  Leviathan, p. 1 15. 
hand; and that is it, men cal1 SCIENCF',"~ we seem to be lefi with the suggestion that 
complete reasoning (science) involves empirical evidence. Hobbes does not define "fact" 
in Leviathan, and so we are left with the task of sifting through altemate uses of the word 
in order to see what he might here mean. Unforhuiately, Hobbes does not use the term in 
an altogether constant manner. He sometimes uses it to indicate a subjective opinion 
CL.. .to make hirn condemn some fact of his own..."'16) and sometimes to indicate 
empirical data (as he seems to above.) And so we turn to alternative passages in 
Leviathan, in which Hobbes distinguishes knowledge of fact and science, in order to clear 
up this confusion. 
No discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or 
to corne. For as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever 
after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which 1 have said 
before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but ~onditionall.'" 
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge of 
Fact: the other Knowledge of the Consequence of one ABmation to 
another ... The later is cailed Science; and is Conditionall; as when we 
know, that, Ifthe figure showne be a circle, then any straight line through 
the Center shal2 divide it h t o  two equall parts. And this is the Knowledge 
required in a Philosopher, that is to Say, of him that pretends to 
~ e a s o n i n ~ '  ' 
These passages are as clear as one ~ g h t  hope for. Hobbes thinks that science, and right 
reason, bnng about certain conclusions, that nevertheless are conditional. They do not 
straight-away tell us anything about the world, and any application to the world does not 
result in certainty. We may dismiss the original passage above by suggesting that, 
notwithstanding al1 the literary mastery apparent in Leviathan, Hobbes simply hit upon an 
- 
"* Leviathan, p. 1 15. 
I l 6  Leviathan, p. 124. 
l7 Leviathan, p. 13 1. 
I l 8  Leviathan, pp. 147-148. 
unfortunate phrase. We are able to distinguish nght reasoning fkom wrong reasoning, 
and it is to this to which we know turn. 
It is quite clear to Hobbes that not al1 efforts at scientific investigation produce 
certain conclusions. Some efforts, however, do present certain conclusions. Better still, 
Hobbes supposed that we can disthguish between them. Given that we d l  reason in the 
same way (and well), a deduction that proceeds from clear, unambiguous definitions wilI 
convince others when presented publicly.llg And so he concludes that "The signes of 
Science, are ... Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the 
sarne; that is to Say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another.. . 3,120 
And so we may conclude that if Hobbes presented a scientific account in 
Leviathan, then that would make sense of his insistence that his conclusions were certain. 
We rule out other possible methods of attaining certain conclusions because Hobbes does 
not discuss any.12' We thus have some grounds for concluding that Hobbes must have 
been engaging in scientific reasoning. There is also other evidence that suggests that he 
was engaging in deductive reasoning. Hobbes claims that philosophers should engage in 
scientific argument.'22 The structure of Leviathan closely resembles Hobbes' proposal 
for a science: proceeding first with many definitions, and continuing to draw out the 
implications of them. It also makes sense of the fact that he was also trying to convince 
people of the applicability of Leviathan to the real world. It is this that makes sense of 
his appeals to ernpirical evidence, such as when he suggests that people who wish to deny 
that his definition of man applies to the real world should see if they do not agree with it 
119 Hobbes left it unsaid that the person iearning the demonstration would have to have no contrary or 
biased agenda of his or her own. 
120 Leviathan, p. 1 17. 
"' Sapience is also infallible, but it iç defined as a gathering of "much science". Leviathan, p. 1 17. 
in action, by arming themselves when going traveling, or locking their do or^.'^^ The 
purely empirical account, by contrasi., cannot explain Hobbes' claims that his conclusions 
are certain.'" And finally, the deductive account can make sense of the passage made 
much of by those who wish to deny the deductive account, to wit: 
yet, when 1 shall have set down my own reading orderly, and 
perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also 
find not the sarne in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other 
Demonstrat ion. 12' 
Given that his reference to an orderly and perspicuous presentation obviously implies the 
presentation of a scientific account, it becomes clear that Hobbes is presenting a request 
of his reader to check his proo. and see if the deduction is correct. Hobbes requests that 
the reader investigate whether the sarne results follow fiom the reader7s use of nght 
reason. 
So we conclude that Hobbes is here presenting a deductive account, not merely an 
empirical one. This interpretation rnakes sense of both the passages where Hobbes says 
he engages in deductive reasoning, and the passages appealing to facts. This also serves 
our interests as well. Were Hobbes to be found to be simply stating facts about his time, 
these results would be of much less interest for our purposes. Finding the exact details of 
our own time lacking, we have tumed to Hobbes to see what alternatives he provides for 
contractarian accounts in general. And it is with this in mind, as always, that we proceed 
to his account of human nature. 
'" Leviathan, pp. 147- 148. 
''j Leviathan, pp. 186- 187. 
124 Without resorting to an incredibly uncharitable interpretation of Hobbes' integrity as a scholar. 
'= Leviathan, p. 83. 
Lii: Natural Man 
Truly appreciating Hobbes' theory of human nature requires recalling his basic 
physical cornmitment: a body in motion stays in motion. It also requires a sympathetic 
imagination. Hobbes does not produce an exhaustive account of the physical components 
of a human being. Neither does he exhaustively examine ou. psychology - saying 
nothing, for instance, about the various ways in which we c m  combine our sensory 
experiences. This is not a failing in Hobbes' account. Hobbes is interested in 
identifjmg, through definition, various characteristics that we will attribute to actual 
people. Deriving what he can fiorn these clear definitions, his hope is that we will 
confirm that people do possess these characteristics and thereby conclude that his 
political conclusions are relevant to the real world. This does not require an exhaustive 
account, so much as a presentation of definitions and a train of thûught that his readers 
will fmd clear, and in which they will find a correct characterization of mankind.'26 
The physical properties of man being of interest only much later on in Leviathan, 
Hobbes begins by focusing prirnarily on mental properties. Al1 thoughts originate from 
sense experience. The motions of the extemal world put pressure on our sense organs, 
which in tum produce fancies in our mind, and it is those immediate fancies that are 
called sense. As our sense organs are bodies, and we sense via movement of our organs, 
and a body in motion stays in motion, the imrnediate fancies must rernain in our systern 
after the original object that produced the original motion has moved on. This remaining 
126 Hobbes does not follow this procedure as explicitIy as one might wish. This fact probably accounts for 
the disagreement regarding his method discussed above. Hobbes tends to present his theory not as a 
hypothetical construction, but as an actual examination o f  what man consists of. We will follow this style 
for its aesthetic qualities. 
79  127 motion is what we cal1 imagination, which Hobbes describes as "decaying sense . He 
immediately points out that this ought not to be taken to imply that he thinks that 
imagination eventually slows down and ceases, contra his physics, but that each motion is 
eventually overcome by other motions, as "the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the 
,9128 starres. It should be unsurprishg that Hobbes notes as salient the imagination that is 
brought about by words and the like (which he calls understanding,) given science's 
dependence upon it. This understanding can involve both understanding simply the will 
of the utterer (perhaps by only the tone of the voice, for example) and also the 
understanding of the concepts which these words are to signify. 
People c m  also manipulate their imagination, both by combining various discrete 
images, and by having one thought (image) follow after another in a train.129 These trains 
are of two sorts: guided and unguided. Unguided thought is thought not regulated by 
some end, while guided thought aims at some end identified by a passion.130 These trains 
of regulated thoughts are themselves of two kinds: those that seek out the cause of an 
imagined effect (seeking), and those that attempt to discover d l  of the possible effects of 
an imagined cause (invention). These powers exhaust the natural "Discourse of the 
~ i n d . " ' ~  ' 
Imagination dso guides our endeavors. Endeavors are defmed as the "small 
beginnings of [voluntary] Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in 
Il7 Leviathan, p. 88. 
I X  Leviathan, p. 88. 
L 29 We wiil modernize speliing when not directly quoting Leviathan. 
150 None o f  what is said here should be mistaken to imply that people are at some liberty here to direct their 
thoughts some way rather than another. Hobbes was a deteminist; he took it that 'fieedom' arnounted to 
no more than a lack of external constraints. 
13 1 Leviathan, p .  96. 
YY 132 walkuig, [etc.] . These may either be towards the cause of the endeavor (an appetite) 
or away from that cause (an aversion). As there c m  be no thought of directed action 
without an imagined end, and no imagined end without an original sense experience, it is 
obvious to Hobbes that al1 voluntary motions must be originally caused by sense 
experiences. Moreover, Hobbes posits that al1 sense experience causes an endeavor. 
This is not obvious, but c m  be taken as implied when Hobbes defines a man's contempt 
for some thing by suggesting that this is caused by a man's overcoming of the action of 
the t b g  sensed."' To be neutral towards some object, other interna1 motions must have 
been pitted against the motions produced by the experience. Al1 of this seems to suggest 
that we could have no natural appetites or aversions, but this is not so. Hobbes suggests a 
few natural, general appetites: food, excretion, and e~onerat ion. '~~ Interestingly, 
aversions need not proceed fiom experience, as Hobbes suggests that we have an 
aversion to t h g s  whose consequences we do not k n ~ w . ' ~ '  
We are now in a position to make sense of a much-misunderstood passage in 
Leviathan, to wit: 
Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, then he, 
whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. ... And therefore the 
voluntary actions, and inclinations of al1 men, tend, not only to the 
procuring, but ais0 to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in 
the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions ... and partly 
fiom the difference of the knowledge.. .each one has of the causes, which 
produce the effect desired. 
So that in the first place, 1 put forward a generall inclination of al1 
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power afler power, that 
132 Leviathan, p .  1 19. 
153 Leviathan, p.  120. 
134 Leviathan, pp. 1 19-120. Exoneration here refers to the evacuation o f  the bowels. This passage requires 
that we either: 1) conclude that these general appetites are not thoughts in the mind, or 2) conclude that 
these general appetites are to be understood as exceptions to Hobbes' preliminary remark that "The 
originatl of ... al1 [thoughts] is that which we cal1 SENSE,.-" [p. 851. 
13' L e v i a t h ,  p. 120. 
ceaseth onely in Death ... because he cannot assure the power and rneans 
to live well, which he hath presenf without the acquisition of more.136 
It is not necessary to c l a h  that Hobbes assumed, without so stating, that some men's 
desires are without limit in order to correctly derive the claim that there is a general 
inclination in men to desire (be drawn to gathering) ever increasing power. C .  B. 
Macpherson is drawn to endorse îhis position by misunderstanding the strength of 
Hobbes' claim, together with his perhaps assuming that desires result in action.13' 
Hobbes is not here clairning that it is the case that each person actually strives for power 
after power, but instead is simply saying that given human nature there is reason to 
conclude that each person has that tendency. Tendencies, as motions, may yet be 
overcome, and do not themselves result in action or manifest themselves as expressions 
of the will. 
if Macpherson's interpretation is to be believed, then this passage renders a later 
passage, in which Hobbes famously proves that the state of nature is a state of war, 
entirely irrelevant. Given scarcity we could forthwith conclude that people in a state of 
nature are in a state of war. Nevertheless, Hobbes does not do so. He hstead suggests 
that in the state of nature, given rough equality, we each can anticipate that it is likely that 
others will corne to desire the same goods, and that therefore we will be enemies, and that 
enernies seek to destroy each other, and that this leads to anticipatory strikes and that 
"6 Leviathun, p. 161. We have excluded the account of felicity in the quotation because it serves only to 
obscure the issue, and there is little point in examining a term on which Hobbes himself was so evidently 
confused. See McNielly' s The Anatomy of Leviathan (esp. pp, 129- 136) for an excellent discussion o f  how 
confused and vacuous Hobbes' discussions of felicity are in Leviathan. We have also excluded the 
inclusion of stated causes of the desire for power which do not always tead to it; they are supposed to be 
included merely for compteteness, and therefore they too only obscure the passage. 
13' See his introduction to Leviathan, esp. pp. 32-37. 
138 Leviathan, p. 184. 
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therefore the state of nature is a state of ~ a r . ' ~ ~  Any interpretation that claims that 
Hobbes7 conclusion here is so strong as Macpherson's does must contend with tbîs sarne 
objection. We claim instead that the k t  passage is designed to make it reasonable for 
people to anticipate that others will become interested in acquiring the sarne goods. We 
now turn to how he shows this. 
Given that desires are positive endeavors, which are caused by which 
are in turn caused by the senses, Hobbes' conclusion - "Nor c m  a man any more live, 
whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand"14' - 
is almost analytic. As long as one has sense, one will likely have desires. It would have 
been completely analytic if Hobbes had included having contempt and aversion for things 
sensed as well, but we cannot expect the life of the apologist to be trouble-fiee.'42 
Turning now to the tendency towards procuring and assuring a contented life, we 
suggest that the key lies in recalling the two trains of regulated thought, wherein we 
examine each imagination for its cause, and for ail possible effects. As our senses will 
always be affected by the world, we will, insofar as we are directing our thoughts, 
examine each imagination for its causes, and its effects. And upon desiring the supposed 
cause of this imagination, or upon discovenng it to be valuable or useful, either now or in 
139 Discounting, for the sake of simplicity, the secondary cause of gIory. 
140 We use the more awkward term "imagùiations" instead of "images" so as to avoid implying that al1 
sense is visuaI. 
141 Leviathan, p, 160. 
142 One can avoid this trouble if one supposes that, contra his explicit definition, "desire' here refers to any 
endeavor whatever, as he seems to when he says cc...as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and 
exoneration (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, fiorne somewhat they feele in their 
Bodies ..." [p. 1301 However this evidence does not seem decisive. 
the f i i t ~ r e , ' ~ ~  we will attempt to acquire it, or fïnd a way through which it may be 
acquired. 
Given our natural reactions to sense data, we will aiways be exarnining things, and 
corne to the conclusion, should these things be power, that we wish to obtain hem, Since 
power is only a thing that helps us secure the object of a desire, this should be 
unsurprising. That we will always seek to determine if this or that thing is a power (could 
be usefil to us) is guaranteed by our basic thought processes. That we cannot secure our 
present means without the acquisition of more power is denved straightfonvardly fiom 
the fact that prudential reasoning is not science, and therefore not certain. We can never 
be assured that we have completely secured our present goods, and so will always 
conclude that there is more that we can do to fiirther secure them. 
Given that we cannot be certain about our efforts to secure such goods as we now 
possess, our minds naturally tend to shape our voluntary motions in such a way as to 
continue to gather new resources (new powers), albeit only so far as we tend to engage in 
directed thoughts. When engaging in scientific inquiry regarding man in the state of 
nature, it is this conclusion about our basic human nature that allows us to reckon it likely 
that people will tend to attempt to gain possession of the same things. This, as has been 
previously mentioned, allows one to eventually conclude that the state of nature is a state 
of war. But this bnngs us beyond that part of Hobbes' project that is of interest to us 
here, and it is to what c m  be said both for and against Hobbes' method that we now tuni. 
143 Hobbes explicitly defines three types of  good which rnay be attributed to a thing, good in the future, 
good in itself, and good as a means. 
ïI: Critiquine Hobbes' Method 
In Hobbes' eyes, Leviathan's most obvious strength is that it is a deductive, not 
empincal, effort. That is to Say that, in his own terms, Hobbes attempted to derive his 
contractarian conclusions purely from a clear and unarnbiguous definition of what it is to 
be human, rather than an effort to examine the actions of people during his day, and 
derive his conclusions fiom such observations. This is not to Say that he paid no attention 
to the people around him, as he must have had some cause to hope that his readers would 
recognize that his account of human nature accurately portrayed humanity. Rather, he 
engaged in an effort to render conclusions that were going to be valid for al1 people, for 
al1 t h e .  
Notwithstanding the issue of whether or not his conclusions follow fiom his 
premises, Hobbes' deductive account fails to provide suficient assurance of the 
relevance of his conclusions to any particular population of people. The problem 
depends on Hobbes concluding that there is merely a tendency towards power after 
power, and that it is this alone that makes it reasonable to anticipate the state of war, 
which in tum justifies his conclusions. More specifically, it is not the content of this 
tendency that is objectionable but the reliance on a tendency itself that renders the effort 
less than satisfactory. 
Observing a mere tendency that univenally obtains is not, of itself, a strong 
enough observation to conclude that al1 people will be so motivated by that tendency in 
any particular population. In other words, while it may be the case that this tendency will 
be taken into account by anyone who is aware of it while they attempt to predict other's 
behaviors, it is not the case that this tendency will in general, or ever, result in overt 
action. 
In a critique of Leviathan, this observation may lead one to suggest, for exarnple, 
that while accepting that d l  people have this tendency to endeavor towards power after 
power, each person's learned desires tend towards resting and hiding. '41 Moreover, one 
could claim that the motions begun by these desires are stronger than those behind the 
drive for power after power, so that it is unreasunable to conclude that the state of nature 
is the state of war. 
For our purposes, this translates into the concern that whatever tendency is relied 
upon, however basic a part of human nature it is, it is not yet guaranteed that the people 
for whom the contractarian calculation is being run would act on this tendency. 
Substituting a basic, or universal, desire for Hobbes' basic tendency does not change the 
picture significantly. However basic this desire is, it is not yet guaranteed that people 
care about it sufficiently to endorse a set of rules based upon it. For a compelling account 
to emerge, it is required that the desire used is sufficiently strong, or is held to be 
sufficiently important, that competing desires are extremely unlikely to be held to be 
more important. indeed, it is this strength alone that is required. Universally held desires 
are a tidy tool with which to produce a wieldly theory, but they are, strïctly speaking, 
unnecessary. A contractarian account can be produced in which different members of the 
population consider entirely different things important, as long as the contractarian 
identifies the preferences that are of paramount irnport to each type of agent. Gauthier 
takes the latter part of this observation to heart, and identiQing market transactions as 
144 This example is inspired by Kavka's discussion of the rationality of hiding out in the state of nature, and 
hoping that no one fin& you. 
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those which we may suppose are of paramount import, proceeds to constnict his market 
contractarianisrn in an effort to present a fundamental justification of his moral theory in 
Morals by Agreement. It is an examination of this effort which will occupy us in Chapter 
5. 
Chapter 5 - Gauthier's Market Contractarianism - 
In Momls by Agreement, Gauthier attempts to guide his theory between two 
almost contradictory observations, given his allegiance to a rational choice theoretic 
conception of reason and a cornmitment to reconciling rationality and morality. On the 
one hand, he recognizes that if a mord theory were to produce duties genuinely in the 
interest of each individual agent, "morality wouid be ~ u ~ e r f l u o u s . " ~ ~ ~  Rational agents 
have no need of counsel instnicting them that they must act in their best interest - they do 
so naturally. On the other hand, no moral theory which cannot recornmend itself to an 
agent's rationality has any hope of being effective in action. Given a cornmitment to 
instrumental rationality, where to act rationally is to act in an effort to maximize the 
fulfillment of one's interests, it seems inevitable in light of these observations that the 
construction of a rationally compelling moral theory is doomed to fail. What is a 
contractarian to do? 
These observations seem to allow for no navigation between them. In offerïng his 
solution to this dilemma, Gauthier proposes a heterodox account of rational choice 
theory, introducing the notion of a rational disposition by which to avoid falling prey to 
the consequences of the first observation while respecting the second. It wiwil be recalled 
that we have embraced the orthodox rationai choice theoretic account. It will also be 
recalled that we have not, to this point, made any argument for the rejection of Gauthier's 
account of rational choice. In this chapter we jus- our allegiance to the orthodoxy. In 
doing so it must be clear that we are able to avoid the dilemma posed above, and still 
David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 1 
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produce a contractarian moraiity. And so the flavor of this chapter wiil, of necessity, 
occasionally adopt a more critical tone than that of the previous chapter. 
We should not be understood to be diverging fiom the reasons that brought us, in 
the previous chapter, to examine Leviathan witb such care, so much as supplementing 
them wiîh a critical analysis. It is stiil our intention to search Gauthier's work for what it 
may tell us about our efforts to construct a non-exhaustive account of peoples' interests 
and beliefs which, when applied to a contractarian endeavor, nevertheless will result in a 
maxirnally compelling justification. We still suggest focusing on what is widely 
acknowledged as Gauthier's most masterfuI and compelling presentation of his efforts 
(Morals by Agreement). And we will still be more interested in examining the logical 
structure of Gauthier's account than in examining whether fiis output is compelling as a 
recognizably moral theory. '46 
The one stylistic different between our presentation of Hobbes' efforts and 
Gauthier's is that we will be less focused on textual evidence and the clarification of the 
author's intent, preferring instead to thematicaily develop and surnmarize Gauthier's 
commitments. This luxury is afforded us for a number of reasons, Due to stylistic 
developments in the three and a third centuries between Leviathan and Morals by 
Agreement, Gauthier is significantly cIearer when identieing his intentions and 
arguments than Hobbes was. Further, Gauthier's prose is also less troublesome to 
interpret, as his style is more familiar to us than Hobbes'. Finally there are relatively 
fewer interpretive traditions that fundamentally misunderstand Morals by Agreement than 
Leviathan; and so we have less to overcome. This is also a necessity forced upon us by 
146 Accordingly we will concentrate on presenting the structure of chapters IV through VIL 
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the complexity of Gauthier's arguments. To accurately present a detailed analysis of 
Gauthier's arguments would be well beyond the scope of the present effort. 
I: The Proiect 
in an effort to prove the rational obligatoriness of rnorality, Gauthier must, 
analytically, provide al1 people reason to adopt and adhere to the content of m o r d i ~ .  In 
doing so he must first provide some goal to which al1 strive, thereby providing the 
motivation to so adhere. Some state of affairs, superior to our natural condition, towards 
which we find ourselves willing to proceed over al1 other possible options, must be 
presented. To fil1 this role, Gauthier presents the perfectly competitive market. It is the 
perfectly competitive market in which Gauthier fmds sufficient promise of mutual 
advantage, shodd it be realized, to argue that our rational reflection would counsel 
attempts to emulate the sarne. The conditions that d e h e  a perfectly competitive market 
are thought superior in the same way that any defined market is superior: transactions are 
possible only within a market, and transactions are, by d e f ~ t i o n ,  desired by the 
participants. A11 participants, therefore, desire a market. It is still a question whether or 
not ail pesons wish to be participants, sornething we shall address below. 
Simultaneously, in the market Gauthier finds patterns of behavior in which the 
dictates of morality would have no meaningfil place. In the perfectly competitive market 
each person acting so as to maximize his or her utility tends towards a distribution of 
goods that is in equilibrium; each will eventually prefer what he or she owns through 
trade to any other bundle of goods available. This state of &airs is also found to be 
Pareto optimal; agents acting fiom self-interest produce a state of affairs in which no one 
couid be made better off without someone else being made worse off. In a perfectly 
competitive market there &se no cases where one person attending to self-interest leaves 
some other worse off than the latter would otherwise be. As Gauthier identifies these 
cases as those to which moral constraints correctly apply, he clairns îhat the perfectly 
competitive market is a morally fiee zone. For Gauthier, mordity is relevant only in 
market situations that are not perfectly competitive. Morality k d s  its reason d'etre to be 
the correction of market faiiures, and that exclusively. 
In the perfectly competitive market, people act under certainty14' in an effort to 
maximize their consumption of products while minimizing their provision of factor 
services in both production and exchange. Not only certain about both the fixed nature of 
their circumstances and the characteristics of the same, actors are also certain of the 
actions and reactions of their feliows, and so make choices parametrically. Al1 products 
and factors of production are assumed to be exclusively and exhaustively owned. That is, 
everything is owned; and each good is owned by only one individual. 
Al1 goods are M e r  supposed to affect only one person's utility function, and so 
consumption is exclusive, as is enjoyment. Once a good is consumed, no other person 
may consume it, and "each person's utility is strictly detennined by the goods he 
consumes and the factor s e ~ c e s  he provides. Y, 148 This latter stipulation is aiready 
familiar to the reader as Wicksteed's assumption of non-tuisrn, discussed in chapter 2. 
These assurnptions are ali necessary to guarantee the absence of externalities - effects on 
some person's utility arising fiom an act of production, exchange, or consumption where 
this person is not a participant, or not a willing participant, in the exchange. The 
existence of externalities upsets the matching of supply and demand, which in turn may 
"' Certainty may be contrasted to the uncertainty outlined in Chapter 2 o f  this thesis. 
14' Morals By Agreement, p. 86. 
upset the equilibrium outcome of the market being optimal- The stipulations that defme a 
perfectly competitive market are jointly sufficient to ensure that the market equilibrium is 
also ~ ~ t i r n d . ' ~ ~  
Appealing to the intuition that Robinson Crusoe has no cornplaint to make about 
the outcome of his choices on a deserted island, Gauthier argues îhat each individual has 
no cornplaint to make for her treatrnent in a perfectly competitive market. Just as each of 
Robinson Crusoe's choices was completely voluntary, so too is each person's choice (and 
outcome) when situated in a perfectly competitive market. The results being known with 
certains., and chosen pararnetrically, no one may claim that the workings of the market 
treated him or her unfairly. Each person's gain in market activity is equal to the worth of 
her voluntary contribution. No one is singled out for special treatment - preferential or 
otherwise. Where equilibrium and optimum coïncide in the perfectly competitive market, 
there is no place for morality as impartial constraint. Morality has no place because each 
chooses fieely ta be affected by any transaction, the benefits of which are proportional to 
her contribution; and the optimality of the market means that any divergence would make 
one person better off only at the expense of some other - an expense that this unfortunate 
other wodd not agree to, given the assurnption of non-tuism. Any forced deviation fiom 
the workings of a perfectly competitive market would therefore involve choosing to value 
one person's advantage over another person's corresponding disadvantage - to treat 
people partially. 
As Gauthier recognizes, this result applies only to the workings of the market, not 
to the initial distribution of factor endowments. "But neither the operation of the market 
. - 
149 This analysis does not include a discussion of rent, as explicidy recognized by Gauthier in Morals by 
Agreement, p. 98. 
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nor its outcome c m  show, or can even tend to show, that its initial situation is .. . either 
rationally or morally acceptable."lsO Fair outcornes are the results of the perfect market 
working fiom a fair initial distribution. Modifjing the unacceptable Hobbesian claim 
that each person's initial endowment is whatever they can make use of, Gauthier presents 
an alternative which is more compatible with the perfectly cornpetitive market. Making 
use of Hobbes' description of initial endowments allows for non-private goods. If you 
are stronger than others, you then have a right to use their body, as do they. Gauthier 
proposes instead that each person's basic endowment is what he or she can make use of, 
and which no one else could make use of in his or her absence. This is easily seen to 
include each person's mental and physical abilities, but does seem to leave a lot of the 
world unclaimed. That this is the correct (rational and fair) conception of the basic 
endowment is the focus of Gauthier's arguments for his version of the Lockean proviso, 
to which we now tum. 
Gauthier proposes that his Lockean proviso (hereafter simply 'the proviso') is the 
rational and fair way of extending each person's basic endowment in natural interaction 
@re-agreements) to include those goods not yet so apportioned. He suggests for 
consideration that the proviso be understood as excluding the worsening of the situation 
of any person by predation or any other way, excepting only situations in which this is 
necessary to avoid worsening your own position. It is worthy of note that 'worsening' is 
here understood as a different animal fiom 'failhg to make betîer 0 ~ " ~ '  As this proviso 
is intended to apply to interactions in a less comprehensive (and more intuitive) sense 
than that defined in chapter 2, 
'Y) Morais by Agreement, p. 94. 
15 1 See esp. Morals by Agreement, p 
Gauthier claims that "the proviso prohibits bettering one's 
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situation through interaction tbat worsens the situation of another. This, we cl&, 
79  152 expresses the underlying idea of not takùig advantage. If this proviso is found to be 
both rational and fair, then it justifies not oniy the acquisition of property, but also 
treating personal abilities as being a part of each person's basic endowment. There is no 
way to make use of someone's body or mind against their will which would not run 
counter to this proviso. 
That this is the rational baseline from which to enact any bargains cornes from 
Gauthier's much-maligned supposition that bargains, which involve baselines derived at 
least in part fiom predatory activities, or the taking of advantage more generaily, are not 
stable.lS3 The reason for this is that it is not rational for one to be disposed to fuifil1 
bargains in which predation helped determine the baseline. It is not rational to be so 
disposed because being so disposed would then encourage predators to take advantage of 
you. It wodd be better, overall, if you were not so disposed, and so did not provide an 
incentive for predation. If it is not rational to be so disposed, then it is not rationai to 
comply with bargains thus made.'" This, in tum, allows Gauthier to suggest that 
correcting al1 effects of taking advantage of potential cooperative partners in the past is a 
precondition for rational agreement. Without such a correction, no bargain is 
recommended, as no cornpliance is expected. The conclusion drawn is that any violation 
15' Morals by Agreementy p. 205. 
15' See for examples Jan Narveson "Gauthier on Distributive Justice and the N a m l  Baseline", 
Con@actarianism and Rational Choice, Peter Vallentyne, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press), 
199 1. pp. 127-148; Jean Hampton "Two Faces of Contractarian thought" Contractarianjsm and Rational 
Choice, Peter Valtentyne, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press), 199 1. pp. 3 1-55; Chrk Tucker, "A 
Moral Obligation to Obey the State", Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 34:2-3,2000, pp. 333-347. 
154 This depends in large part on Gauthier's heterodox rational choice theory, in which 'disposition' is a 
technical term. We wilI dwell upon it in greater detail beiow, however, and even an intuitive understanding 
of the term suffices for the level of discussion presented here. 
of the proviso must be corrected, as the proviso forbids the taking of advantage. And so 
the rationality of the proviso as a pre-condition for rational bargaining is demonstrated. 
That the proviso is fair is much less adequately defended - relying again on the 
identification of fairness with impartiality, and suggesting that to re-distribute any goods 
acquired in cornpliance with the proviso would requïre bettering one person at the 
expense of another. In other words, the redistribution would require partial treatrnent. 
That this may be suggested of any other exhaustive distribution of goods seems to 
trivialize Gauthier's argument, but it is not o u  intent to be overly critical, and we will 
waste no more time upon this point. HaWig identified Gauthier's rational pre-condition 
against which bargaining may take place, we turn to his argument that it is rational to 
dispose oneself to constrain pursuit of maximum expected utility in certain cooperative 
scenarios - arguments for the adoption of a moral 
Gauthier envisions a scenario in which a rational agent is attempting to determine 
which disposition she ought to adopt. Whether, on the one hand, to adopt a disposition to 
always act in such a way so as to maximize her own utility given the strategies she 
expects others to adopt in strategic situations (become a straightforward maximizer), or, 
on the other hand, to adopt the disposition of a constrained maximizer. The constrained 
maximizing disposition is best described (unsurprisingly) by Gauthier himself. In laying 
out the formal conditions of this disposition, Gauthier states that 
We shall therefore identiQ a constrained maximizer thus: (i) someone who 
is conditionaliy disposed to base her actions on a joint strategy or practice 
155 A significant part of the argument that the constraint argued for by Gauthier is moral constraint depends 
on the fact that the agreed distribution of the benefits of rational agreements will accord with his principle 
of minimax relative concession. His argument that this is both the rational agreement point, and that this 
point is recognizably moral, provides the linchpin to his argument that constrained maximizen adopt moral 
dispositions. We will not dwell upon Gauthier's developrnent of minimax relative concession because it 
was never our intention to dwell overlong on considering whether his efforts adequately captured morality. 
should the utility she expects were everyone so to base his action be no 
less than what she would expect were everyone to employ individual 
strategies, and approach what she would expect fiom the CO-operative 
outcome determined by minimax relative concession; (ii) someone who 
actually acts on this conditional disposition should her expected utility be 
greater than what she would expect were everyone to employ individual 
strategies. Or in other words, a constrained rnaximlier is ready to co- 
operate in ways thaf, if followed by aZZ, would yield outcornes that she 
wouldfind beneficial and not unfair, and she does CO-operate should she 
expect an actual practice or activiîy to be beneficial. In determining the 
latter she must take into account that some persons will fail, or refuse, to 
act CO-operatively. ' 56 
Choosing between these dispositions, a person need only consider the situations in 
which the two dispositions, if adopted would counsel different courses of action. Given 
the definitions of straightforward and constrained maximization, above, these situations 
are characterized by the possibility of a fair and beneficial CO-operative outcome, and also 
some advantage gained fiorn defection via some deviation fiom the CO-operative strategy. 
In any interaction, constrained maximizers face either a straightforward 
maximizer or another constrained maximizer. If they face a constrained rnaximizer, then 
they are both in a position to realize the benefits of the CO-operative outcome. If they 
face a straightforward maximizer, then they behave like a straightforward maximizer, and 
are not taken advantage of 
Straightforward rnaximizers also wiIl face either a constrained maximizer or a 
shghtforward maximizer. If they face another straightforward maximizer, then they 
both adopt individual strategies, and are not able to take advantage of the benefits of 
defecting fkom any CO-operative strategy. If they face a constrained maximizer, then they 
still both adopt individual strategies, and both fail to take advantage of the beneiits of 
defecting, but also fail to gain the benefits of adopting a CO-operative strategy. No 
156 Morals by Agreement, p. 167, emphasis added. 
benefit is realized fiorn defection, yet con-ed maximizers are able to take advantage 
of the benefits of joint strategies; and so the rational disposition to adopt is the disposition 
of constrained maximization. Thus is the rationaiity of moral constraint proved. 
As Gauthier makes perfectly clear, the rationality of moral constraint depends on 
a heterodox rational choice theory. In navigating between the constraining nature of 
moral dictates and the interest driven account of rationality, Gauthier has created a gap 
between them by introducing the notion of a disposition. in Gauthier's proposed 
alternative, a disposition is rational "if and oniy if an actor holding it can expect his 
choices to yield no less utility than the choices he wouid make were he to hold any 
alternative disposition."157 A choice, in turn, is rational if it is expressive of a rationally 
held disposition. in such a way c m  rationality maintain a link with interests, and 
nevertheless council constraint. Notwithstanding this substantial advantage, we do not 
support such a radical alternative conception of rationality. In what follows we suggest 
that this benefit may be had by the orthodox conception of rational choice, and so there is 
no need to adopt such a radical alternative. The cost of doing so is sirnply reinterpreting 
what it is that we suppose we are doing when we council that a person constrain their 
utility-maximizing activities. It is M e r  suggested (although not much more than 
suggested) that dispositions would cause more trouble than they are worth. 
II: Dispositions, Rationalitv, and Constraint 
Gauthier suggests that a rational choice ought to be understood as one that 
expresses a disposition which it would be rational to adopt, and that a disposition is the 
rational one to adopt if and only if its adoption would maximize expected utility at least 
157 Morals by Agreement, p- 1 82- 1 83. 
as well as any other alternative. We Say that such a radical departure fiom the standard 
account of rational choice is not necessary for Gauthier's purposes.'58 In proposing an 
account of rational morality that is nevertheless a constraint upon behavior, Gauthier 
conjures up an intermediate piece of mental machinery of which the rational agent may 
make use. In no other way can the link between the constraint of morality, and the 
interest based nature of rationality, be maintained. Gauthier claims that a rationd 
disposition, chosen in an effort to maximize expected utility, can occasionally counsel 
one not to act in a straightforwardy maximizing manner. There are many problems with 
this account that extend far beyond any particulars of the argument - problems with the 
introduction of dispositions as rational apparatus. Dwelling on these problems would at 
this point be premature. If no alternative presents itself which c m  overcome the 
problerns inherent in attempting to present a rationally compelling account of a moral 
theory that counsels constraining the pursuit of self interest, then, however problematic, 
the introduction of dispositions is a necessary evil. There is a viable alternative account 
available to us, however. We suggest that the contractarian project be understood as 
providing counsel as to which preferences it is rational to adopt in order to maximize the 
expected utility of one's current preferences. 
It has become standard in the literature to distinguish between final ends and 
instrumental ends.''' A fmal end is a goal that one has for no other reason. 1 prefer to do 
X because 1 think that X is a good thing to do. An instrumental end is an end that 1 have 
158 We will here be focusing on his contractarian purposes as described above. We will ignore Gauthier's 
work on the rationality of pre-cornmitment strategies in garnes o f  nuclear deterrence, as exemplified in 
Gauthier's "Deterrence, Maximization and Rationality", Moral Dealing, Corne11 University press, 1990, 
pp. 298-32 1. These two issues are, however, closely linked. 
1 9  See, for example, David Schmidtz's Rational Choice and Moral Agency, Princeton Universiv Press, 
1995, esp. pp. 58-59. Schrnidtz distinguishes between the commoniy accepted final, instrumental and 
acquired in order to further sorne other end that 1 have. 1 prefer to do X because I think 
that it will bring about Y, and 1 think that Y is a good thing. Y can be considered a good 
thing either instnimentally or finally. To take a tirnely (though of course counter-factual) 
example: the author of this thesis prefers to write this thesis for instrumental reasons; he 
believes that it is a way to bring it about that he acquires a Ph.D. in philosophy. Once he 
has intemalized the project, the goal of writing a thesis is an instrumental goal. He had 
no previous interest in the writing of a thesis in and of itself - in fact it seemed like quite 
a bore! The end was only acquired in order to bring it about that the author wodd be 
likely to receive a Ph.D. in philosophy. It does not matter whether the goal of receiving 
the Ph-D. is itself an instrumental goal. It may be that the goal of receiving a Ph-D. in 
philosophy was adopted as a way to tinally show that snotty grandfather of his how smart 
he really was, or it may not have been so adopted. The standard account of rational 
choice theory has no problem accounting for such a scenario, nor of evaluating the 
rationality of any choices made about the rationality of any given proposal. When 
choosing to adopt a new set of preferences fiom any given set of alternatives, the rational 
choice is to adopt the set of preferences which would maximize the expected utility of the 
set of preferences which the agent has at the time of the choice. 
So too may the contractarian effort be interpreted within an orthodox rationd 
choice theory. We c m  now roughly re-interpret Gauthier's results to show that given the 
choice between adopting no new preferences (the straightforward maximizer), and the 
adoption of a preference to CO-operate in certain strategic situations given a certain class 
of potential partners, one should choose to adopt this new preference. Duncan MacIntosh 
constitutive ends, and introduces a different kind of end: a maieutic. A maieutic end is an end to have other 
ends. We ignore this discussion for the sake of simplicity of presentation. 
has proposed this alternative account while roundly criticizing Gauthier's efforts.'60 
Since it is not yet our intention to criticize the adoption of dispositions, but o d y  to 
suggest that orthodox rational choice theory can account for what it must, we will not 
dwell upon these critiques. It is worthwhile to note that Maclntosh has gone so far as to 
suggest a rather precise preference o r d e ~ g  which ought to be adopted. This List of 
preferences goes well beyond merely a re-interpretation of Gauthier's efforts, and is an 
effort to supplant both the rnethod Gauthier proposes and the content. We have no desire 
to attempt the latter, and so will not present MacIntosh's acco~nt . '~ '  That Gauthier's 
arguments may be so re-interpreted may be adequately demonstrated by rephrasing his 
definition of the constrained maximizer, which we quoted above: 
"We shall therefore identify a constrained maxirnizer thus: (i) . someone 0[who prefers] to base her actions 
on a [faid joint strategy or practice should the utility she expects were 
everyone so to base his action be no less than what she would expect were 
everyone to employ individual strategies.. . [given that]; (ii) A. . . . her expected utility 
[also] be greater than what she would expect were everyone to employ 
individual strategies." ' 62 
in other words, a constrained maxirnizer may be thought of as someone who prefers to 
fairly CO-operate with others when CO-operative strategies afford some advantage over 
acting with individual strategies. n i e  re-interpreted quotation above seems to repeat the 
second hdf of condition (i) in condition (ii). This is due to Gauthier's separation of 
- 
160 See for examples Duncan MacIntosh, "Two Gauthier's?", Dialogue, 1991, pp. 3-32; "Preference- 
Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumentai Rationality" Canadian Journal of Philosophy (22:4), Dec. 
1992, pp. 503-530; "Co-operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma", Philosophical Sfudies, (64:3) 
December 199 1, pp. 309-32 1; "Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma", 
Pacijk Philosophical Quarferly, (72: 1)  Marc h 1 99 1, pp. 9-32- 
161 Those interested are referred to MacIntosh's "Co-operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma", 
Philosophical Studies, (643) December 199 1, esp. pp. 3 16-3 17. 
1 62 Morais by Agreement, p. 167, sûikethroughs have been added to indicate original text to be igiored and 
square bracketed text has been added. 
action and disposition, so that this disposition must be described in such a way that it is 
ciear that it is this disposition which governs action in these particular circurnstances. 
There is no need for this description in the standard rational choice theoretic account, as 
preference leads directly to action. 
And so while we have by no means ironed out al1 the problems for a contractarian 
proposal that envisions itself as recommending instrumentally valuable preferences, we 
have shown that such a proposa1 is primafacie possible.'63 This type of project does 
have the substantial advantage of being able to provide an answer to the infamous 
cornpliance problem. One follows through on the dictates contractarianism recommends 
because after adopting the instnimentally valuable preferences, you then desire to follow 
through on the dictates, There is one large problem for such an account, however. It may 
seem that by providing straightfonvard rational choice theoretic counsel, contractarianism 
fails to account for the role of constraint in moral theory. If there is no constraint in ths 
contractarian account, then there can be no claim that the contractarian provides an 
account of morality. 
Or so it may seem. Where Gauthier decided to create a wedge in order to separate 
moral constraint and rational choice with the introduction of dispositions, we choose to 
modi& the presupposition of morality as requiring a kind of constraint. Given the 
intuitive force of the idea that morality must involve constraint - an intuition shared by 
Gauthier, Danielson, and cornmon sense - we must attempt to neutralize that force before 
presenting an account of moral theory that tosses it aside. We turn to the examination of 
the intentions of a saint. Saints will here be identified with persons who have final ends 
163 One of the most glaring difficulties being that we have no argument at al1 for how strongIy these 
preferences should be preferred in order to maximize expect utility. 
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that already conform to the dictate of a rational choice contractarian account. They will 
not need to constrain their actions to conforrn to the dictates of morality. If rnorality 
entails constraint, then they seem to not act morally. However this conclusion is at odds 
with our cornmon judgments. Saints are the very exemplars of moral agents* 
To state the case somewhat differently, becoming a saint is seen as the goal that 
most moral agents strïve towards, but fail to perfectïy attain. Insofar as we see the moral 
life as worthy of effort, we attempt to become saint-like, and encourage others to do the 
same. It seems that constraint, then, is not a necessary part of our moral judgments. 
Worse still for proponents of the constraint mode1 of morality, it seerns that there is some 
case to be made that it is preferring to act morally that is our ulthate moral goal. How 
could we have gone so wrong? 
We propose @ut certainly do no more than propose) an alternative account with 
which to explain our intuition that morality involves constraint. In the real world, it is 
one thing to know that you ought to adopt a set of preferences other than the one you 
currently have, and quite another to actually intemalize these preferences. Sara knows 
that she ought to prefer to eat more vegetables, but dani it, veal is so much more 
appetizing! In the real world, in order to corne to prefer something different from what 
we do currently, we must modify our behavior somewhat. We might hang out with 
people who currently love what we do not, in an effort to fïnd something desirable in it. 
We might avoid that which we currently like, in an effort to overcome our attachment to 
it. We might have someone attach electrodes to our body, in an effort to negatively 
reinforce behaviors detrimental to this change we wish to intemalize. In short, we 
modify our behavior patterns in order to mod@ our preferences. In moral cases 
(ignoring whether or not Sara's veal preference is a moral issue) this changing of 
. . behavior would look suspiciously like constrammg the maximizing pursuit of the 
satisfaction of our preferences. But a straightforward maximizing account may be made 
for this apparently constrained (irrational) behavior. Upon coming to the conclusion that 
it is worthwhile (in our interest) to change our current preferences, we modiQ our current 
behaviors in order to do so. And so we see no need for the constraint of self-interest to be 
a necessary part of acting morally. 
The case seems at least as appeaiing in the case of Our encouraging others to be 
moral agents. Jan Narveson has pointed out that one of the features of a mord system is 
that agents who engage in actions that are required by it are praised, and agents that 
engage in actions that are proscribed by it are blamed for so acting. This is a part of the 
informal, uncentralized reinforcement of the dictates of morality. '" Such reinforcement 
aims at changing the behavior of immoral agents, and reinforcing the behavior of morally 
inclined agents. In short, decentralized rewards and sanctions seems to be used in part to 
make it the case that agents who are not saints eventually prefer to act morally. 
At first blush, one rnight suggest that people engaged in such activities are 
encouraging people to constrain their behaviors. But the use of praise and blame, and 
more generally reward and punishment, is better understood as an exercise in behavior 
modification. Behavior modification differs fiorn mere constraint because of the results 
over time. By merely constraining a river fiom running down some section of its bed by 
damrning it up, 1 do not thereby expect that, upon removing the impediment the river will 
thereafter fail to rush through that area. But, by digging an alternative bed that is deeper 
164 See Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, Temple University Press, 1988, esp. p. 125. Also see section 
3.22 of his essay "Remarks on the Foundations of Mords", forthcorning. 
and wider than the original riverbed, and channeling the river through that bed, 1 thereby 
expect that the river will nin tlrrough the modified route. Moral (re)education aims to 
change the preferences of people through behavior modification. The hope is that such 
praise and blame will no longer be necessary, that eventudly the agents will prefer to act 
morally. 
Having argued for the plausibility of an orthodox rational choice theoretic account 
of mordity, it may now be appropriate to briefly detail some of the largest problems 
endemic to a dispositional account of rnorality. In such a way we hope to present not 
only a defense of the plausibility of an orthodox rational choice contractarian account that 
ignores the need to explain constraint's place in moral theory, but also show that this type 
of project avoids certain difficulties thought fatal to the type of proposai favored by 
Gauthier. 
In the first place, there is the problem of how often one ought to engage in 
deliberation regarding the rationality of one's disposition. If it is an effort that is 
undertaken only once in one's life, then it is difficult to understand how one could 
possibly hope to rationally calculate the correct disposition to a d 0 ~ t . l ~ ~  Recalling 
Danielson's recognition that the disposition you should adopt depends on the dispositions 
adopted by the rest of the population with whom you expect to interact, and that the 
population is likely to change over time, any calcuiation made over so long a period of 
time seems rationally suspect. Moreover, there is the question of when it would be 
rational to engage in this deliberation, assuming that agents have a choice about this. 
Given the foolishness of movuig f i s t  in any game where predation is possible, choosing 
165 This general objection lurks behind many of the objections MacIntosh rnakes to Gauthier's dispositional 
account of rationality. 
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a disposition before anyone else in the population does dso seems il1 advised. No 
solution to this puzzle is likely to be forthcoming. Requiring choosing a rational 
disposition any other number of times is likeiy to be either an ad hoc stipulation, or to 
depend on the clairn that the correct number of times to choose a rational disposition is 
the rational number of times - that is to Say, the number of times that it would be utility- 
maximizing to do so. Such a project quickly becomes much too complicated to compete 
with the simpier alternative we endorse above. This is so especially when one considers 
that if the fiequency of deliberation regarding a rational disposition becomes too great, 
the compliance problem re-emerges. If it is rational to re-assess one's disposition too 
regularly, one could be a constrained maximizer at the time of an agreement but re- 
emerge as a straightforward maximizer in order to defect when it comes time to act. 
We add to this MacIntoshYs observation that if a disposition is understood as 
being activated in certain situations, and forcing an agent to choose differently fiom how 
they othenvise would (in such a way as to maxirnize their expected utility directly) then 
dispositions act as an involuntary constraint. The text quoted above does support such an 
interpretation. Insofar as this concerns the adoption of the disposition, this seems 
mproblematic: the adoption of the disposition is voluntary, and so may be considered 
mord. But this is not constrained behavior, and so on Gauthier's own tems would fail to 
be genuinely moral. In situations where the disposition is engaged, however, this would 
entai1 that the behavior exhibited by the agent was not voluntary, though it would be 
constrained behavior. Insofar as we think that an action must be voluntary in order to be 
moral, dispositions might be thought to ensure that any action resultuig from constraint 
was not moral behavior. There is no such problem with the orthodox contractariankm 
outlined above. In short we conclude that together these problems are suficiently 
significant and cornplex, to suggest that the sirnpler alternative ou@ to be embraced. 
III: Examining Gauthier's Project 
Now that 1 have both defended the orthodox account over Gauthier's proposal, 
and shown how one may translate the resdts of the latter into something usefiil for the 
former, the tirne has corne to see what Gauthier's efforts have to offer to our central 
problem. From the revisions to Gauthier's account, we have concluded that those 
interested in maximizing the advantage to be derived fiom CO-operative encounters, in 
which they will either be pitted against straightfonvard or constrained maxirnizers, would 
rationally choose to adopt preferences regarding how to interact in these situations. More 
specifically, they adopt preferences to fairly CO-operate with others who also so prefer, 
and otherwise to not CO-operate when others would prefer to defect on the agreement. As 
Danielson points out, one significant weakness of Gauthier's program is that it does not 
consider al1 possible patterns of interactive p e f e r e n ~ e s . ' ~ ~  Insofar as Danielson's and 
Gauthier's projects are considered comparable, Danielson may be understood as 
attempting to correct that deficiency, although he, too, obviously falls short.167 
We do not think this so serious a charge as Danielson does, although we suppose 
that this is so for particularly biased reasons. Our contractarian proposal made in chapter 
two makes it quite clear that what we are interested in obtaining is some method through 
which to provide a rationally compelling justification of a morality to an existing 
population. Not al1 possible motivations are of interest to us, only the motivations of the 
'66 Danielson, ArtFcial MoraIiry, esp. pp. 13-14. 
'" As he recognizes at the end of his book, given his open invitation for others to continue ta test various 
models. See Ibid. p. 202. 
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existing population. More correctly, it is the production of a compelling rnorality while 
avoiding reliance upon an exhaustive account of these motivations that here concems us. 
Ln any case, we are not concerneci with the extension of this problem to al1 possible 
populations. 
More significant is the conditional nature of Gauthier's argument- Gauthier's 
argument captures oniy those people interested in strategic interactions, and in 
maximizing their expected utility in some of these encounters. Not al1 people can be 
expected to share this interest. Some may prefer self-sufficiency, and we may not 
dismiss the stoic lifestyle out of hand. Gauthier will not find this probIematic, as 
morality as envisioned in Morals by Agreement covers only market activities, aiming to 
correct only market failures. For Gauthier, merely occupying the sarne environment and 
making use of the same resources is not yet enough to suggest that morality has a place. 
We define an interaction more broadly than Gauthier's market interactions and daim that 
rnorality may have something to Say about these as well. An interaction is one in which 
some person's utility is affected by an action of some other person. As suggested in 
chapter 2, we cannot yet rule out the possibility that moral theory has something to Say 
about al1 such interactions. Since this is so we cannot discount the hennit from possible 
inclusion in the moral sphere. 
Herrnits and Stoics, we may reasonably suppose, are not trying to maximize 
utility in market transactions, and so cannot rationally be convinced by any proof 
dependent upon the assumption that they are motivated to do so. This is not to Say that 
Gauthier's account holds no appeal. Insofar as someone is interested in maximizing the 
benefits of actual, imperfect, market transactions, Gauthier provides good reason for thern 
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to adopt the proposed preferences. There is M e r  good reason to suppose that this 
interest is almost paramount; market societies abound and those failing to be market 
societies still evidence significant co-operative behavior between individuals. Common 
phrases like "everyone can use a fiend", "no one is an Island" and 'Uon't burn your 
bridges" al1 attest to the importance that people place upon the co-operative surplus 
which may be generated by working well with others. Gauthier7s strength is Hobbes' 
weakness: Gauthier recognizes as significant the interest that most people have and that is 
often effective in action, namely, the interest in productive cooperation. Hobbes' 
strength is also Gauthier's weakness: Hobbes', if correct, identifies a trait that is universal 
arnongst the population, albeit not one that is necessarily effective in action. Et is to see 
what we may glean fi-om the two proposals that will hereafter occupy our attention. 
Chapter 6 - Where we end up - 
1. Justifvine the Contractarian's Efforts. 
A common phenornenon in any course that introduces students to moral theory is 
the inevitable espousal of ethical relativism by one of the more outspoken students in the 
group. "But why are we bothenng with al1 this stuff?" they ask, "It's al1 just what you 
feel is right anyway, isn't it?" Upon being asked what they mean by that remark, 
students tend to respond that the ri& thing to do is either: whatever you want (ethical 
subjectivism), whatever you feel is right (conscience theory), or whatever your society 
tells you is right (cultural relativisrn). Responding by conter-example, one can generally 
overcome ethical subjectivism by pointing to particular people in history who (almost) 
everyone wouid cal1 immoral, but who were nevertheless simply doing what they wanted. 
The merest mention of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, or The Marquis de Sade is usually 
sufficient to convince people that ethical subjectivism is not a position that they can 
reflectively endorse. Pointing out that if it were the case that any of these people thought 
that they were doing the moral thing then conscience theory would proclaim that they 
were doing the right thing is also usually sufficient to convince people that they are not 
supporters of this position either. Cultural relativism is usually overcome by citing 
example of extremely repugnant behaviors systematically recomrnended by existing 
societies. Pointing to societies that engage in fernale genital mutilation or the killing of 
unwanted children by leaving them to die of exposure tends to encourage people to 
closely examine alternative mord theories. 
But the lecturer who has so responded has engaged in a useful (some might even 
Say necessary) sleight of hand. Pitting the student's moral intuitions against the cited 
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persons or societies, and finding that they diverge, does not show the falsity of ethical 
subjectivism, conscience theory, or cultural relativism. It may be that al1 that this shows 
is that each çtudent so convinced personaiiy disapproves of the person or cuIture. From 
such disapproval it in no way follows that any of the subjective moral theories are false, 
but only that the disapproving student does not consistently espouse ethical subjectivism. 
The perceptive student recognizes this, and one occasionally receives a response to that 
effect. Mere intuition divergence in no way disproves subjectivist ethical theories. This 
perceptive student has picked up on the general acceptance of skepticism regarding the 
validity of moral theories; it seems unlikely to most that one could rise above the mere 
clashing of intuition against intuition when discussing the moral standing of particular 
activities. 
This skepticism has led to a shift fiom the identification of what the correct moral 
theory is, to a series of debates regarding what the right thing to do is, in particular 
circurnstances. In political theory, efforts have shifted away fkorn attempts to justiQ a 
particular institutional arrangement, and have focused instead upon how one ought to be 
treated in such arrangements- Rawls' progress may be taken as a telling exarnple of, and 
perhaps a significant contributhg factor to, this shift. A Theory of Justice attempts to 
justify a particular theory (justice as faimess) over another particular theory 
(utilitarianism). In Polirical Liberolism Rawls shifts his emphasis to see instead what 
institutions would maximally realize the ends of a liberal democracy. If your moral 
intuitions support liberal democracy, then Political Liberalism may have something to 
Say regarding how to best realize your supposed moral state of &airs. 
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Or perhaps not. The force of these efforts rest on  presenting a theory regarding 
how to act in certain circumstances that follows fiom widely and strongly held intuitions, 
Unfortunately, for this and other similar efforts, it seems that no such intuition exists, or 
does not do so in a vacuum. People seern divided regarding the most basic moral 
intuitions. Theorists who fiercely cling to the moral intuition that people ought to be 
treated with respect tend to be pitted against theorists who just as fiercely cling to the 
intuition that people ought to be left alone. This cornes to the fore most clearly in 
arguments regarding redistributive taxation - one side concluding that taxation ought to 
be allowed to the degree to which it is necessary to ensure human dignity, and the other 
strenuously denying exactly that. People who seem to agree on a particular intuition 
disagree regarding its strength relative to others. Those who agree that a person ought to 
keep her promises, and that a person ought to help people out of dangerous situations, 
nevertheless may also disagree about whether to keep a promise to help Kathryn study for 
her final exam (which she is sure to fail without such help) or instead give aid to a dazed 
pedestrian, helping him safely through the last few blocks to his home. And finally they 
may disagree regarding what some cornmonly held intuition entails: it may be that both 
theonsts agree that the dignity of persons must take precedence, but that the one argues 
that people's dignity is best guarded by allowing them to keep that which they have 
gathered, and that the other argues that people's dignity is best guarded by passing on 
what others have gathered to those who have not been able (or willing) to gather. Appeal 
to intuitions has largely led to intractable debate. This, in turn, has led to a deepening of 
the skepticism that was partially responsible for the adoption of such argumentative styles 
in the first place. 
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There are two problems in evidence above: disagreements regarding the 
intuitions, and disagreements regarding the implications of the intuitions. The latter is 
not our bailiwick. These disagreements find much of their root in disagreements over 
particular facts - whether dignity is best guarded by redistribution or not is clearly an 
empirical matter, assurning that one has clearly defined what dignity is. A justification of 
particular intuitions, however, is our bailiwick. Mere reliance on intuition has no t 
fûrthered the moral debate, for intuitions are insufficiently shared. Moreover, even if 
such intuitions were sufficiently shared, such a method of justification still ailows for the 
possibility that our answers might be systematicaily mistaken. It is only egotistic 
posturing that allows us to pretend that we are immune to the kinds of mistakes with 
which we have charged the slave-owners, baby killers, and woman mutilators. 
So what is our dtemative? We must attempt to rise above the mere clashing of 
intuition against intuition however unlikely the success of such an enterprise is supposed 
to be. We must provide a method with which to justiQ some set of moral intuitions in 
the face of al1 contenders. Pessirnism over the possibility of justifying a particular moral 
theory drove theorists towards a more limited mode1 in which to argue in order to provide 
what answers rnay be gleaned fiom reliance upon commoniy held intuitions. Such 
attempts at justification have become the nom, and efforts to justiG particular systems 
have largely fallen by the way. The recognition that the moral debate which relies on 
intuitions has become intractable gives a new urgency to the justificatory enterprise. No 
good advice can be given that ends with the phrase ". ..or at least, that's what I'd do!" 
Moral advice that relies for its force upon the holding of a particular intuition is not really 
good advice at dl. This advice is no more than an opinion, and to rely only on opinions 
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really is to suppose that Hitler's actions (assuming that he did not privately think that he 
was doing the wrong thing) are on the same moral level as any other person's. This 
supposition renders the enterprise of mord theory pointless. 
Have we here merely engaged in another sleight of hand? Not at dl .  Finding it 
undesirable to allow that reliance upon moral intuition is al1 that there is to the moral 
debate, due both to the intractable (and thus useless) nature of that enterprise and the 
repugnant conclusion that a sincere Stalin was a moral person, we therefore attempt to 
justi@ some intuitions over others. We attempt to provide a justification that may, in 
effect, raise the status of some intuitions to the level of moral dictates. That is not to say 
that this effort aims to justify a particular set of moral intuitions. It is clear that to attempt 
a biased justification is to end up providing no justification at d l .  Our aim is to overcome 
the skepticism regarding this justificatory enterprise so that the moral debate may 
usefùlly continue. It may be the case that the set of justified moral d e s  so identified 
includes moral dictates that were not widely held as moral intuitions; we will have to wait 
and see. 
Whether the justified moral dictates were wideIy held as intuitions or not, 
whenever a person's moral intuitions diverge from the set of rules identified by our 
efforts, the justification m u t  provide sufficient reason to set those intuitions aside, and 
embrace the justified morality. Only in such a way will this justification overcome the 
problem of intractable debates described above. It is only through a recognition of the 
superior nature of the justified morality over any particular person's intuitions regarding 
how to act that one can expect any particular person to be guided into so acting. And 
morality is about advising one how to properly behave. 
And so a fundamental justification must identi& a compelling set of moral 
dictates in a non-biased way, if it is to have any chance at convincing people that this 
identification is also a justification. This requirement is forced upon us given our project; 
if we are attempting to fùrther the moral debate, to provide reasons for certain actions or 
policies, we must provide convincing arguments. The justification must, in other words, 
give some reason for some theory's adoption, if it is to be a justification, as opposed to 
merely identification. It must produce non-question-begging reasons for the adoption of 
the set of dictates that it identifies as those of morality. Given our pre-theoretical 
understanding that moral theory has to do with recomrnending certain actions, a 
fimdamental justification of mord theory must have practical force. Our fimdamental 
justification must provide reasons for acting in accordance with the identified dictates of 
morality. These requirements, derived as they are fkom the nature of the enterprise, are in 
tum also dependent upon a certain view of morality as social constniction, as opposed to 
a rational intuitionist conception of morality, whose likely end is the skepticism we are 
trying so desperately to avoid. 
John Rawls describes rational intuitionism as the view that is characterized by 
four general features: true moral first principles correctly describe "an independent order 
of moral values", these principles are known through theoretical (as opposed to 
instrumental) reason, they rely on the mere recognition of the principles as sufficient to 
motivate one to act in accordance with them, and a statement is true when it accurately 
describes the object being dis~ussed. '~~ This is certainly an adequate representation of 
the view that contractarians must reject. Morality is not seen as an independent entity 
existing in metaphysical space, waiting to be discovered and governing action thereafter. 
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Morality, it is supposed, is both part artifice and part artifact. Human interaction, both 
intentional and otherwise, has proceeded in such a way as to give rise to morality. 
Given that we suppose that hurnan interaction has given rise to morality, we may 
turn to our primary motivation in order to both discover fiom whence morality resdted, 
and fkom whence morality is to be justified. Given that we are driven by our preferences 
to purposehl action, and that morality is supposed to be a result of human actions, we 
may conclude that moral practice arose, in large part, due to our preferences. Supposing 
that our preferences primarily govern our actions also has the eEect of dlowing our 
justification of morality to proceed fiom the same domain fiom which the practice arose. 
The need for a justification arïses because our actions are also driven in part by affect, 
and our reasoning skills are imperfect. These imperfections obscure the logic of 
morality . 16'
Without this obscuring of the end of morality, it would be perfectly obvious what 
reason we have to adopt moral behaviors. With the observation that people are 
imperfectly rational and have affected behaviors, we may also expect that particular 
moralities that exist in society may not maximally achieve their goal; they may fail to 
maximize the satisfaction of people's preferences given interactions with others in 
various real-world circurnstances. This aiiows the theorist to expect some separation 
between actual practiced moralities, and the identification of a critical moral theory that is 
maximally compelling - a theory that would, if presented to people, actually be thought 
to have the best chance to maximize preference satisfaction. In such a way we can speak 
- -- 
168 See esp. Chapter 3 of Political Liberalism. 
'" Gauthier makes a similar point in Morak by Agreement, p. 60-6 1 .  
of a justification of morality and hope for a correction of some positive (existing) moral 
codes. 
And so we have corne to conclude that a fundamental justification of moral theory 
must rely upon people's preferences; that in order to present compelling reasons for the 
adoption of the tenets of morality, we must rely upon peoples' preferences. In order for 
this justification to be maximally compelling, al1 preferences must be included. 
Preferences will both identi@ and justi@ morality. Insofar as people are rational agents, 
we cm also be hopeful that the theory so identified will be reasonably close to our 
comrnon sense understanding of the content of the tenets of morality. Insofar as any 
divergence will be due to people's irrational behaviors, we al1 have reason to prefer the 
theoretically derived moral theory to any historical artifact. 
II. What form the Project must Take 
The contractarian, then, is interested in identieing a social choice (the rules 
thereafter governing behavior) via individual rational choice (which set of rules each 
person prefers to so govern). Social choice via individual choice, given cardinal utility, is 
derivable either fkom arnalgamative models or bargaining models. People's group 
choices over action are either the result of adding up each person's preferences and 
finding out what would give maximal satisfaction, or they are the result of bargains 
struck - each person coming to agree with the others over the actions to be perfonned by 
each person. In the real world each procedure is commonplace; political decisions are by 
and large made via some cakulation over what would produce the greatest good, and 
market transactions (analyticaily) involve bargaining scenarios. 
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The case of the identification of moral d e s ,  however, is a different animal 
entirely fiom the exchange of some arnount of money for a saucepan. In the case of the 
exchange of money for a saucepan, each agent (the shopkeeper and the would-be-cook) is 
able to have a rough and ready understanding of the fbture benefit of engaging in such a 
transaction. The cook has some idea of how rnuch better off he expects to be given that 
he would have a new saucepan at his disposal, and be out some arnount of money. The 
shopkeeper has some idea of how much better off he would be with some more money at 
his disposal, but be out one saucepan. These expectations depend on certain background 
conditions likely remaining the case. The cook who already has a pedectly good 
saucepan at home is likely willing to give up less money than if he had no such item. The 
shopkeeper would be less willing to exchange the saucepan for some amount of money if 
it was the case that the addition of this amount of money would put him into a new 
taxbracket, and therefore result in his having less take-home cash. It is the expected 
stability of these background conditions that makes it reasonable to ascribe a particular 
expected utility to any given trade- 
In the contractarian endeavor, however, none of the otherwise background 
conditions could reasonably be assumed to remain the same. For each piece of property 
you have at your disposal, there is a chance that it will not remain at your disposal. Non- 
taxation is not at al1 guaranteed, to Say nothing about the particular form of taxation that 
would be instigated. It may also be the case that practicing phiIosophy will be banned, in 
which case students of philosophy will be worth less to others than they might otherwise 
be. In short, no one can reasonably expect to corne to any reasonable conclusion 
regarding the relative worth of each participant's proposed contributions. As a result of 
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this, no rational bargain can be struck. It would be extremely unreasonable to suppose 
that an agent wouid engage in bargaining activities given no reasonable expectations of 
the relative value of each other person's contributions, and the relative cost of their own 
proposed contributions- The only possible reason for such a bargain would be that there 
was no other way to corne to a decision regarding the social choice of the tenets of 
morality, and that corning to any decision at al1 was thought by al1 to be in their interests, 
al1 things considered. As mentioned above, however, this is not the case. The 
amalgamative option is an available option, and it is to this option which we now 
proceed. 
Arnalgamative contractarianism seizes on the motivational force of al1 of each 
person's preferences and beliefs about any given set of d e s '  effects on the world, and 
with these in hand ranks each complete set of d e s  goveniing interaction in relation to 
each other. These results are tallied together, and the maximally preferred system of 
d e s  is identified. This should not be understood as a second-best option. It is not only 
endorsed because of the bargaining rnodel's failure to produce usefûl results. It is not 
obviously the case that most people in any given population would prefer the bargaining 
model to the arnalgamative model. There may be good reasons to suspect that, prima 
facie, those who would have greater influence should a bargainhg model be made use of 
instead of an amalgamative model would, other things being equal, prefer that such a 
model be made use of if it could be. But this has not yet taken into account whether al1 
other things are equal. If any given population has independent positive preferences 
regarding, for example, the democratic cornmitment to "One person, one vote!", then 
these prima facie reasons would not necessarily be found decisive. Even if the 
bargainhg mode1 is possible - which we have argued is unlikely - it is perhaps even then 
not always ultimately compelling, 
There is one glaring failure comrnon to al1 models which attempt to provide an 
ultimately compelling justification for mord theory. Finding that the inclusion of a 
greater nurnber of people's preferences in a justification tends to increase the reasons that 
that person has for finding the justification sufficiently compelling, and concluding that 
this implies that the ultimately compelling justification will thus be one that includes al1 
people's preferences, we find the proposal irnpractical. While the calculations required 
of this proposa1 are not too computationally complex to be undertaken, the inputs 
necessary are lacking. We do not have at our disposal an exhaustive List of each person's 
preferences and relevant beliefs about the world. No exhaustive list is likely to be 
forthcoming either. Instead of admitting defeat, or at least a temporary withdrawal fiom 
the field, we proposed to examine what characteristics a partial list of preferences must 
have, in order to provide a sufficientiy compelling justification for us to overcome the 
reliance on mere intuition in moral debate. 
III. What we have learned 
1n.i Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes presents us with a deductive account of what drives people to 
action. Starting with the principle that an object in motion stays in motion and the 
supposition that living consists of the moving of parts of a body instigated intemally, 
Hobbes eventually concludes (among other things) that people continually tend to strive 
for what they find useful. It is argued that the recognition of this striving, and the 
scarcity of things useful, will eventually drive people to conclude that it is reasonable to 
expect to corne into connict with each other. Finding this unpalatable, it is then argued 
that it is reasonable to instigate an al1 powerfid Sovereign who will change the situation 
suficiently that it is reasonable for people to foresee no such conftict. We did not 
examine Hobbes' argument for the Sovereign, as it is not his conclusions that here 
concem us. We are interested in his deduction of a preference that is always at work in 
al1 agents. 
We may attribute to Hobbes a minimal definition of an agent: an agent is that 
which has the power to move its parts through processes internal to it. Examining that 
type of agent most likely to correspond, in the relevant respects, with people, he presents 
a mechanistic process that originates in the sen se^."^ The motions of the world react 
with our bodies, via the senses, in such a way that fancies (immediate perceptions) are 
produced in the rnind. These fancies, being motions, continue to exist in the mind long 
after the initial sensory experience, and are called imaginations. Each fancy produces an 
endeavor in our mind, These endeavors are motions either towards or away fiom the 
cause of the imagination (either appetites or aversions.) These fancies are the begiming 
of voluntary motion. 
Hobbes also details our thought process. A train of thought is a succession of 
imaginations. The past succession of fancies guide ou. manipulation of thought, each 
segment in a train of thought having been joined with its predecessor and successor 
previously through the senses. These trains of thought are of two kinds: regulated and 
unregulated. Unregulated thought does not here concem us. Regulated thought takes 
170 We ignore for the sake of simpiicity the problem of the statu of Hobbes' proposed natural appetites, 
which he identifies on pages 119-120 of Leviathan. We remarked on this dificulty in 4.I.ii. 
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only two forms: that of seeking and that of inventing. Seeking involves imagining 
possible ways to bring about a particular effect. Inventing involves imagining al1 of the 
possible ways in which a particular object may be used. Neither of these types of 
regulated thought are ever idIe speculation. They always-aim at some end identified by a 
passion - the obtaining of the object of an appetite, or the avoiding of the object of some 
aversion. 
Hobbes concludes fiom this description that, as long as an agent of such a 
constitution exists, it will tend to continually acquire power after power. A power, it wilI 
be recalled, is that which is thought useful in acquiring a future good. Given that fancies 
will always be produced, and that regulated thought wiil, in part, tend towards 
discoverhg ways to acquire that for which one has an appetite, it may with some 
justification be concluded that these agents do have this tendency. 
But as Hobbes himself makes clear, each regulated thought does not, by itself, 
lead to action. It is only the last appetite or aversion in any deliberation that is identified 
as the will of an agent - as that which leads to a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  It is, ultimately, courses of 
action for which we wish to S U C C ~ S S ~ ~ ~ L ~  lobby. What we cannot rely upon is a mere 
inclination. Inclinations may be overcome. There is nothing to require that a tendency 
ever once be effective in action. In searching for an ultirnately compelling justification, 
we must search for preferences that are of paramount import. It is only in such a way that 
we can maximize the justification's efficacy- 
17' See esp. p. 127 of  leviathan, where he States "...the whole summe o f  Desires, Aversions, Hopes and 
Fears Continued tilI the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we cal1 DELIBERATION. ... In 
Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhæring to the action . . . is that wee cal1 the 
WILL". 
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IIl.ii David Gauthier 
David Gauthier presents us with compelling reasons to accept that agents, who 
fmd it to be in their interest to engage in market behavior and find themselves in a 
perfectly competitive market, have no need of the council of moral theory. In a perfectly 
competitive market each agent is affected only vofuntarily, and voluntary exchange and 
consumption tend towards equilibrium. Each person will end up satisfied with their 
bundle of goods over any other possible bundle of goods which could be received though 
trade, given the rate of exchange. It is also the case that this equilibrium state is optimal; 
no one could be made better off without someone being made worse off. Ignoring for the 
moment any claims regarding the fairness of the initial distribution of goods - claims 
which Gauthier has made some argument regarding - what need would such people have 
of moral counsel? 
In situations where CO-operative outcornes provide some benefit, and some benefit 
is also to be had fiom not acting in compiiance with the proposed CO-operative outcome, 
equilibrium and optimality do not coincide. When the possibility exists to trade some 
amount of money for a saucepan, assuming the participants are interested, there is sorne 
benefit for each if an agreement can be reached regarding the amount of money to be 
exchanged (say, $50.) Yet there is still (other things being equal) some advantage for the 
shopkeeper to attempt to retain his saucepan, and grab the $50. There is also some 
advantage for the cook to attempt to retain the $50, and grab the saucepan. In such 
situations, let us suppose, the result is that neither brïngs their item into reach of the 
other, and as a result no exchange takes place. For either agent to act differently would 
be il1 advised, as bringing the item in question into the reach of the other allows him or 
151 
her to attempt to take the offered item without engaging in the exchange. And so 
equilibrium and optimality corne apart. Each would prefer that the exchange take place, 
and would be better off if it occurred, but by each acting in such a way as to maximize 
their expected utility, no such exchange takes place; by each acting in a utiliq 
maximizing rnanner, both fail to end up in an optimal state. 
In coming to recognize the existence of these situations, our reinterpretation of 
Gauthier's arguments suggests that agents have a choice to consider regarding the 
preferences that they choose to adopt. They cm either allow their preferences to remain 
the same, or they can adopt preferences in which they prefer to act on CO-operative 
arrangements when they think that their possible partner in the interaction also so prefers, 
and otherwise not act on these possible arrangements. If they choose to keep their 
original preferences, then they will not be able to engage in exchange. Straightfonvard 
maximizers will either interact with other straightforward maximizers, or (the now 
unfortunately narned) constrained maximizers. If interacting with other straightforward 
maxirnizers, no trade will take place, for the reasons outlined above. If interacting with 
constrained maximizers, no trade will take place if the constrained maximizer correctly 
identifies with whom he is dealing. Constrained maximizers, however, when interacting 
with other constrained maximizers, will prefer to CO-operate, and so the exchange will 
take place. Optimality and equilibrium are rejoined in these situations, and so we 
conclude that these arguably moral agents are al1 better off, and morality has fuifilied its 
hc t ion .  
But this argument rests crucially on the assurnption that only agents wishing to 
engage with each other in market interactions are the agents to whom morality is to 
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apply. We take issue with this assumption. It is definitive of this enterprise that it 
attempts to cast the net of morality as widely as possible, and Gauthier's approach seems 
a hair too thin. Agents who do not so wish to engage others may still be engaged in 
interactions with others- We defïned an interaction as one in which some agent's utility 
is affected by some other person's action, and that each person engaged in an interaction 
is either affecting some other person's utility, or being so afTected themselves. Morality, 
it was supposed, exists to regulate such interactions - either by permitting, requiring or 
forbidding them. Given the nature of this project, Gauthier's proposa1 does not capture 
each agent to which morality must be justified. And so we insist that the preferences 
identified as sufficient for our project must not only be of paramount irnport, but also be 
of paramount irnport for each agent to which morality applies. 
III.iii The Possibilitv of Paramount Preferences with Universal Scope. 
When suggesting that the preferences to be made use of must be of paramount 
import, and that we must find preferences of paramount import for each agent, one might 
naturally conclude that what we need to discover is one preference that is of paramount 
import for each agent. While the discovery of such a preference, if made, wouid indeed 
be sufficient to provide the hope of a successful conclusion to our enterprise, we hold no 
hope that it will be made. Given that preferences, given beliefs, are what lead to action, 
should such a preference exist, we expect that most choice made in the world would 
provide evidence for its existence. If it were the case that every person on earth had an 
incredibly strong preference that they stay married, we would expect to see that divorce 
almost never occurred. If it were the case that every person on earth desùed their 
persond liberty over everything else, gender oppression and submissive sexual games 
would be alrnost unheard of. If ali people were driven by a respect for persons, holy wars 
would not be waged. 
There is little as obvious about people as the fact that they differ in their 
preferences. When we suggest that preferences must be found for each agent that are of 
paramount irnport, we are not suggesting that hegemonic preferences, universal in scope, 
need be discovered. We are instead simply requiring that hegemonic preferences be 
identified for each person to be guided in interaction- We also need not be committed to 
providing only one preference for each penon to be so guided. What the contractarian 
neeus is a list of preferences for each agent strong enough that however incomplete this 
set is, each agent will be sufficiently satisfied by the maximization of the consideration of 
this set of preferences in justifying the dictates of morality so as to overlook that the list 
made use of was incomplete. It is supposed that it will so satisfi people because those 
preferences that were not included were, by definition, not very strong. If they were not 
strong we can conclude it likely they would have made litîle difference in the substance 
of the rules so identified. There is nothing in this airn that requires that only a single 
preference be made use of for each agent. 
This is fortunate indeed. Were it the case that only a single overriding preference 
had to be made use of, our enterprise would have little chance of success. If it were the 
case that, for most people, a single preference was decisive in action, then people would 
be much easier to predict than we comrnonly take them to be. People, however, quite 
ofien surprise us in their activities, and many of these activities are not attributed to a 
single preference. When explaining a choice to become employed in a particular 
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profession, one tends to say things like "Well, the salary was good, and the benefits were 
fme, and 1 couldn't beat the three weeks paid vacation!" People are complicated, and it is 
unrealistic to suppose that in most cases a single preference will be found that is so 
important to a given person that its inclusion in the contractarian calculation will satise 
her. 
And so we are left with the task of identifjkg some set of preferences for each 
agent such that their inclusion in the contractarian calcdation would produce an 
ultimately compelling justification of the tenets of morality. n ia t  this is our task, as 
opposed to simply identifying a universally paramount preference that al1 people hold, 
means that we must go beyond a mere identification, and discover both the distribution 
and strength of each preference. For any particular set of preferences identified as being 
of sufficient import for a segment of the population, we would also need to identie what 
percentage of the population held the inclusion of that particular preference set to be 
sufficiently compelling. Without such a figure, mere identification of the preference set 
would not be worthwhile, as it could not be meaningfùlly incorporated into the 
contractarian's efforts. Let us suppose that it has been found that some members of the 
population hold preference set A to be sufficient. Without an identification of the 
nurnber of people who hold this set sufficiently strongly, we have no idea how much 
weight to give this set of preferences when engaging in the contractarian calculation. We 
would need to find out not only that preference set A is held, but also how many held it. 
Only upon discovery that 25% of the population held A, and 25% held B, and that the 
other 50% held C, would we be able to proceed. Without such information, we would 
not be able to effectively calculate the weight each preference set is to have in the 
calculation. Similar reasons require the relative strength (cardinal measure) of each 
preference in each set, in relation each other member of the set. Without such weighting, 
no meaningfùl calculation can proceed, as was made clear in chapter 2. 
1s it reasonable to be discouraged, given these requirements so set out? We think 
not. These requirements, while substantial, are not insurmountable. David Gauthier 
identified a large segment of the population when he suggested that morality applies only 
to agents who are interested in cooperating with each other for mutual gain. This group 
grows even larger if one includes those who are willing to tolerate each other (although 
not necessarily engage in market exchanges with them) for the peace that it provides. 
Adding to these the groups who wish to remain isolated fiom others (the stoics mentioned 
in 5.111) and those who wish to wage war on those different fiom themselves (for 
exarnple, for religious reasons) and the net seems to capture most imaginable people. 
This is offered, not as a considered proposal regarding how to capture everyone's 
interests, but instead as an exarnple meant to suggest that the chances of success are not 
so bleak as might otherwise be assumed given the conditions we must meet as outlined 
above. It is not solely through conceptual analysis that the preferences of people are to 
be descnbed, but by the linking of conceptua1 analysis with empirical evidence. But 
through what rneans may we expect to fmd evidence to which we may apply our 
analytical tools? It is this matter which concerns us in our penultimate section. 
IV. Where we should Look 
1V.i Evolutionaw Game Theory 
One possible area for exploration opens up for us because of our rejection of the 
necessity of constraint for moral activities. In chapter 5 we argued that constraint is not a 
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part of moral activities, based in large part on our intuitions regarding the moral status of 
saint-like behavior. As outlined in chapter 1 Peter Danielson rejected some evolutionary 
approaches to moral questions solely on the grounds that they would never be able to 
produce any recommendations that suggested constrained moral behaviors. Perhaps 
evolutionary game theoretic constructions codd  offer us some responses. 
Unfortunately, it is imrnediately ciear that such an enterprise is not empirical. 
Such constructions could tell us that &!agens had preference sets A, B, or C, and ifthey 
were interacting in games that had such-and-so characteristics, then the agents that had 
preference set B faired best. They might also suggest that agents which have preference 
set C were least likely to be invaded by predators, or that they would al1 be well advised 
to change their preference sets to sets A2, B2, or C2. What evolutionary game theory 
does not do is provide any information regarding the preference sets that people actually 
have. 
One form of this project tries to explain how it is that we have come to have the 
preferences that we do. Starting with a set of preferences designed to mimic the 
preferences we rnight expect to have at a lower level on the evolutionary scale, this 
project attempts to show how it is rational to have developed into people who have the 
preferences that we have now. How it is that, given our environment and interests, we 
have developed into the people that we are. The search to explain the evolution of 
altruism is of perennial interest to evolutionary game theoreticians, and stands as a 
paradigm example of such projects. It is clear, however, that these projects can o d y  
succeed if they have independently arrived at conclusions regarding the preferences we 
rnight have at a Iower level on the evolutionary scale, and the interests that we have now. 
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In short, they require what we require, a list of preferences that we actually have. It is 
empincal work alone that will produce such results, and it is the empincal sciences upon 
which we must ibcus our attention. 
IV& Historical Analvsis 
An historical andysis of human motivation d s o  hoIds some initial appeal. 
Perhaps we ought to examine what we have noted regarding past human efforts in an 
attempt to find anything consistent in it which could provide the basis for a contractarian 
justification. Hobbes himself has been thought to rely heavily on this method by way of 
assuring a close fit between his deductive efforts and the problems he saw in the real 
world, with which he was primarily con~erned . '~~  There is more than just historical 
precedent to recornmend this method, of course. A successful survey of human 
motivation over tirne would retum with data of preferences that led to actions which are 
stable over time, which could be taken to indicate both the universal applicability of the 
sets discovered (in the sense outiined above) and that these preferences are strong enough 
to lead to action. 
We must, however, carefully examine the strength of any conclusions based on 
historical analysis. Any pattern of behavior identified is likely to be only a general 
pattern of behavior, indicative perhaps of only the 'noteworthy' of humanity. Any 
historically-based pattern of behavior amounts to no more than a pattern of behavior to be 
found in those described persons. History is radically incomplete, and the results of 
combing it for a general motivation for behavior must, of necessity, be incomplete as 
'" As he States in his conclusion "And thus 1 have brought to an end my Discourse of Civil1 and 
Ecclesiasticall Govemment, occasioned by the disorders of the present time ..." He has been argued to turn 
well. This is not to Say that the pattern of behavior so identified would be found not to 
hold for people in general, but only that other means must be made use of to see whether 
this is so. 
History is also an inexact discipline. The ascnption of conflicting motivations to 
particular agents who have engaged in particular actions is cornmonplace, and 
problematic in the extrerne. If we cannot him to history to give us clear answers 
regarding the preferences of people, then it rnay not be able to help us. It may be said in 
reply that history cm help to identifi certain patterns of behavior, and that its strength 
lies in providing a large-scale analysis of human interaction. To expect exactness at the 
individual level is perhaps not only unreasonable, given the natural limitations of the 
subject, but also unnecessary. If history c m  identie general patterns of behavior, then 
we cm make use of it to provide contractarian justifications for particular moral dictates. 
Ignoring for the moment that the substantiai problern that ascribing general 
patterns of motivation is also faced with a problem of multiple possible descriptions, 
histoncally identiQing general patterns of behavior is still not s&cient for our 
contractarian efforts. A pattern of behavior so identified amounts to an identification of a 
tendency in people to act in such-and-such a way over long periods of time. But a 
justification must deal with particulars. It is to be justified to person X, person Y and 
person Z, who at this moment may not act so as to conforrn to this pattern. People at 
particular times are different than at other times, and patterns of behavior are necessarily 
abstracted fiom the particulars. If a person endorsed pacifism over 65% of his life, and 
thought seriously of beïng violent oniy when first attacked over 30% of his life, and 
to history to inform his efforts to examine the basic motivations of mankind, Pace Leo Strauss, by David 
Johnston in the first chapter of The Rhetoric ofLeviathan, Princeton University press, 1989. 
believed in indiscriminant violence over the (presurnably last) 5% of his life, an historical 
account wouid find him to be a pacifkt. Any results derived from this observation would 
likely fail to convince him of the mex-its of any case presented when he was not a pacifist. 
It could be responded that the above argument misses the point - any 
contractarian justification derived fiom general patterns of behavior will end up with a 
likely justification. If we can see that, historïcally, people tend to prefer X, Y, and 2, then 
any argument that relies upon these facts will end up producing a result compelling to 
most of the existing population. If, 80% of the tirne 75% of people are governed by 
preferences X, Y, and Z, then any particular contractarian justification that is provided by 
such methods would likely be quite compelling. This is not, however, a response 
relevant to our project. 
W s  response would mean a great deal if we were examining the stability of any 
proposed contractarian justification. If we could provide historical evidence to suggest 
that people have been motivated by exactly the preferences of which we made use when 
constructing our justification, then this would suggest that the justification would remain, 
by and large, compelling over tirne. We are not, however, primarily concemed with 
providing proofs that our justification would result in a stable conclusion, for reasons that 
will be elucidated below. We are concerned with providing a justification that is 
ultimately compelling to existing persons. Insofar as we rely upon historical information, 
we are not relying on occurrent information, and this dirninishes the strength of the 
justification. In attempting to convince actual people that they have reason to adopt some 
set of moral dictates, we ought to find reasons that actual people find compelling. 
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Lastiy, we observe that people's preferences have changed over tirne. Acceptable 
behavior means diffèrent things now than it has meant before. The western acceptance of 
the rough equality of people's worth today stands in sharp contrast with the feudal orders 
of several hundred years ago. Women's rights have come a long way over the last 
century in some quarters of the world- Religious tolerance is also on the rise in some 
quarters, while some areas are backsliding into a more extreme religious intolerance. In 
short, people change, and reliance upon general patterns of behavior may be ill-advised 
given this observation. This is not to Say that this observation, nor any of the previous 
observations, is decisive for disrnissing an appeai to history. It is the combined force of 
al1 of these arguments that is decisive. Given history's incompleteness, inexactness, and 
questionable applicability to our enterprise, we feel that other approaches, more exacting 
and directly applicable to contemporary people, would be more fniitfully made use of. 
IV.iii Psvcholoeical & Economic Analvses 
And so we turn to two fields of investigation into contemporary human 
motivation: psychology and economics. We must first delineate the disciplines being 
examined. When we here discuss economics, we are not discussing the theoretical 
developments in the field of probability. Psychology is, in its turn, not to be thought to 
examine group market behavior in unguided circumstances and thereby derive 
hypotheses regarding hurnan motivations. While economics is rightly understood to 
include probability theory, and psychology may be properly concemed with the 
examination of market behavior, we are not concemed with these aspects of the fields. 
We will take economics to be an examination of natural market behaviors, contrasted 
161 
with the political economics of Wicksteed discussed in chapter 2. Psychology will be 
understood as the examination of people's behaviors in controlled circurnstances; these 
circurnstances may include verbal responses to direct questions, but are certainly not 
limited to such responses. It is these domains ofwhich we may make use. 
It is not our intention to here argue for any particular form that out investigation 
ought to take. As we have mentioned before, it is not for the philosopher to compete with 
the economist, or the psychologist. It is only our intention to suggest why these domains 
are found acceptable while history has been found wanting. The results of economics 
and psychology are, of course, incomplete. Indeed, were al1 motivations of contemporary 
agents identified, the contractarian could foahwith produce an exhaustive calculation, 
and the discussions of chapters three through six of this project would have been entirely 
unnecessary. While this incompleteness is a necessary feature of history, however, it is 
not a necessary feature of psychology or economics. This is not to suggest that we think 
it reasonable to foresee a complete description of motivation for each person fiom either 
economics or psychology any time soon. Certainly we are not even optimistic about the 
completion of either enterprise in the near future. The point being made is one of degree 
of completeness. We have described history as being necessarily, and radically, 
incomplete. We may never know why Alexander the Great visited Siwah, nor what the 
priests there revealed to him, or how those revelations guided his future behavior. 
However there is still some hope that we will gain insight into how much pressure people 
feel in PC environrnents, and how this affects their actions in such environments. Neither 
psychology nor economics are necessarily incomplete, nor need they fail to capture most 
of what they profess. 
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Both psychology and econornics also have some claim to rigor that is lacking in 
history. This again is not to assert that psychological or economic explanations are 
incapable of error. Both disciplines are clearly works in progress, and evolving in 
response to glitches made clear through experiment or repeated observation. They are, 
however imperfect, still more ngorous than history. And this hope of further 
development rnakes either discipline supenor to an histoncal examination. It is through 
these more rigorous processes that we may eventually hope to discover what primary 
motivations we actually have. 
Lastly, economics and psychology both more directiy pertain to existing people. 
History, by definition, applies most directly to the past. Economics and psychology more 
immediately focus upon the present. One cannot nui a double-blind experiment except in 
the present. It is true that neither discipline can entirely disregard history. A group of 
conclusions regarding what motivates the people of Northem Ontario will likely take as 
data several sample behaviors gathered over tirne. Psychological data is also cumulative; 
building on what has been concluded in the past, we construct experiments designed to 
m e r  this knowledge. In neither case, however, need these disciplines focus on the 
ps t .  Using past experiences, either discipline can attempt to provide us with 
information about the present; it is this information of which we have need. 
V, What Has Been Imored. 
V.i Stabiliîv 
As has been occasionally alluded to in this project, we have not been concemed 
with the stability of a contractarian justification over t h e .  This is not to Say that we do 
not h d  the issue of stability conceming. We are in full agreement with those who 
suggest that the stability of a particular proposal is an important issue to address. We do 
not, however, think that neglecting this issue is a grave failing of our project. The nature 
of our enterprise required setting aside this issue. Any satisfactory argument regarding 
how to produce a resulting moral code that would be maximally stable over time would 
end up obscuring the logic of our arguments for a maximally compelling justification. A 
justification of a moral theory that makes good use of person A's set P of preferences is 
going to be less compelling than one that makes good use of person A's set (P + N) of 
preferences.173 Arguments that depend on this line of reasoning will tend to view a 
person as having a set of preferences ut a purticular time, and will not consider the 
preferences that this sarne person may have in the fùture, or has had in the past. 
Justifications are presented to a person at time T,, and the preferences that are going to be 
made use of when constnicting a justification at time T,, are exactly those that the person 
has at tirne T,. This can include some preference that her preferences that she is likely to 
have at T,+, are be given some consideration, but certainly need net do so. 
Justifications that rely on stability, however, do not rely on such a conception of 
each person. Given a set of preferences P, it is not the case that relying on set (P + N) 
will generdly result in a more stable set of moral dictates. It may even be the case that 
relying on set (P-M) wodd produce a more stable justification than relying on set P. 
Imagine the case where included in set M were very strong preferences that an agent had 
that striking a teenager was completely acceptable, due to the fact that at time Tn-, the 
sampled agent had just had a particularly unsat ismg row with her child on the issue of 
17s Ignoring for the moment the unusual cases where the person would prefer to not have their N preference 
included in the calculation. 
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showing basic respect for others. Such desires, while no doubt strong at the tirne, are 
famously fleeting (to the benefit of teenagers everywhere.) The agent sarnpled may, at 
most times, strongly prefer that teenager-abuse was not acceptable. Excluding set M 
would then produce a justification that is more stable over time than including set M. It 
would not, however, result in a more compelling justification at tirne T,. 
Those interested in providing stable justifications are going to be primarily 
interested in fmding those preferences most consistently held over some specified amount 
of time. This can be specified as over the course of a pzrson's adult life, or over peoples' 
entire lives, or even go so far as attempt to fmd preferences held over al1 recorded history. 
They need not attempt to find arnong those stable preferences the most strongly held, 
although of course they might. Compelling justifications, altemately, must uncover the 
most strongly held preferences that an agent has at a particular t h e .  The aims of the two 
projects necessarily conflict. This is not to suggest that a complete contractarian proposa1 
will be the result of either effort, but to suggest that the two projects should be attempted 
separately, and then we should see in what way they could be joined. 
V.ii Limitine the Examined Population 
Finding it impossible to continue with a justification that completely includes 
peoples' preferences, we decided to examine what would need to be accomplished by 
proceeding with an account that relied upon less than the complete inclusion of peoples' 
preferences. This strategy was not our only recourse. We could have attempted instead 
to produce a complete account of a smaller population. There is good reason to expect 
that the examination of a smaller population would more easily produce a complete list of 
preferences. Not least among these reasons is the sheer size of the project. The fewer 
people one needs to examine, the less tirne it wilr take. Whether geographical location or 
conceptiral criteria, (for example, al1 agents that prefer to engage in market activities) 
delineate the smaller population, one rnight also expect to encounter less deviation of 
preference from person to person. 
Whether or not this laçt expectation could be born out, it is questionable whether 
or not it would result in any less effort spent on compiling the preferences of a givsn 
population. It is arguable that it wodd take just as much energy to identie and record 
two sets of preferences that happened to be identical in content as it would to identifi and 
record two sets that diverge. This aside, we are skeptical regarding the prospects for 
success of any project that attempts to exhaustively enurnerate any number of peoples' 
preferences, given the current state of the fields to be relied upon (economics and 
psychology.) Given that this is so, our results will be as applicable to these more specific 
populations. In fact, we have made no effort to exhaustively describe to whom, exactly, 
morality is to apply. This is not to Say that we have not implicitly endorsed some 
conditions that these agents must meet in order to fa11 under the scope of morality. They 
must be agents, be capable of deliberative activity and of rational planning. They must 
also be capable of changing their set of preferences. But these conditions are not 
necessarily considered sufficient. If we have not come to a precise understanding of who 
is to be included in the set of moral agents, then it wodd be prernature to attempt to 
define a M e r  sub-set of this population. 
VI. Conclusion 
Finding the current stalling of ethical debate regarding practical matters 
unacceptable, we deny the usefulness of relying on moral intuitions in debates about the 
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proper course of action. The oniy alternative is to rise above this useless yammering, and 
renew our efforts to justiQ a particular set of moral dictates. As a justification rnust 
provide reasons for the effective adoption of a particular moral code over its contenders, 
we must base our justifactory efforts in that which motivates people to action. Finding 
economic concerns to be significant motivators, we base our justification on economic 
concerns. We have some reason to suppose that the result will be a recognizably moral 
theory because of our assumption that our common understanding of morality arose 
through human interaction - insofar as humans are rational, the results of hurnan 
interaction are supposed to be so as well. 
Danielson and others have convincingly argued that traditional rational choice 
theory is incapable of providing a justification of morality that would be a recognized 
constraint on otherwise straightforward maxirnizing behavior. We must therefore either 
reject traditional rational choice theory, or reject the intuition that morality must involve 
constraint. Finding the intuition insufficiently grounded, and providing some explanation 
regarding how it May have been mistakenly acquired, we choose to reject it, and embrace 
instead traditional rational choice theory in our efforts to provide a rational basis on 
which to justiQ a moral theory. 
Justimng a particular moral theory is effectively also endorsing a particular 
pattern of behaviors as desirabIe. Basing such an endorsement on individual preferences 
is attempting t ~ ,  derive social choice fiom individual choice. We examined two different 
ways in which to attempt such a derivation: bargaining theoretic or amalgarnative efforts. 
Bargaining theory cannot produce a rational account of an agent's expected worth to 
others. Any attempts to stipulate expected worth deviated fiom the nature of the 
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proposed justification; the worth of agents must be derived solely fiom what it is that 
they can offer other agents - agents do not care about bargains reached on any other 
basis. And so we turned to an amaigamative justification, which has no such problem. 
Amalgamative contractarianisrn is computationally trivial, but nevertheless cannot 
yet produce a justification because the necessary inputs are lacking. We do not have 
access to each agent's preferences- To proceed with a partial list of preferences, which 
we may more easiiy acquire, we would have to identiSl preferences that are of paramount 
import, and we wouid have to identi& such preferences for each agent to whom morality 
is to apply. Such preferences are most reliably acquired through an investigation of 
contemporary psychological and economic results. Without a thorough examination of 
these fields, nothing can be said regarding the chances of success of such an enterprise. 
Without this knowledge, no justification can proceed, but we at least now have a focus 
for such an investigation. We know what we have to discover for any investigation of 
these fields to be considered a success. 
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